

## Graduates (MA Philosophy)

Year 2020

Name /date of graduation /Supervisor	Title /abstract of thesis
Walter Rachbauer  September 11, 2020 Alexander Hieke	<p>A socio-philosophical investigation into the use of figurative speech in general, and analogies and metaphors in particular</p> <p>Using figurative speech in general, and analogies and metaphors in particular, is a socio-cultural phenomenon that is widespread and an integral part of any communication. It dominates our way of thinking (Lakoff) and consequently our application of language (Wittgenstein). Societal conflicts as well as their solutions often take place within metaphorical linguistic frames. Any unreflective practice bears the risk of delusion and manipulation. On the other hand the creative force of analogical reasoning and figurative speech cannot be disavowed. By presenting three practice-oriented examples, the potentially fallacious character of figurative speech will be unveiled, and therapeutic proposals be made in order to avoid the dangers of manipulative speech-acts (Searle, Austin) in a socio-philosophical context in human life. The thesis ends with normative issues on an ethical approach to figurative speech for all kinds of opinion leaders in science, economics and politics.</p>
Philipp Mayr  September 15, 2020 Christopher Gauker	<p>Epistemic Contradictions</p> <p>Epistemic contradictions are sentences like 'It is raining and it might not be rain- ing' whose oddness to the common ear demands some explanation. Yet providing such an explanation in a sufficiently precise and general manner has proven to be a fairly controversial enterprise as it seems to entail answers to some notoriously controversial foundational problems of philosophy like the question what the right concept of logical validity amounts to. Since this problem has generated quite a bit of literature, the first aim of this thesis is to survey, categorize and evaluate the different kinds of solutions proposed. Secondly, it aims to provide a new solution which is intended to fill a gap in the literature. It will be contended that all existing solutions up to this point face problems that have not yet been overcome and that the new solution might be a way to account for these problems. In particular, it will be suggested that epistemic contradictions should be treated as semantically consistent albeit epistemically defective sentences.</p>
Adrian Moruz  September 28, 2020 Johannes Brandl	<p>An account of aesthetic experiences: A game one plays alone?</p> <p>My aim in this thesis is to isolate aesthetic experiences from other types of experiences. This naturally requires that, once proven different from other types of experiences, I will expand on what is a valid aesthetic experience and what factors in our ability to instantiate or derive one. I shall propose that fundamentally we need imagination and a willingness to set ourselves into a special state of mind - the aesthetic state of mind - to entertain objects aesthetically. To entertain an object aesthetically is to take pleasure in its beauty.</p> <p>This account proposes that experiencing beauty in an object is the same, regardless of that object's status as art or non-art, and therefore the domain of valid aesthetic experiences is larger than art tokens. What brings validity to our entertaining of an object as beautiful is for each beholder to decide, which makes us the architects of our own 'aesthetic spheres'.</p> <p>Central to this account is separating aesthetic experiences into two parts which are dependent on each other. One is aesthetic feeling and the other is aesthetic understanding. This separation allows us to avoid any strong commitment to notions of validity through 'pertinent' artistic judgement or commit to notions of validity through taste for high art.</p> <p>I shall propose the following analogy: having an aesthetic experience and</p>

	<p>seeking beauty in things is best compared to a game one plays alone. On one hand the primary mental operators in aesthetic feeling - attention, emotions and imagination - show us that our aesthetic experiences cannot be fully shared. On the other hand, we build our own aesthetic spheres and set the rules for our own games of aesthetic pleasure based on our interactions with the world and our interactions with others. I will defend the game one plays alone definition by pointing out that even as we can only instantiate the experiences alone - we do not aim to actively exclude others. We pursue, create, preserve and share beauty as a tribute to and in expectation of others.</p>
Angelica Eissing Patenova  September 30, 2020 Alexander Hieke	<p><b>JUSTICE WITH UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME.</b> Why a Universal Basic Income Provides the Basis for an Ideal Society</p> <p>I argue for the claim that a universal basic income (UBI) provides the basis for an ideal society, i.e. one that provides the greatest justice possible. By first analyzing four key approaches in political philosophy – utilitarian, libertarian, meritocratic and egalitarian distributive principles – it will turn out that the latter are best suited for establishing an ideal society. In particular, John Rawls' egalitarian principles of justice guarantee for all members of a society equal liberty rights and additionally claim rights, which can compensate for the inequalities resulting from the destiny of birth. Then, I will show why a UBI can realise Rawls' distributive principles particularly well and why therefore, a UBI provides the basis for an ideal society. In the last part, different funding sources for a UBI will be assessed philosophically. A (negative) income tax system and a consumption tax system are analyzed along the three criteria of fairness, simplicity and efficiency. Finally, a mixed model is discussed, which seems to be the most promising strategy for funding a UBI. However, since a (negative) income tax is not an optimal solution, a mixed funding model should rather contain a consumption tax and further tax sources.</p>
Leonie Eichhorn  November 16, 2020 Christopher Gauker	<p>Past Perspective Modality: The Meanings 'Might Have' Might Have</p> <p>Condoravdi (2002) argues that, considering only non-root modals, sentences containing modals for the past, such as 'might have,' are ambiguous between an epistemic reading, associated with epistemic modality, and a counterfactual reading, associated with metaphysical modality. On the counterfactual reading the perfect is said to scope over the modal, thereby shifting the modal's temporal perspective to the past. My first argument is to the effect that modals that scope under the perfect can be epistemic as well. I defend this claim mainly by means of examples and responses to objections raised by Hacquard (2010, 2011). My second contention is that counterfactual modals that allegedly express metaphysical modality should rather be analyzed as dynamic modals. With the aim of avoiding the problems that Condoravdi's branching future analysis and Abusch' (2012) circumstantial analysis face, I offer, following Vetter (2015), an account that views modal sentences as ascriptions of potentialities. On my account, a subject has a potentiality or a compulsion in a context, just in case certain necessary conditions selected by the context are fulfilled. Finally, since epistemic as well as dynamic past perspective modals convey counterfactuality, and since Condoravdi's explanation of the counterfactual implicature does not carry over to these kinds of modality, I suggest, following Iatridou (2000), that the counterfactuality arises because of the morphological features that are present in these cases. For this, I consider past perspective modals in English, German, and French.<sup>[15]</sup></p>
Raymond Ioratim-Uba  December 4, 2020 Charlotte Werndl	<p>From Symmetry, to Structure. Symmetry and Invariance as Structural Constraints on Reality.</p> <p>A law, or physical state, is symmetric, if it does not differ, under transformation. In such a scenario, it can be said, that the law or state is invariant/symmetric. The laws of physics are invariant with respect to space translations and consequently, universally objective. Symmetry as invariance</p>

	<p>explains the apparent objectivity of the laws of physics and underlies objective physical reality. The world, exhibits underlying mathematical structure. This is the view maintained by structural realism. Invariant properties and symmetry principles cohere within a mathematical structure. As such, there is need for an account of how, the objective physical world reduces to mathematical structure and/or vice versa.</p> <p>Symmetry and invariance play a fundamental part in shaping reality. In the Standard Model, invariance and symmetry principles determine interactions. For instance, with electromagnetism, symmetry dictates the interaction between photons and other charged particles, such as electrons. Spacetime invariance and symmetries, also influence particle interaction. Symmetry underlies and defines particle structure and interaction, thereby acting as a constraint on the 'objective' physical world. Invariant properties and symmetry principles, constrain the structure of the objective physical world, and define the nature of microscopic and macroscopic entities. Symmetries and invariance are of great pragmatic, normative and epistemic importance.</p> <p>Symmetry is more fundamental than particles and the emergent features of the macroscopic world. Invariance and symmetry principles, constrain ontological structure. Some physicists, think, that the search for forces and particles is inherently, a search for symmetries.</p> <p>While we can subsume entities, invariant properties and symmetry principles into an underlying structure, much still remains to be accounted for, in terms of the relationship between structural and non-structural aspects of knowledge and how structures explicitly explain the objective physical world. There is also need, to upgrade our understanding of entities/objects and structure(s), in line with our most successful scientific theories. This is in relation to the question of whether, at the fundamental level, individual identities really exist, as highlighted by the Einstein-Bose statistics and other phenomena in quantum mechanics.</p>
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