Curriculum Vitae

I am a post-doc in Legal and Social Philosophy at the University of Salzburg and in Moral Philosophy at the University of Graz; I am also a fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research at the University of Bielefeld. My main research interest is in empirically informed ethics (e.g., implications of experimental psychology for theories of moral justification), but also in moral psychology and experimental philosophy more generally. Moreover, I also work in political philosophy, applied ethics and legal philosophy, especially on issues concerning populism and democratic theory (fake news, post-truth thinking etc.).

Before moving to Austria, I studied philosophy and law at the University of Hamburg and did my PhD on methods in applied ethics. I had fabulous research stays at Georgetown University, Oxford University and Yale University. Moreover, I am a co-founder of the German-language philosophy blog

Selected Publications

  • „The Confluence of Philosophy and Law in Applied Ethics” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016)

Edited Volumes and Special Issues
  • „Populism – Perspectives from Legal Philosophy“, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (ARSP) Beiheft (with Stephan Kirste, in preparation)

  • „Empirische Ethik”, Suhrkamp (with Christoph Bublitz, forthcoming)

  • Special Issue of Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie (2019): “Demokratie in der Krise – rechts- und  sozialphilosophische Aspekte” (with Stephan Kirste), 107-260

  • Special Issue of Neuroethics (2017) „Political and Human Rights Implications of Moral Enhancement” (with Christoph Bublitz)

  • „The Unreliable Intuitions Objection against Reflective Equilibrium”, The Journal of Ethics (online first), DOI 10.1007/s10892-020-09322-6

  • „Romantisierte Intuitionen? Die Kritik der experimentellen Philosophie am Überlegungsgleichgewicht“, N. Paulo & C. Bublitz (eds.), Empirische Ethik, Suhrkamp (forthcoming)

  • „Empirische Ethik: Hintergründe, Einwände, Potentiale“ (mit Christoph Bublitz), N. Paulo & C. Bublitz (eds.), Empirische Ethik, Suhrkamp (forthcoming)

  • „Moral Intuitions between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful Thinking”, M. Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, Routledge (forthcoming)

  • „A Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism for Decision Procedures in Ethics”, M. Bauer & M. Meyerhuber (eds.), Empirical research and normative theory: Transdisciplinary perspectives on two methodical traditions between separation and interdependence, DeGruyter (forthcoming), DOI 10.1515/9783110613797-010

  • „Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (online first), DOI  10.1007/s10677-019-10037-3

  • „In Search of Greene’s Argument”, Utilitas (2019), 38-58, DOI 10.1017/S0953820818000171

  • „Die Rationalität postfaktischen Denkens”, Behemoth (2018), 55-73

  • „Moral Epistemic Enhancement“, M. Hauskeller & L. Coyne (eds.), Moral  Enhancement: Critical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press (2018), 165-188, DOI 10.1017/S1358246118000346

  • „How (not) to argue for Moral Enhancement” (with Christoph Bublitz), Topoi (2017), DOI 10.1007/s11245-017-9492-6

  • „Law, Reason, and Emotion? The Challenge from Empirical Ethics”, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (ARSP) (2017), 239-258

  • „Liberal Perspectives on Moral Enhancement”, Ethics & Politics XVIII (2016), 397-406

  • „Pow(d)er to the people! Voter manipulation, legitimacy, and the relevance of moral psychology for democratic theory” (with Christoph Bublitz), Neuroethics (2016), 55-71

  • „Mehr Citoyens! Über die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit: Wie viele Flüchtlinge können wir aufnehmen?“, in T. Grundmann & A. Stephan (eds.), „Welche und wie viele Flüchtlinge sollen wir aufnehmen?“ Philosophische Essays, Reclam 2016, 120-132

  • „Vom Nutzen der Rechtstheorie für die angewandte Ethik: Spezifizierung, Abwägung und Kasuistik in der Bioethik”, in: S. Kirste (ed.), Interdisziplinarität in den Rechtswissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot 2016, 253-269

  • „Specifying Specification”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 26 (2016), 1-28

  • „Casuistry as Common Law Morality”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 36 (2015), 373-389

  • „The Bite of Rights in Paternalism”, in: T. Schramme (ed.), Paternalism and Health Care: New Perspectives, Springer 2015, 127-141

  • „Taking Dworkin Seriously. Zur Ethikkonzeption in Dworkins Spätwerk”, Rechtsphilosophie – Zeitschrift für Grundlagen des Rechts 2015, 117-136