Main Right Party Responses to Radical Populist and Extremist Party Positioning in Central Europe.

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Abstract:

Drawing on data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and case profiles, the paper traces the interaction between main right parties and (radical) right party competitors, to determine, whether the former adopt dismissive, accommodationist-convergent, accommodationist-cooperative, or, adversarial responses. Assuming that main right parties are forced to respond strategically to right party competitors, we examine in this the role of the dominant cleavage structure (socioeconomic or socio-cultural), the initial position of the main right party, the cost/pressure associated with changing a long-established position, the issue dimension involved (economic vs. exclusivist), and decision of cooperating with parties with more complementary or more compatible positions. Drawing on the literature, we argue that regime legacies and the role of the EU accession process on party realignment have structured party competition such that contestation occurs primarily over socioeconomic or socio-cultural issues. In the latter case, we expect main right parties to move to the right either to converge on positions of a far-right competitor or to prevent challenges from the right. If contestation is centered on the economic issue dimension, we assume main right parties be more constrained in their ability to accommodate right party competitors and rather engage in cooperation to form a right or center-right bloc to compete with a center-left bloc. With respect to European integration, which we consider containing both socio-cultural and socioeconomic aspects, the behavior of right main parties and far right parties tends to diverge. While we are extremely cautious in interpreting our findings, we find some support for our assumptions.

This paper represents very early steps in the process of understanding the relationship between radical right parties and the major conservative parties in Eastern Central Europe (ECE). We seek to determine through position tracing the pattern of interaction between main right parties and right party competitors. Specifically, we are interested in whether conservative parties adopt dismissive, accommodationist-convergent, accommodationist-cooperative, or adversarial strategies. At this first step we want to primarily identify the patterns of position taking in key areas of party competition. Moreover, we wish to ascertain the salience that parties ascribe to that position and trace the observed changes in both position and salience, and suggest preliminary explanations. While several dimensions of mutual political influence are relevant, we will focus especially on the European integration as we assume this to be an important area of contestation. We also examine other well-established issue areas of right party contestation such as immigration policy, minority rights, and multiculturalism. Our work will also incorporate the party stance on the economy and the positioning along the left-right spectrum, although the application of the latter two criteria is not without problems in the context of post-communist political systems. The analysis is centered on five Central European countries, the so-called Višegrad group consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia along with neighboring Austria as a comparison case.

In order to measure the positions adopted by parties, we rely on the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) 2002, 2006, and 2010[1] as well as on detailed case analyses. In terms of the paper's structure, it will first present the theoretical argument and then introduce brief case histories of the party system and party competition for each of the five cases. In the subsequent segment, the analysis will be grouped by issue dimension to allow for cross-country comparisons within areas of contestation. The final part will provide a country-by-country account of main right party position taking vis-à-vis right party competitors. The availability of CHES-data narrows the timeframe of our analysis to the years 2002 to 2010 and in some issue dimensions only to the years 2006 to 2010. However, by drawing on individual case analyses, we will also try to extend our conclusions further into the present.

Research Question and Theoretical Considerations

When surveying the theoretical discussion about the relationship between rightwing populist parties and conservatives in West European context, rightwing populists have been described as the *"ugly sisters"* of their conservative siblings, enabling the latter to form center-right governments (Bale 2003). Well-known cases have been Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, to some extent Italy and, more recently, Norway. In these instances, conservative parties were either directly in coalitions with RWP or supported by them in the legislature. This suggests an additional strategic avenue for main right parties when faced with a far-right party competitor than has been laid out in Meguid's (2005) well-known strategic triad in the sense that parties can opt for dismissive, accommodationist, or adversarial courses of action. Accommodationist was taken to mean convergence in terms of position. However, the aforementioned cases point to a different form of accommodating a competitor, namely by forming an alliance and thus orchestrate a center-right bloc intended to compete with a center-left or center-liberal party coalition. Müller and Fallend (2004) have analyzed the formation of such a system of two-bloc

competition in Austria following the electoral triumph of the Freedom Party in 1999. Whereas Meguid (2005) and others (i.e., de Vries and Hobolt 2012, Pirro 2014) were primarily concerned with explaining the successes of new and rightwing populist as well as extremist parties respectively, our focus lies on the behavior of main conservative and right parties in order to examine to what extent they choose dismissive, adversarial, or accommodationist strategies. In case of accommodation, we are interested in whether this took the form primarily of convergence or cooperation and in the conditions in which this occurred. As there are numerous reasons for why parties engage in cooperation—chiefly to secure a minimum winning coalition—, our interest centers first on the degree of a main right party's convergence with a right party competitor. However, even if coalition building is a requirement in the typically fragmented party systems in ECE, numerical necessity and ideological compatibility do not tell the full story. First this is because there are different political cleavages that structure party competition. Secondly, this is because broad ideological categories of left and right are not readily applicable as the party systems in post-transition societies offer a conflicting array of parties that are labeled "right" but offer starkly different policy choices ranging from neoliberalism to ultra-nationalism, Catholic-traditionalism to civic pragmatism, quasi leftist anti-market populism to entrepreneurial populism, sweeping Euroscepticism to mainstream liberalism. What is important for us is to ascertain which choices of cooperation are made by main right parties given the range of options. Moreover, we want to understand the circumstances under which these choices are made. Alternatively, there are numerous examples especially in Western Europe of niche parties that are purposefully shunned. Van Spanje (2010) has particularly examined the conditions of why some parties are ostracized. We are curious to see whether such forms exist also in ECE party system.

In Western Europe where main right parties—typically conservative mainstream and Christian-democratic parties—with their stake in the national business community have to balance pro-market, pro-European, and cosmopolitan positions with more traditionalist sentiments, there are limits to which such parties can adopt radical exclusivist, nativist, and parochial positions (e.g., Downs 1957, Müller and Støm 1999). Convergence on more extremist positions would exact a price in the form of defections by centrist voters and/or reduce support among the key clientele such as business groups. Thus, we would arguably expect to see more of a division of labor in that conservatives try to accommodate rightwing populist competitors by cooperating and leaving the more extremist agenda and the more radical elements of the electorate to the populists. Under such circumstances, a pattern of accommodation by either cooperation or by partial convergence and cooperation is plausible. We wonder to what extent this would apply also to post-communist polities. This is because in ECE conservative parties appear less attached to cosmopolitan and pro-market positions and can thus move more freely to the right to compete more directly with RWP on their own ideological turf. We base our expectation on the well-known argument put forth by Kitschelt et al. (1999) that differentiates between different communist regime legacies, of which certain types increase the propensity for the emergence of socio-cultural cleavages, which are especially relevant in right party contestation. We also base our argument on shifts and realignments in ECE party systems that have occurred as a result of the EU accession process. Specifically, it is important to understand that European integration was initially a valence issue in all pre-accession countries. Thus, it was supported by all mainstream parties across the political spectrum. As such, it was no longer a means for bourgeois/right parties to differentiate themselves from leftist and

reform-communist parties. Thus, a pro-European stance was no longer a necessary and distinctive characteristic to identify a party as reformist and as having no connection to previous regime. When disillusionment with accession set in, main right parties were arguably better positioned to champion nationalist and traditionalist causes to take more eurosceptical positions. Therefore, we would expect them to engage far right competitors by accommodation through convergence. Both the role of regime legacies and the effect of the accession process on ECE party systems will be explored more fully in the subsequent section.

Empirical Expectations

In our analysis, we treat parties as unitary actors that respond rationally to political competitors. With the emergence of radical rightwing and populist parties, conservative mainstream parties must react to the growing competition. However, the nature of the dominant socioeconomic cleavage structure makes it difficult for conservative parties to accommodate radical populist positions by adopting radical illiberal, anti-systemic, and exclusivist positions beyond certain limits. A dismissive approach, which would imply adopting a cordon sanitaire position or, at the very least, a refusal to react to a competitor, is a risky strategy as Meguid (2005) has shown. This is because dismissive strategies tend to benefit radical rightwing populists while extracting a high toll in terms of electoral support on the right. A better strategy for a main right party would be to engineer a center-right bloc that creates an electoral alliance and thus brings a significantly large portion of the electorate to support such a government. Accommodation by cooperation does not necessarily require convergent positions but rather an agreement on a common opponent and on a common opposition to an alternative agenda—as Meguid (2005: 350) put it *"the enemy of my enemy is my friend."*

When socio-cultural cleavages dominate, as they do in parts in East Central Europe, we would expect conservative parties to pursue accommodationist strategies by converging on illiberal, anti-systemic, exclusivist, and anti-European positions. This stands in some contrast to the strategies of the center-left, which we would assume to pursue adversarial strategies designed to challenge radical right parties by offering stark alternatives. We would expect cooperation to be the preferred response whenever the cost of abandoning a long established position is greater than the expected benefit. We would also expect that any accommodation, either through convergence or closer cooperation, be dependent on the prevailing cleavage structure. If the dominant area of party competition in which the main right party engages is socioeconomic, they would find it difficult to veer to the right and pursue convergence with radical right party competitors. Conversely, if contestation is primarily socio-cultural such convergent strategies are more likely. Moreover, main right parties pursuing bloc-formation though cooperation may do so both to the right and to the left. In short, a main right party that is positioned already relatively further to the right may seek cooperation with a more moderate right party competitor positioned near the center to cover a broader range of the center-right spectrum.

Conceptualization and Case Profiles

In the following we have selected the four most advanced and most fully developed ECE party systems along with Austria as a Central European comparison case that shares many similarities (size, geographic location, socio-cultural background, economic interdependence) and historical connections with the remaining ECE countries and which developed a rather formidable rightwing populist party. What separates Austria from the Višegrad countries is the latter's communist legacy.

Before delving further in this argument, we want to stress that we are quite aware that the concept of regime legacies has been overused, may be too deterministic, and has proved *"rather slippery"* (Minkenberg 2010: 16). However, in our case, we do not employ it to explain the origin of specific parties but rather draw on it to delineate the emergence of broad cleavage structures, which shape the political contestation. We also take lessons from the EU accession literature on Central and Eastern Europe to explain party realignments and positional changes. It is also understood that there is a large literature dedicated to conceptualizing the various rightwing, populist, nationalist, and extremist parties, and to matching them to specific conditions of origin—for a general overview see Mudde (2009). This is even a more controversial and problematic issue in the context of the highly fragmented party systems in Central and Eastern Europe—for a detailed analysis see Minkenberg (2010). However, this paper cannot engage in such conceptualizations in any detail for it is broadly comparative in orientation and makes no claims with respect to these parties' ideological purpose but rather about their observable positions on select issue domains. We also use the term 'main right party' as a broad signifier of a formation positioned to the right of the political center, which may encompass a range from centrist to rather far right. Hence we avoid the term 'mainstream' but rather use as our determinant criteria a party's electoral performance and inclusion in government over time to identify it as a 'main' right party. We also prefer right competitor party to right challenger party so as not to over-interpret dyadic party relationships.

Famously, Kitschelt et al. (1999) distinguished *bureaucratic-authoritarian Communism* (advanced and secular societies under an efficiently repressive regime), *patrimonial Communism* (a regime imposed on a backward society utilizing a mixture of cooption and repression), and *national-accommodative Communism* (a regime imposed from without but with some roots in a domestic revolutionary labor movement). The legacy of bureaucratic-authoritarian Communism in advanced and secular societies initially rendered nationalist-cosmopolitan divisions less relevant. Thus, the party system formed principally around the economic dimension and party competition followed the socioeconomic cleavage. In such an environment, political entrepreneurs tended to offer clearly distinguishable programmatic choices to voters that nonetheless appealed to a rather homogenous population (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 70). In short, we would expect competition along the left-right divide based primarily on social and economic issues.

In countries associated with other Communist regime legacies, sociocultural fault lines became more prominent. These regime legacies were expected to bring forth political parties, typically of the protest variety, for which questions of ethnicity, national identity, and authoritarian dispositions were central. In these countries, political transitions and economic reforms were often incomplete and intransparent

processes, creating overnight a new class of wealthy transition winners. On one hand, this fueled a popular backlash against a seemingly corrupt new establishment. On the other, the new wealth created a group of political entrepreneurs who could afford to launch new parties to take on the establishment—as we can observe in Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and most recently the Czech Republic abound. In both these regime legacies, the opportunity structures for the formation of radical right parties were rather favorable. Moreover, national accommodative and patrimonial Communist regime legacies had largely failed to resolve existing socio-cultural and ethnic divisions that created new cleavages after the regime transition such as between the urban/modern and rural/traditional electorates as well as between the ethnic majority and minority populations. As a consequence, multiple cleavages emerged around which parties could compete such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, but also Bulgaria and other Balkan countries.

Nonetheless, the initial pattern of party competition that emerged was one in which (the anti-communist) bourgeois and conservative parties adopted a pro-market agenda and reform positions whereas leftist-parties and reform communist were expected to act as the champions of transition losers, seeking to adopt a reform-sceptical position. This also meant that initially all mainstream parties along with a vast majority of the ECE electorates supported EU accession and adopted dismissive or adversarial strategies against more radical competitors. This is because the main competition was to be between the reformist center-right and less-reform-willing left. However, in the course of the accession negotiations between 1998 and 2004, the question of "Europe" moved from being a diffuse one to be a concrete issue. As such, political actors had to adopt positions vis-à-vis the specific requirements in the accession process because the European Commission reviewed candidate countries regularly on their progress. The greater the cost and the higher the conditionality imposed by Brussels, the greater was the potential for political opponents of the government to exploit the accession process (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007). Moreover, completely autonomous national decision-making, a new experience in most of ECE, appeared once again to be in jeopardy once countries had opted for membership (Vachudova 2008: 870). Opposition parties, in particular, took aim at the "weakness" of the government in defending national interests (Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 29).

The accession process had a profound effect on party competition with far-reaching consequences: Communist successor parties, which had been expected to be potential obstacles to pro-Western reforms and EU accession, became more moderate in their anti-market attitudes.[2] As a consequence, many of the ex-Communist parties transformed themselves into variants of Social Democracy and became increasingly liberal both socially but also in economic terms (Vachudova and Hooghe 2009: 190). In other words, the uncompromising stance by the old left seeking to limit the system's exposure to the West would have forced other political parties to adopt opposite positions to be competitive with largely pro-European electorates. However, as post-Communist parties moderated their views, newly established parties rushed in to fill the Eurosceptic, anti-reformist gap. Succinctly stated, the shift in position among leftist parties in ECE allowed for a host of new parties of different strips to establish themselves after the initial transition process was complete. Main right parties had to respond to this development in one way or another to remain competitive. Specifically, main right parties had to consider whether to compete on a socioeconomic agenda, pushing for greater market-liberalism, or

whether to compete on sociocultural grounds, claiming to defend sovereignty, national interest, and the established order.

In the following we will look in snapshot fashion at party competition in all of the cases in our sample:

The **Czech Republic** is arguably the clearest example of the bureaucratic-authoritarian communist legacy and has a long tradition of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. Its tradition of reformist anti-Catholicism and its preponderance for liberal ideas and individualism leave it with no significant ethnic cleavages or collectivist impulses. Hence, after the collapse of the communist regime, the dominant cleavage to emerge was socioeconomic, giving the country a clear advantage compared to other post-communist countries when it came to modernization (cf. World Bank 1999).[3] The so-called 'Czech miracle' was accompanied by a clear sense of national identity and a general consensus about the country's direction.

In party political terms, the disintegration of the anticommunist civic opposition, the Civic Forum in 1991 paved the way for the creation of a new mainstream party—the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). It formed around a staunchly anti-communist and market-liberal philosophy. Surprisingly, it also emerged as one of the few genuinely Eurosceptic parties in ECE because it subscribed to a form of free-market liberalism that is rare among conservative parties in continental Europe. The driving force behind the radicalization in the party's Euroscepticism was arguably the leadership of Vaclav Klaus and his political agenda (Hanley 2002).[4] Although the party never went as far as rejecting EU membership outright, it continuously nurtured Euroscepticism, culminating in a party program in 2002 that included a special chapter on the EU in which two thirds of the references made to European integration were negative (Hloušek and Pšjea 2009).

As a result, in its 1992-1996 tenure in government, the ODS brought the relations with Brussels occasionally to a standstill. However, the government party was weakened in 1996 elections and in 1998 the pro-European and market liberal Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) formed a minority government. It was supported by the ODS as a necessity to prevent the Communists and populist-nationalist Republicans[5] from influencing government formation. Klaus accused the government of selling out the country and continued the Eurosceptic course. After 2002 the ČSSD continued on in government by forging a coalition with the Christian-democrats (KDU-ČSL) and the Liberals (US-DEU). By doing so, this alliance brought together parties that, despite ideological differences, were all convergent on their support of EU-membership. The ODS returned to power only after EU accession process was completed (Kopecký 2004: 235-236).

Another Party opposing EU membership for ideological reasons was the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) but it moderated its Euroscepticism over time and eventually lost out to other emerging protest formations. Despite the history of socioeconomic competition between main right and left parties and thus the appearance of clear political choices in the most important issue dimension, the Czech electorate appears to perceive the dominant formations increasingly as cartel parties engaged in insider politics. There has been growing resentment of corruption, in-transparency, and a lack of change regardless of frequent changes of government (Saxonberg and Sirovatka, forthcoming). As a result new

protest parties of different stripes have appeared: The bourgeois Tradition-Responsibility-Prosperity 09 (TOP09) founded by former foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg is centrist. Thus, whereas KSČM's constituency was composed mainly of 'transition losers', TOP09 was attracting voters from the ODS's. Losing a part of their middle-class constituency, especially young, more liberal, and pro-European voters to TOP09 was a problem for the ODS. Another emergent anti-establishment formation was Public Affairs (VV), which entered the lower chamber in the 2010 elections. Other such groups were the Party of Free Citizens advocating a mix of eurosceptic and populist views as well as Sovereignty – Jana Bobošíková Bloc (Mareš 2011: 291-292). More recently two new parties, ANO 2011 and Dawn, appeared which further highlights the growing protest party dimension in the Czech Republic. However, for most of the past decade the situation for the ODS was one in which it had a rather defined position on key issues but which was out of step with the majority of its electorate.

Hungary is a clear case of national-accommodative communist legacy as evidenced by the socio-cultural issues that are at the forefront of the political debate. The long dominance of outside empires (Ottoman Empire, Austria, Soviet Union) and 'trauma of Tiranon' (Mayer 2010: 21-23) have created a fertile ground for nationalism and a nationalist political agenda in party politics. The political order established in Central Europe after the First and Second World War prevented large numbers of ethnic Hungarians from living within the borders of the Hungarian state, which in turn provided a major source of political mobilization based on identity politics (Mayer 2010). This nationalist cleavage does not only render other areas of political contestation—such as over socioeconomic policy—as less significant but also influences positions on European integration. Those in favor of a 'nation' of Hungarians are most likely to consider the integration into a supranational political community problematic while those defining nationhood in terms of a political community might have a more favorable view of integration.

The communist successor party *Hungarian Socialist Party* (MSZP) became a pro-Europe, technocratic 'instant mainstream party' (Innes 2001), managing to establish itself as the only relevant actor on the left (Ilonszki and Kurtán 1995: 359). In doing so, it reacted to the main right party Fidesz und its charismatic leader Victor Orbán, who along with his party underwent a most extraordinary transformation given that the group had begun as a rather liberal and youth-oriented formation in 1988. By the mid-2000s Fidesz had adopted an increasingly nationalist and conservative profile (cf. Ilonszki and Kurtán 1999; 2001; 2003).[6]

The party's principal ambition was to unite the country's fragmented political right by pursuing an anti-Communist and anti-establishment agenda that was nonetheless sufficiently pro-market and pro-European integration to be acceptable to the bulk of the electorate. However, Fidesz' pro-European profile was tinged by nationalist and eurosceptical positions in certain policy areas such as foreign land ownership. This was employed strategically in campaigns to attract both voters from the social-liberal government during the early accession negotiations and radical right voters.

Playing the 'national interest' card proved very successful for Fidesz, which eventually emerged as the main right party in Hungary (Batory 2008a; 2009; 2010). This stood in marked contrast to the fate of other right parties that had appeared in the transition process such as the Christian Democratic People's

Party (KDNP), the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP), and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)(Kitschelt 1992: 30-31).[7]

An emerging nationalist and exclusivist vacuum on the far-right was filled by the newly-formed extremist Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) in 1993. However, it failed to enter parliament in 1994. Although doing better in 1998, the eurosceptic MIÉP failed again in 2002 as a result of which it formed a strategic alliance with the even more extremist Jobbik-Movement for a better Hungary in 2006 (Barlei and Hartleb 2010: 95). The alliance was further strengthened by the inclusion of the nationalist-conservative Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party. At the time of the formation of this 'triple alliance', Fidesz pursued its own strategic cooperation by developing a curious relationship with the re-founded Christian Democratic People's Party (KNDP) (Batory 2008a). The latter has sometimes been described as a more radical extension of Fidesz. In fact in 2005 Fidesz and the KDNP signed an agreement for election cooperation, as a result of which the latter obtained seats in the Hungarian National Assembly. In the 2006, elections this alliance gained strength, winning 42.0% of the list votes and 164 of the 386 representatives in the Hungarian Parliament[8]. Subsequently KDNP formed its own parliamentary faction, the third largest in the National Assembly, but has continued to cooperate closely with the Fidesz.[9]

Overall, the strategy pursed by Orbán's party was highly successful in the 2010 parliamentary elections, when Fidesz won almost 53 percent of the votes. Owing to a constitutional change initiated by Fidesz, it was able to translate its electoral gains into a supermajority of 68 percent of seats. Its main competitor on the right is Jobbik, which won some 12 percent of the seats in 2010 and was thus just 5 percent shy of representation achieved by the main socialist opposition party MSZP. Generally speaking, Fidesz has been singularly successful in unifying the fragmented political right in Hungary, while severely weakening the left. Its main challenge appears to come from the right.

Poland is another country with a national-accommodative communist legacy but it also bears elements of the bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition and therefore constitutes a mixed type (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 36-37). Strong Catholicism, the influence of the agrarian sector, and extreme concerns about sovereignty posed considerable challenges in the process of EU accession negotiations. The socioeconomic and nationalist dimensions are highly intertwined as Poles feared cheap imports, the destruction of its agriculture, and the loss of self-determination following EU membership. It was also assumed that accession would represent a push toward greater liberalism and thus not only hurt the native economy but also undermine basic catholic values and national traditions (Wysocka 2009: 6-7).

Being by far the least competitive of the Višegrad group of countries, Poland's only option for transition governments was to engage in far-reaching economic and systemic reforms. The 'instant mainstream party' that emerged from the Solidarity movement approached transition in a technocratic manner to ensure that the country would succeed in EU accession. Later on the successor party of the communist Polish United workers party, the *Social Democracy of the Polish Republic* (SdRP) continued the reform efforts. Learning from the splintering of the left that followed Solidarity's collapse in 1991, the right

united as Solidarity Electoral Action AWS, a broad coalition of about 40 *"[…] right-wing/nationalist/religious groupings"* (Innes 2001: 13-14). In coalition with the Freedom Union, AWS pursued a rather radical market strategy but also moved towards more religiosity and nationalism (Innes 2001: 14). Negotiations between Poland and the EU proved difficult and proceeded only slowly.[10] As a result, support for EU membership fell from nearly 80 percent in 1994 to between 55 and 60 percent in the late 1990s. This opportunity was exploited by two new parties, Self-Defense (*Samoobrona*) and League of Polish Families (LPR) that emerged before the 2001 election. The LPR, a coalition of various Catholic-nationalist parties and right-wing groupings supported by Radio Maryja (Szczerbiak 2006: 94-95), opposed European integration due to the perception of the imminent *"[…] destruction of Polish conscience and culture*" (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 312). By contrast, the agrarian Self-Defense had a rather ambiguous approach to Europe by combining principal support for European integration with an extreme criticism of Poland's position in the accession negotiations and within the EU.

Law and Justice (PiS), founded in 2001, also adopted a critical stance toward the accession negotiations because the EU was to offer a 'second class membership' to Poland (Riishøj 2007: 521). Though not opposed to EU membership in general, PiS adopted a rather eurosceptical position for what appears to be mainly strategic as well as coalition-tactical reasons. Particularly in light of LPR's electoral success in 2001, it seems that PiS intended to position itself somewhere between a mildly pro-European and staunchly eurosceptical position so as to be able to send a signal in both directions. For the integration supporters, PiS was the lesser of the various evils while for anti-integration voters, PiS was still seen as a champion of national interests. From 2005-2007 the party of the Kazcyński twins, Law and Justice, governed in a coalition with the radical parties Self-Defense and the League of Polish Families. While the former mainly supported the necessity of defending national interests, Self-Defense appealed to those voters who saw themselves as the losers of the economic transition (Szczerbiak 2006: 94-95).

After 2007, the Kazcyński government was replaced by a new coalition. It consisted of the genuinely europhile Christian-democratic Civic Platform (PO), which had decisively beaten PiS in the elections, and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) (Gałązka and Waszak 2013: 201). Quickly, the new government embarked on a more pro-European course, vastly improving Poland's relationship with Brussels and the neighbor Germany.[11]

Overall, he party political landscape in Poland differs from that in other ECE countries and Austria in that the main rival is another party right of center, albeit one that has staked out a much more liberal and pro-European orientation. It is this situation to which PiS had to react to a situation in which contestation is centered on the traditionalism-exclusivsim/modernization-cosmopolitan divide.

Slovakia represents another mixed type in terms of communist legacy, reflecting both national-accommodative and patrimonial characteristics. Politics in the Slovak Republic was dominated after the transition by the center-periphery cleavage. After Slovakia's independence in 1993 the cleavage transformed into an ethnic one as conflicts arose between the Slovakian majority and the Hungarian

minority. Also the state-church cleavage grew in importance due to the still strong Catholic undercurrent present in society.

Already in the Czechoslovak Republic, the Slovakian part had a fairly independent party system (Rybář 2006: 149-150). The Slovak counterpart to the Czech Civic Forum was Public Against Violence (VPN), which in 1990 formed an alliance with the Christian-democrats (KDH) and the small center-right Democratic Party, headed by Vladimír Mečiar, who became prime minister. Their competitors, the former communists (Czechoslovak Communist Party, KSČ), the separatist Slovak National Party (SNS)[12], the Green Party (SZ), and a two-party alliance of parties representing the Hungarian minority, were less successful, forming the opposition (Rybář 2006: 150). When Public against Violence sought to replace Mečiar, he broke with VPN and in 1991 established a new political formation, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008: 533). In the 1992 elections the newly established HZDS won the majority of votes due to the successful activation of the center-periphery cleavage and playing the ethnic card against the Hungarian minority. HZDS portrayed itself as standing up for the interests of the Slovak 'periphery'.[13]

Another cleavage in the Slovak politics stemming from the country's communist legacy has been the authoritarian-democratic divide, which benefited the HZDS', or rather Mečiar's, rise. As a result, parties aligned themselves either on the pro- or anti-Mečiar sides (Rybář 2006: 158). As the party system showed little consolidation, parties were prone to fragmentation and defections, resulting in unorthodox alliances by bringing together ex-communists, nationalists, and Christian-conservatives. The rather fragmented nature of the party system meant that governments generally required multiparty coalitions. Although Mečiar remained the dominant political figure in the 1990s and managed to return again as prime minister, he was forced to cooperate with a very heterogeneous coalition including the radical right SNS and the radically leftist Alliance of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS). Following the 1998 elections, Mečiar could no longer muster enough allies or seats to form a government. Instead, a broad multi-party coalition was formed by Mikuláš Dzurinda.[14] Despite their very different ideological profiles, these parties were held together by their determination to break Mečiar's hold on Slovak politics and lead the country back to the road of democratization and integration into the NATO and the EU (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008: 537-538).

With the end of the Mečiar era, the socioeconomic cleavage moved to the foreground. In this context, two new parties, the liberal New Citizen Alliance (ANO) and social-democratic Smer (a breakaway formation from the SDL), ran successfully in the 2002 elections, criticizing the economic reforms of the Dzurinda government. The 2002 elections saw a realignment of the political system when, for the first time, the government was formed by parties located on the same side of the left-right spectrum. They included the SDKU[15], the Hungarian Coalition SMK, the KDH, and the ANO—all belonging to the center-right. The coalition proved rather unstable following a conflict over the Church-state cleavage issues involving abortion legislation and divorce laws and broke apart in 2006 (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008: 542).

The new major political figure to emerge was Robert Fico who became prime minister in 2006 and whose party Smer formed a coalition with the ultra-nationalist extremist SNS and Mečiar's HZDS. The

thrust of the 2006 election campaign had been centered on the social-economic issue dimension following the most ambitious neoliberal reform program anywhere in Central and Eastern Europe, which had been implemented by the Dzurinda government. While the SNS re-entered parliament capitalizing on its traditional Anti-Hungary rhetoric, HZDS lost a large part of its electorate to the SNS, obtaining only 8.8 percent of the votes (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008). It appears that Fico selected the two junior partners, SNS and HZDS, because they were not very engaged in socioeconomic issues. As such, Smer was to have a free hand in reversing some of the neoliberal reforms (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008: 544).

Also the 2010 elections were seen by both Smer and the major right party, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS) as *"[…] as a contest between left and right-wing economic policies"* (Henderson 2010: 2). Although Smer became again the largest group in the new parliament, it failed to form a government when HZDS fell short of entering the parliament and the SNS lost seats. In addition, the new party Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)[16] obtained over 12 percent of the votes, resulting in a clear parliamentary majority of the center-right camp. Thus, the new government was composed of the SDKÚ-DS, the SaS, the KDH as well as the Hungarian Party Most-Hid (founded in 2009) and led by Iveta Radičová while Druzinda remained party leader (SDKÚ-DS)[17] (Mesežnikov 2013: 54). In the wake of the European financial crisis in which the EU pressured the Radičová government to support the bailout package for Greece, the SDKÚ-DS-led coalition collapsed in 2012 following a vote of no confidence. After a memorable showdown in the Slovak parliament, Fico made a triumphant return in 2012, obtaining an absolute majority.

Slovakia thus represents a case in which the socio-cultural dimension was dominant at first in party politics but receded in the background. Subsequently, the major right party pursued a neo-liberal economic agenda and clashed with a populist-leftist formation, which was in a coalition with more extremist right parties that in other political systems typically have acted as potential coalition partners of a main right party.

Austria differs from the ECE cases by representing the clearest example of a cartelized party system (Katz and Mair 1995) until the major parties the Christian-democratic People's Party (ÖVP) and Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) were increasingly challenged by the Freedom Party (FPÖ). Previously a small nationalist-liberal party polling about 5 percent, the Freedom party transformed under the leadership of Jörg Haider into rightwing populist party after 1986. By 1999, the FPÖ captured some 27 percent of the electorate and reduced the combined margin of seats held by ÖVP of SPÖ from over 90 percent to under 60 percent. Being ideologically very flexible and opportunistic, the FPÖ presented itself first as a middleclass protest party with German-nationalist rhetoric, taking aim at Austria's partitocrazia and corporatist model. In time the Freedom Party adopted a more Austro-patriotic profile and sought to appeal especially to the economic losers of Austrian modernization and the European integration process (Heinisch 2002; Luther 2007). Following initially a cordon sanitaire strategy, the main parties adopted a dismissive approach but eventually moved more to the right, most on immigration and somewhat less on law-and-order.

Following some narrowing of positions between ÖVP and FPÖ in the latter part of the 1990s on issues such as budgetary retrenchment, family policy, deregulation, and welfare reform, after the 1999

elections, the Christian-democrats and Freedom Party, formed the first center-right government of the Second Republic under the chancellorship of Wolfgang Schüssel of the ÖVP. Whereas the latter was quite successful in government, enjoying significant electoral gains especially in the 2002 national elections, the FPÖ encountered an enormous voter backlash (Heinisch 2003, Luther 2003). The FPÖ had been forced to moderate its position on several issues, especially on European immigration so as to be an acceptable coalition partner to the pro-European ÖVP (Luther 2010; Fallend, forthcoming). Although the FPÖ sought compensation by moving substantially to the left on socioeconomic issues, it could not contain the growing internal fragmentation between moderates and radicals, market-liberals and traditionalists. In 2005 the office-seeking faction of market-liberals and moderates (ironically led by Haider) left the FPÖ and formed a new party called Alliance Future Austria (BZÖ), which continued the coalition with the ÖVP until 2007. No longer in government and having jettisoned its party moderates, the FPÖ quickly reverted to its eurosceptical and more extremist positions. After losing unexpectedly in 2006, the Christian-democrats lacked the numeric strength to continue a coalition with the BZÖ and instead formed a grand coalition with the Social Democrats. The BZÖ presented itself as a more moderate nationalist-libertarian alternative to the FPÖ that was more market-liberal and less Catholic and conservative than the ÖVP. However, following Haider's death in 2008, the BZÖ declined markedly and failed to re-enter parliament in 2013. The appearance of new bourgeois protest parties (Team Stronach, Neos) along with the Greens and a resurgent FPÖ continue to weaken the main parties so that their combined strength barely exceeded 50 percent after the 2013 elections. Barring unforeseen developments and if current trends prevail, one may assume that the main parties would find it difficult to continue their coalition arrangement following the next elections in 2018.

Cross-Country Comparisons based on select Issue Dimensions

Turning to our analysis of the CHES-Data, we want to trace comparatively the positions parties adopted on select issue dimensions that matter in right party contestation such as Euroscepticism, expansion of minority rights, multiculturalism as well as the overall ideological positioning and the stance on the economy—although party positions on both these latter issue areas have to be interpreted carefully – for a detailed explanation of the coefficient cites in the following section, see endnote[18].

Euroscepticism.

In all of ECE the salience of the issue of European integration was rather high prior to accession, but decreased thereafter and moderately increased again in 2010. Only in the Czech Republic does this topic become even less salient in 2010 than it had been in 2006. Generally, conservative and right parties, with the exception of extremist parties, in Slovakia and Hungary display trends toward a more pro-EU direction. Particularly the rather liberal right parties such as the Czech US-DEU, SNK-ED, TOP09, Hungarian MDF, Polish Civic Platform and the Slovak SDKÚ can be found with pro-integrationist positions over time. On the other hand, the aggregated party means for all five countries studied are quite similar. Only in Hungary did the average party position become more pro-integration by 2006 that

is after accession, whereas in the other three post-communist countries the party mean moved in the opposite direction.

In the Czech Republic, the positions on EU integration of conservative and rightwing parties are quite stable over time. While ODS was clearly eurosceptic before Czech Republic's EU accession, it became even more so afterwards (2006) and only modified its position slightly in 2010. The Czech Christian-democrats on the other hand, became rather more pro-European by 2002, veered back toward greater scepticism in 2006, only to become once again more pro-EU in 2010. In fact, all the center-right parties represented in the survey at only one point in time (US-DEU, SNK-ED, TOP09) clearly favor European integration. Therefore, we can conclude that the conservative right parties in the Czech Republic, with the exception of ODS, tended to have favorable attitudes towards EU integration. By comparison, the ODS staunch opposition has in fact been more reminiscent of positions similar to those of the parties on the left prior to accession.

In Hungary we can observe a clear convergence on the question of European integration not only by conservative and other rightwing parties but all parties in general as indicated by the party mean on this issue. This is to say that the positions of parties by 2010 was tendentially more pro-European with only one outlier—the extreme right Jobbik. Contrary to the Czech Republic where one notices a decline in pro-EU positions after the accession, Hungarian parties became less eurosceptic with accession. This has changed somewhat by 2010 when the data show MDF and Fidesz reverted to a more negative view the EU. Compared to that, the more moderate and less salient stance of the rightwing KDNP appears surprising at first. Overall, issue salience was highest before accession but declined afterwards. The ongoing disputes between the Orbán government and Brussels may have once again raised the salience by 2010, underscored also by the fact that this issue area appears to resonate especially for the government party Fidesz.

In Poland we notice a more diverse picture among conservative and right parties. Two key formations right of center, PO and LPR, showed extremely stable positions on Europe, although on opposite ends of the scale. While the centrist PO has been very pro-European over the years, the rightwing populist LPR was strongly opposed in 2002 and has since moved only slightly towards a less critical position. The rather conservative AWSP, an offshoot of the Solidarity movement, took a pro-European stance whereas in 2001 the main right party PiS began abandoning its pro-EU stance only to move toward the position of LPR. By comparison, the center-right agrarian People's Party (PSL) was initially rather EU-sceptical but eventually become friendlier toward European integration, almost converging on the mean party position by 2006. On the other hand, Self-Defense (Samoobrona) only intensified its opposition to EU-membership between 2002 and 2010. By comparison, the aggregated party mean for Poland has been rather stable and rather pro-European.

Overall, we may conclude here that the rather far-right parties, PiS, and LPR converge in their eurosceptic position on EU integration while the conservative-agrarian mixed type parties Samoobrona and PSL tend to converge on a middle-of-the-road position. The same diverse picture emerges when we look at the salience attributed by parties to the topic. For PO, European integration plays an important role and the salience of this issue has only increased since accession. Samoobrona on the other hand has

not attributed a high salience to this topic—particularly it did not do so immediately after accession—but was converging with the other parties and the party mean by 2010.

With the exception of the nationalist SNS, the conservative and right parties in Slovakia all narrowed their positions on EU integration in 2010. Of these, the liberal-centrist SDKÚ was by far the most pro-European in the beginning. However, following accession, the party became more sceptical, although the salience of this issue remained rather constant after 2006. By comparison, the populist HZDS' position appeared always slightly more favorable toward the EU than the party averages. This seems surprising considering the acrimonious relationship between Brussels and Vladimir Mečiar and his party. Of all right parties, the culturally conservative KDH has made the most pronounced shift in position, starting out as rather pro-European in 2006 and moving toward greater Euroscepticism after accession. Although, this has narrowed the gap to the other conservative and right parties, it is still the relatively most pro-European formation in Slovakia. In terms of issue salience, European integration became relatively more important for SDKÚ, KDH, and SNS whereas it mattered increasingly less for HZDS.

Looking at the positions Austrian parties' took on EU integration, we see a clear divide between the main right ÖVP and the right competitor parties FPÖ and BZÖ. The party mean was slightly pro-European in 1999 and 2002 but fell below the mean value for the subsequent time points of 2006 and 2010. Over the years the Christian-democrats' position remained stable, favoring EU integration, but the salience they attributed to the issue increased markedly between 2002 and 2006. The peaks we observe in the data can be explained by elections taking place in both years and ÖVP's likely strategy to highlight its political distance to the FPÖ. On the opposite of the spectrum, we find the ÖVP's rightwing competitors FPÖ, and for 2007-2010 also the BZÖ. Though already located toward the sceptical end of the scale in 1999 and 2000, the FPÖ moved even farther to an anti-EU opposition after the exodus of the group that formed the BZÖ. The latter moved to a position that was moderately friendlier toward the EU than that of FPÖ. Salience of the issue is generally rather high for all parties but in the case of the FPÖ it changes noticeably for each year of the analysis reflecting flexibility and perhaps political opportunism.

Minority Rights.

Concerning the extension of rights of ethnic minorities in these four countries, Hungarian and Slovak parties follow similar development paths. While in both countries the party mean lies in a middle position for the period surveyed, the main right parties and right competitor parties increasingly oppose the extension of minority rights. Also, we notice that the respective ultra-nationalist parties, SNS and Jobbik, take positions close to the range maximum indicating the strongest possible opposition. With regard to the parties' salience of these issues, there is a clear difference between the two countries. While salience is low in Slovakia, it is increasing in Hungary. As Jobbik emerged on the political stage in the latter part of the last decade, it focused especially on minority rights and appears to have pushed up the salience of this agenda for the other right parties as well. On the other hand, the nationalist SNS has been in place since Slovak independence but the issue had not seemed to resonate particularly in the Slovak party system. For HZDS, the issue has declined in importance and we may plausibly infer that doing so indicates a dismissive strategy towards SNS. That is to say that HZDS probably tried to distance

itself from the Slovak ultra-nationalists after their coalition with Smer from 2006 to 2010. As the former party had already lost a large share of the electorate that we may label the 'losers' of the economic transition to the leftist party Smer, they could not risk losing even more voters by competing with the extremism of SNS over an issue with such a low overall salience. This changed when the issue salience of minority rights increased in 2010, which was most likely related to the foundation of the inter-ethnic party Most-Hid in the run-up to the 2010 elections (Mesežnikov 2013: 61-62). In Hungary by comparison, Fidesz was reluctant to distance itself from the extreme Jobbik (Barlei and Hartleb 2010: 91-92) and we may infer that it was rather accommodationist by moving toward a more extreme position on ethnic minority rights without actually converging on that radical position.

Poland and the Czech Republic need to be analyzed separately regarding ethnic minority rights because party positions have developed in rather different ways. In the Czech Republic the main right and right competitor parties were rather opposed to an extension of minority rights. This is particularly evident in the pronounced shift by ODS from a score of 5.0 to 7.25 on the 10-point scale in the direction of opposing such rights. This coincided with the establishment of the clearly nationalist and social populist Sovereignty Party (Mareš 2011: 291). On the other hand, TOP09's moderate position situated below the aggregated party averages can be attributed to the fact that it needed to distinguish itself clearly from ODS because some of its members had been with ODS before (Spáč 2013: 135). Generally speaking, the salience of this issue decreased between 2006 and 2010, a phenomenon we observe also in nearly all other countries in 2010.

Figure 1 about here

As we can tell from Figure 1, Polish parties are somewhat convergent in to their position on ethnic minority rights. That is to say that LPR which was strongly opposed to more ethnic minority rights in 2006 (9.0) moderated its stance in 2010 while all other right parties and the aggregated party mean move towards a position of stronger opposition to an extension of ethnic minority rights. LPR's opposition towards an extension of minority rights lies in its programmatic focus on 'Polishness' (de Lange and Guerra 2009: 538, 535). Most pronounced is the shift for PO, though the party's position remained rather in favor of minority rights (4.92) compared to the party mean (5.53). This is an interesting development as the salience of the issues is quite sharply decreasing for the party mean and most right parties. Although salience is also declining for LPR, it stays at a very high level (6.42). Probably as a reaction to this, also Samoobrona deemphasizes the issue in 2010. As in the Hungarian case, we can speak of a slightly accommodationist-convergent development among main right and right competitor parties with regard to their positions on ethnic minority rights.

Contrary to many of their counterparts in ECE, the Austrian Christian-democrats as well as all right competitor parties moved from opposition to extending minority rights in the early part of the survey towards a more liberal position and continually devote very high salience to the issue. The ÖVP's moderation can most certainly be put down to its coalition with the Social Democrats from 2007 onward.

Immigration.

If we look at right parties' positions concerning immigration, we notice that parties in Czech Republic, Poland, and the Slovak Republic move towards positions favoring tougher immigration policies. The same is true for the average of Austrian parties. Curiously, the Hungarian parties on the other hand oppose tougher immigration policies. The only exception was Jobbik, which took up an outlier position (7.81), strongly supporting much more restrictive policies and attributing also very high salience to this issue. Nevertheless, the overall salience of this topic has declined since 2006. A tentative explanation may be that, pushed by Jobbik, the widespread hostility towards the Roma population exerted pressure on right parties to position themselves on the restrictive side on the issue of minority rights, which became increasingly important. By contrast, immigration did not appear to be all that pressing an issue in Hungary and therefore did not exert a similar pressure on right parties.

Overall, the most liberal positions on immigration was to be found in liberal bourgeois parties such as the Czech SNK-ED and the Polish Civic Platform, which represent policies considerably more moderate than those of the aggregated party averages. Also in Slovakia, the rather liberal SDKÚ was more moderate than the national party average but has nonetheless adopted more of a middle-of-the road stance than its Czech and Polish counterparts. In the Czech Republic ODS and KDU-ČSL arrived almost at the same position in 2010, although both parties differ significantly on the salience of this issue, as it is considerably more important for ODS. Given the resonance of immigration in Austria, the Christian-democratic ÖVP stands out among bourgeois main parties in that they were favoring tough policies and ascribing a high salience to the issue. The FPÖ's important role in this regard can be gleaned from by the considerable salience of this question for Austrian parties, which is exceptionally high (7.78) compared to the other cases.

In Poland all parties, pursued more restrictive stances on immigration between 2006 and 2010 but the distances between the parties' respective positions remained nevertheless rather constant. The average salience of the immigration issue was low for Polish parties, only LPR considers the issue more important.[19] For Samoobrona (Self-Defense) and PSL, we have data only for 2010 but one may safely assume that the two are far apart and counter each other's positions. For the Slovakian parties, the mean party position with regard to immigration policy is slightly above the midpoint of the range. Not surprisingly, the SNS is by far the most extreme. Of the other parties, KDH came closest to this position in 2010 (8.23). HZDS and SDKÚ have also moved toward tougher stances, albeit at a much more moderate overall level. In general, the salience of the issue was rather low, though markedly higher for KDH and SNS than for HZDS and SDKÚ. All in all, the right parties were generally moving toward favoring tougher immigration policies but the distance between them has remained rather stable.

Multi-Culturalism.

With regard to Multiculturalism we see that in all our countries, center-liberal parties (Czech SNK-ED, Hungarian MDF, Polish PSL, and Slovak SDKÚ) were located on a moderate to pro-multiculturalist

position whereas extreme parties such as Jobbik, SNS, LPR, and FPÖ were strongly in favor of assimilation. The salience of the issue was lowest in Poland, although LPR attributed more salience to it than its competitors. In Czech Republic and Slovakia the issue salience was overall moderate in 2010, the year of the survey but relatively most important for SNS (6.29). Of all ECE countries, the topic was most salient (5.21) in Hungary but interestingly still considerably lower than in Austria (7.68). The overall positions of parties in these countries also developed following different patterns. Party means were stable in moderate ranges for Hungary and Slovakia, countries that are commonly dominated by the socio-cultural cleavage. In Poland the party mean moved from an assimilationist position to a moderate multicultural one. This was despite the fact that compared to the other countries Polish right competitor parties were found to harbor the most assimilationist positions ranging between 8.0 for Self-Defense to 9.33 for the League of Polish Families in 2010. This strong opposition to multiculturalism may arguably be a consequence of the country's dominant Catholic tradition, especially for those parties that particularly identify with this heritage. Similarly, the Slovak nationalists and the Catholic KDH favor assimilation over multiculturalism. The high salience attributed to the issue by these two parties is likely due to their similarity nationalist and Catholic-conservative attitudes. Thinking strategically, the KDH would likely risk losing voters to the radical right competitors if it were to adopt a dismissive approach on this issue. Whereas the HZDS moderated its position in 2010 approximating the overall party mean (6.12) and the main right party SDKÚ's changed its stance to a somewhat more assimilationist position. As in the Austrian case, the average position of parties in Czech Republic became a more assimilationist one. The Hungarian main right parties' became increasingly assimilationist, which can be attributed without doubt to Jobbik's strength in this issue area. In the Austrian case both right and radical right parties were somehow moderating their positions from 2006 to 2010 but preferring assimilation to multiculturalism.

Position on the Economy.

With regard to economic policy, we find similar positions and developments in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Austria and different ones in Hungary and Poland. The first three can be grouped together in the sense that in these countries the main right parties were clearly pro-market. Also the all-party means in these countries were rather constant in following a moderately pro-market orientation. In the Czech case, the Civic Democratic Party owes its persistent liberal pro-market position to its early role in the transition process when the party presented itself as technocratic reformer until the economic recession of 1997 (Innes 2001: 17). The party's dominance with regard to this issue was only challenged in 2010 with the emergence of TOP09, which positioned itself as another clearly liberal and pro-market party. The Christian-democrats left their pronounced pro-market stance in 2006 (7.92) and moved to a new position in 2010 (4.84) even below party mean (5.09). In Slovakia, the picture is slightly different because the nationalist SNS took up a strongly anti-market position in 2002 (3.67) and 2010 (4.27). Its more moderate position in 2006 was likely to have been prompted by joining in a governmental coalition with Smer and HZDS in 2006. In the Austrian case, as we can see in Figure 2, the ÖVP's shift to a less pronounced pro-market position from 2006 to 2010 was undoubtedly the culmination of several developments. First and foremost, the FPÖ's move to the left nurtured a growing public perception that

the ÖVP had become uncharacteristically neoliberal and "coldhearted" in the face of social need. In short, whereas the FPÖ sought to boost its "common man" image, the ÖVP feared for its reputation as a "People's" Party. It was also this image that has cost the People's Party the elections in 2006 and brought back the Social Democrats, which had campaigned on social policy issues. As the FPÖ veered to the left on socioeconomic issues, the BZÖ took a complementary clearly market friendly position.

Figure 2 about here

In Hungary and Poland, where socio-cultural cleavages dominate, we notice clear differences in the positions of main right parties and those of their non-leftist party competitors. These come in two varieties: Significant centrist and liberal conservative parties—in Hungary MDF and in Poland PO—on one hand and smaller extremist and ultra-nationalist on the other. However, contrary to the Czech and Slovak cases, all main right parties are positioned on the market-sceptical side of the spectrum. Interestingly, the traditionally more market-liberal MDF and PO moved in opposite directions: MDF increased its pro-market profile over the years while PO became more sceptical of market-liberalism. In doing so, the Polish Civic Platform reacted undoubtedly to the anti-market sentiments prevalent in all right parties in Poland, especially in the main right party PiS. It bears to remember here that the dominant cleavage in Poland was socio-cultural. PO's re-positioning can therefore be considered an accommodative-convergent behavior with regard to clearly market-sceptical right competitors such as Self-Defense, League of Polish Families, and the Law and Justice party. Meanwhile, it was especially PiS which campaigned heavily with the slogan *"Solidarity vs. (economic) Liberalism"* to discredit the Civic Platform in the run-up of parliamentary elections in 2005. And all members of the subsequent coalition government of PiS, Self-Defense, and League of Polish Families frequently expressed their disdain for the transition process, blaming the old elites for *"jobbery and corruption in public institutions"* (Gałązka and Waszak 2013: 200-201). This undoubtedly raised the pressure on the Civic Platform between 2005 and 2007 to narrow the difference in position. In Hungary, Fidesz had been moderately pro-market in 2002 (4.62), then moved towards greater scepticism in 2006 (3.0), only to became more market-friendly again by 2010 (3.41). The extreme parties' positions (MIÉP and Jobbik) were close to Fidesz' positions for the respective years of their inclusion in the survey. Arguably, their market scepticism was rooted in the fear that economic interdependence would impact national sovereignty and undermine "Hungarianness" (Barlei and Hartleb 2010: 97). In a cleavage structure dominated by questions of identity and the danger posed by liberalism, it is not surprising to find Hungarian Christian-democratic People's Party's to be highly market-skeptical, although it moderated this position somewhat after their close alliance with Fidesz in 2006 (Batory 2009: 35).

Left-Right Dimension

Data on the left-right dimension are problematic as they encompass different issue domains given that both a strong neoliberal pro-market position and a rather exclusivist/traditionalist stance would render parties as far to the right. With this in mind, we may rather look for trends than positionality. In Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia average party positions move within a relatively narrow range between 5 and 6. In Austria and the Czech Republic the average party position shifted to the right. When we consider only

right parties, the Austrian ÖVP appeared more moderate than the main right parties in the Višegrad countries if we discount the civic/centrist parties with liberal attributes such as MDF and PO. However, following respective national trends, they too, moved from moderately right positions in 2002 to rather mid-range ones thereafter. Not surprisingly, the right competitors such as LPR, FPÖ, Jobbik and SNS were all located toward the extremes, ranging between 8 and 10, with Jobbik, LPR and FPÖ (in 2006) ranking highest.

Main Right Party Responses by Country

We now want to trace on a country-by-country basis the responses of main right parties in terms of positions adopted on key economic and socio-cultural issues.

In the **Austrian** case the expert survey data confirm what we know from the political country profile in that the main right party ÖVP had staked out a rather extreme pro-integration position which differs from the mean party position in Austria as well as from that of principal rightwing competitors (FPÖ and BZÖ). For the self-appointed *Europa-Partei* changing its stands on Europe would have involved significant political cost, not only with important clientele groups such as the business community but with key groups of party officials within the party. For the Christian-democrats, 'Europe' represented a clearly defined stable policy-position and singularly identifying characteristic. As euroscepticism increased in Austria, first in the latter half of the 1990s and then after 2000, and as the eurosceptical parties on the right (especially the FPÖ, the List Hans Peter Martin, and later the BZÖ) did well in the polls, the ÖVP faced pressure to adjust its staunch pro-integrationist position. It could ease this pressure by changing its position and converge on a more eurosceptical stance or by accommodation through cooperation in the form of an electoral alliance with the right party competitor. The ÖVP chose the latter and formed a coalition with the FPÖ from 2000 to 2005 and then with the BZÖ from 2005 to 2007. This temporarily transformed the Austrian party system to a two-bloc model in which a Social-Democratic-Green bloc and a Conservative-Right bloc (cf. Müller and Fallend 2004) competed and which allowed the ÖVP along with its coalition partner to engage the entire center-right electorate. Following the collapse of the two bloc model in 2007—which the ÖVP had hoped to continue—, the People's Party was still wedded to its strong pro-European stance while the mean party position in Austria became more eurosceptical. Numerically unable to form any more alliances with right party competitors, the Christian-democrats reacted to the pressure to adjust their position on Europe by subsequently sharply decreasing the salience they attributed to the EU issues. In short, the ÖVP maintained its position but changed the salience of that position markedly after 2007.

In the issue dimension of multiculturalism and immigration, the position of the ÖVP had already become more restrictive in the 1990s and was thus to the right of the mean position of Austrian parties. Moving further to the right would have been difficult, as it would have thrown into question the ÖVP's character as Christian-democratic centrist party. Again, cooperation with the FPÖ eased the pressure on the People's Party. By the same token, the FPÖ for its part was forced to moderate its position on Europe, immigration, and minority rights so as to be acceptable as a partner of the pro-European ÖVP in 2000.

The data clearly reveal the Freedom Party's break with its previous position on the economy—which had been similar to that of the ÖVP. After 2000 the Freedom Party turned sharply toward the left on the economy to compensate for their moderation on socio-cultural issues and European integration that been important to the FPÖ's radical base and electorate. Following the exodus of the party moderates from the FPÖ in 2005, resulting in the formation of the rival BZÖ, and the end of the coalition with the ÖVP, the Freedom Party returned to its eurosceptical position. By comparison, the newly formed BZÖ took up a liberal position on the economy while otherwise positioning itself between the main right party, ÖVP, and the more extremist FPÖ. The split and rivalry between the rightwing competitor parties FPÖ and BZÖ made further center-right alliances arithmetically impossible. As such, the People's Party was forced to opt for a centrist coalition with the Social Democrats, which in turn pushed the ÖVP's stance on immigration, minority rights, and multiculturalism closer toward the mean party position. Overall, the Austrian ÖVP represents an example of a main right party for which further adaptation by convergence was ideologically not possible. Given the dominance of the socioeconomic cleavage and the ÖVP's role as centrist and Christian-democratic pro-business party, its ability to move further to the right in socio-cultural domain was constrained. As a result cooperation rather than convergence was the observed behavior. In fact, it was the radical right competitor party, FPÖ, which converged on the less radical socio-cultural position of the People's Party while diverging from the latter on the economy. The ÖVP remains a clear example of accommodation by cooperation in the time surveyed.

In the **Czech Republic** the eurosceptical Civic Democratic Party (ODS) had staked out a clearly defined position as one of the most eurosceptical major parties anywhere in Europe. In fact during the process of accession when the party was not in office, the ODS became even more hostile to European integration. After its return to government in 2006, it slightly moderated its views on this issue. However, within the Czech party spectrum, the ODS continued to be an outlier on this question and in fact remained locked in what had been a signature stance for the party. By comparison the right competitor Christian-democratic Party KDU-ČSL was strongly supportive of EU membership. Thus, the ODS' predicament was similar to that of the Austrian People's Party in that its position on Europe was rather extreme—albeit in the opposite direction—relative to all others, especially its right competitor(s), and the preferences of the overall electorate. As with the Austrian ÖVP, we observe that ODS maintained its rather extreme position but eventually attributed substantially less salience to European integration when it was able to do so. On the economy and left-right ideology, the ODS also maintained rather extreme right (de facto neoliberal) positions which differed markedly from those of all other parties. In the socio-cultural issue domain, such as on immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic minority rights, the ODS was positioned to the right of mean party position but generally close to the Christian-democratic Party KDU-ČSL. As in the case of ÖVP, the ODS formed a coalition with a right party competitor, that was positioned rather differently from itself in key policy dimensions (Europe, the economy) but more compatible on others. Most likely, owing to its libertarian undercurrent, the ODS was initially moderately supportive on the question of expanding minority rights and multiculturalism than the mean party position and even the KDU-ČSL but it eventually became more hostile. Interestingly, the ODS changed its position but the salience of this issue actually declined at the same time despite the fact that the topic of immigration issue increased markedly from 2006 to 2009. We may infer that ODS did not want to appear deaf to calls for a more restrictive policy without actually taking

any action about it. Overall, the Czech case represents a political context in which the socioeconomic cleavage has been dominant but where the question of Europe has represented a defined and stable policy position of the ODS, which threatened to hurt its standing with the bourgeois electorate and where it had to react to a different stance of political competitors on the center-right. It did so by engaging in cooperation, some convergence toward the mean party position (on socio-cultural issues) where it could while maintaining its signature positions on Europe and the economy.

After 2000 the main right party in **Hungary** was Fidesz, which was ideologically positioned to the right of the mean party position and center-right competitor, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). The data indicate that this remained unchanged until 2005. On the question of Europe, Fidesz was somewhat more eurosceptical than the average party position in Hungary but there too, it followed the national party-political trends and did not veer much further to the right. This trend ended after 2006 when Fidesz changed direction on a number of positions to coincide with those displayed by the re-founded Christian Democratic People's Party (KNDP), with which Fidesz was closely associated. In the process, Fidesz altered its stance on European integration, minority rights, and immigration, which subsequently matched that of the KDNP more closely. Although the data do not allow us to infer a causal connection, it is striking to observe this example of accommodation by convergence amidst cooperation. Through 2009 Fidesz moved to the right and in tandem, or at least parallel, to KDNP with the latter occupying the more radical positions whereas the former moved into the space between KDNP and the mean party position. It seems plausible that this occurred first in response to the so-called 'triple alliance' of MIÉP, Jobbik and the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers, and Civic Party (Barlei and Hartleb 2010: 95). Fidesz thus presents a case of convergent adaptation to the right in an environment in which the socio-cultural issue dimension was dominant. Whether one would qualify the relationship between Fidesz and KDNP as cooperative or co-optive is hard to determine. Despite regional cooperation, Fidesz clearly did not choose to engage in a convergent cooperative strategy with Jobbik at the national level.[20]

In **Poland** in which the cosmopolitan-traditionalist divide is still rather strong, several parties compete on the right. In fact the two major parties that have emerged are both bourgeois formations and compete along the cosmopolitan-traditionalist issue dimensions. Of these the Civic Platform (PO) is not only socially and economically the much more liberal but also staunchly pro-European. As a result, it has dominated the political center. Its major rival, the Law and Justice Part (PiS), was thus free to move consistently to the right and converge on positions held by several right party competitors such as the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Solidarity Electoral Action/AWSP. Unlike the Austrian ÖVP with its ties to the liberal and pro-European business community, PiS could adopt rather extremist positions on Europe—becoming by 2010 the second most extreme anti-European party in the Sejm and moving away from the mean party position—, on minority rights and multiculturalism. For PiS and contrary to other parties, the salience of European integration actually increased after 2006. The data suggest that faced which a cosmopolitan-traditionalist cleavage structure in which the cosmopolitan-liberal side was already dominated by a non-leftist competitor, PiS tried to lock up the electorate on the traditionalist-exclusivist side of the divide to the extent possible. Thus, Law and Justice took up positions complementary to those of its main party rivals PO and the more centrist PSL, while accommodating the far-right competitors through a mixture of convergence and also cooperation. It appears that PiS as a

major party and, after 2005, government party was initially constrained and could not quite match the extremism of LPR and Self-Defence. In that phase it rather pursued accommodation by cooperating with the two. Following the end of the PiS-led government when it lost to the PO in 2007, PiS increasingly pursued convergence. Its position on Europe as well as on minority rights, multiculturalism, and immigration policy shifted substantially to the right. Overall PiS' strategy appears to have been one of accommodation by convergence toward the position of its extremist competitors. As such the Law and Justice Party arguably tried to tap the large staunchly Catholic, traditionalist, and anti-integrationist electorate as completely as possible.

In **Slovakia** the main right party SDKÚ was initially strongly in favor of European integration but it then continually decreased its support from 2002 to 2010, converging on the position of the HZDS. The latter had maintained a stance that was moderately more pro-European than the mean party position, which did not change much from 2002 to 2010. SDKÚ's position on the economy and ideology saw practically no change and to the extent that the ultranationalist SNS and the populist-conservative HZDS were coalition partners of the social democrats under Prime Minister Fico, there seemed little reason to seek an accommodation through cooperation with the latter. Also in the socio-cultural dimension, SDKÚ was the most moderate right party in every issue category, although SDKÚ did show some convergence toward the mean party position. With SNS and HZDS unavailable and incompatible, SDKÚ formed instead coalitions with Party of the Hungarian Coalition, Party of Civic Understanding, and Party of the Democratic. Although the socio-cultural dimension has been important in Slovakia and had been exploited by Mečiar and the HZDS during the 1990s, the dominant issue and area of contestation was economic policy, specifically the radical neoliberal reforms implemented by the SDKÚ-led government before 2006. Thus, Slovakia remains an example in which the socioeconomic cleavage is dominant. The European financial crisis, Slovakia's accession to the Euro (during the financial crisis) arguably only strengthened this issue dimension, which is indicated also by the fact that salience of European integration increases again for nearly all Slovak parties after 2006.

Summary Assessment and Conclusions

In countries in which the dominant cleavage structure was socioeconomic (Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia), main right parties were constrained in their ability to converge with far-right parties perceived as rather hostile to market liberalism or integration (see Table 1). To the extend we see movement, it was restricted to conditions where main right parties had some flexibility such as in the non-dominant issue dimension or where the mean party position also trended right and thus reduced the constraint. In Austria, the ÖVP held fast to its position on integration and actually pushed the far-right Freedom Party to a more centrist position. The ÖVP engineered a center-right bloc government it could dominate. In the Czech Republic, the ODS faced the dilemma in that it was both staunchly free market and eurosceptical. In this situation, it split the difference between these two opposite positions. Unable or unwilling to abandon its stance and converge with the main right competitor, the Christian-democratic KDU-ČSL held its position significantly closer to the party mean, the ODS instead formed a bloc alliance in an attempt to unify the center-right camp. However, both the ÖVP and the ODS noticeably reduced

the salience of their rather extreme position on integration. In Slovakia the main right party SDKÚ also pursued an extremely neoliberal course, which it maintained more or less throughout period surveyed. However, it did modify its highly favorable stance on EU integration, following a similar trend among all parties and especially the right competitor KDH In short, given that SDKÚ remained the by far most pro-European party of the right and substantially more supportive of integration than the aggregated party average and its right competitors, the SDKÚ remained in character as a market-liberal pro-European right party, albeit one that had prudently moved somewhat closer to the national party mean position. Eventually it also formed a coalition government that included the KDH, thus appearing to behave in a way consistent to ÖVP and ODS when we consider the political context.

Table 1 about here

In those countries in which the socio-cultural dimension was the more crucial for contestation (Hungary, Poland), main right parties were expected to move to the right, especially if far-right competitor parties were electorally successful. In Hungary, Fidesz followed this pattern in that it converged on positions of right competitors especially in the socio-cultural dimensions while veering away also from market-liberalism and integration. The party's move towards a less market friendly position in 2006 can be considered a strategic choice to attract voters of MSZP who were prone to be attracted by Fidesz' tough line regarding immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic minority rights. As expected, the Hungarian right main party eschewed cooperation with the center right MDF but rather pursued convergence toward the parties of the far-right, especially Jobbik. In Poland the main right party PiS moved to the right, pursing de-facto a strategy that allowed it to dominate the extreme end of the spectrum and maintain their distance to more centrist positions. As in the case of Fidesz, also PiS remained closer to the mean party position in the economic issue domain and the European integration. In Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia we see cooperation with parties that are in some way complementary, resulting in the formation of broad blocs. The ÖVP and ODS are the two parties with the most entrenched position and thus most constrained in their behavior. By contrast, in Poland and Hungary the main parties pursue convergence strategies. To the extent we see cooperation (due to the fragmentation of the party system coalition are a necessity), it is generally with parties that are ideologically rather close already or somewhat more extreme than the main party. In Austria and the Czech Republic where the main right parties forged alliances with right party competitors, it is the latter than subsequently diverge in an attempt to carve out a distinctive position. Of course, also the initial position that is the starting out point matters. It is curious to observe that the two most extreme main right parties Fidesz and (to a lesser extent) PiS started out more centrist and less engaged in the socio-cultural dimensions—by some account they were more centrist than both the ÖVP and ODA.

While accommodation, either by convergence or cooperation is frequent, we find few instances of adversarial behavior (e.g., the broad anti-Meciar coalition in Slovakia or the so-called triple alliance against Fidesz in Hungary) within and between right party families as this behavior seem to be reserved

for opponents across the cleavage line. However, there is evidence of dismissive behavior on the part of main right parties toward right party competitors if the latter is moving toward, or is closer to a mean party position.

With respect to the issue dimensions of our analysis, we may conclude that except for the extremist parties main right parties tend to have constant and favorable positions toward EU integration—the only exception is of course the Czech ODS. The split between right parties on European integration is likely a function of the fact that this issue area can be viewed in two ways. For some, Europe represents threat to culture and sovereignty while, to others, it suggests the freedom of the market. Thus, depending on the vantage points, it divides the center-right constituency and thus we see different party strategies. Generally speaking, the issue salience of European integration was rather high prior to accession, decreased thereafter and moderately increased again in 2010. Only in the Czech Republic did salience decrease even in 2010.

Taking together all three sociocultural dimensions, we can observe a clear trend of main right, and right competitor parties towards tougher policies in these issue areas. These are in line with party means in these countries. Particularly for the extreme parties their tough positions are justified by the defense of the nation and its cultural heritage. In the Austrian case we observe a slightly different picture. There, the party mean also moved towards a tougher stance, nevertheless main right and right competitors slightly moderated their positions.

Finally, with regard to economic policy, we identified similar positions and developments in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Austria because in these countries, the main right parties were clearly pro-market, a clear support for the dominance of the socioeconomic cleavage. On the other hand Hungary and Poland can be compared because there the main right parties—with the exception of the rather liberal MDF and PO—are clearly market skeptical. This different development is arguably shaped by the countries' dominant socio-cultural.

Summing up, this paper represents a first step in grappling with the behavior main right parties as a result of competing with right party challengers in different cleavage structures and over different issue dimensions. The approach of case analysis and position tracing hardly allows us to test the theoretical assumptions in a rigorous way and generalize the conclusions—we hope to do this in a next step. However, we think we could successfully present evidence that main right parties behaved broadly in a manner consistent with the theoretical assumptions laid out in the introduction.

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Figure 1: Poland – Position on Ethnic Minorities Rights



Value key: 0 = Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities; 10 = Strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities

Note: The national average was calculated using all parties (2006: 8 parties; 2010: 8). Please see Appendix for a full list of Polish parties

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Trend file 1999-2010, http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php

Figure 2: Austria – Ideological left/right positions on the Economy



Value key: Value key: 0 = Extreme Left; 10= Extreme Right

Note: The national average was calculated using all parties (1999: 5 parties; 2002: 5; 2006: 7; 2010: 6). Please see Appendix for a full list of Austrian parties.

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Trend file 1999-2010, http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php

Table 1: Difference between main right and competitor party

Difference between main right party and right competitor party per year/issue*							
Country	Year	Sociocultural Dimension**	Party behavior	Socioeconomic Position	Party behavior	EU integration	party behavior
AT	1999	N/A	**main party ✓constant**/competitor converges	6.6	**✓main party constant**/competitor diverging	-1.6	**✓main party constant**/competitor diverges
	2002	N/A		7.06		-1.62	
	2006	-2		2.83		-3	
	2010	-1.93		3.14		-2.57	
CZ	2002	N/A	**main party converges**	0.28	**✓main party constant**/competitor diverges	2.66	**✓main party constant**/competitor diverges
	2006	0.4		-2.29		2.86	
	2010	0.07		-3.42		3.05	
HU	2002	N/A	**✓main party converges**	0.62	**main party diverges*** **	3	**main party diverges*** **
	2006	N/A		N/A		N/A	
	2010	-2.08		0.28		3	
PL	2002	-1.33	**✓main party converges**	2.63	**main party converges**	3.75	**main party converges**
	2006	-1.08		0.83		2.12	
	2010	N/A		-0.43		1.26	
SK	2002	N/A	**✓main party rather constant**** **	3.58	**✓main party constant**	3.69	**main party converges**
	2006	-4		3.29		2.84	
	2010	-3.87		3.3		2.12	

NB: Coefficients are aggregated averages for issue dimensions measures by CHES and the denote the numeric difference of the main right party minus the competitor party. Large coefficients show larger differences in position; negative signs typically indicate positions toward the high/extreme end by the right competitor party relative to main party; plus signs denote more extreme positions by main right party relative to competitor.

*Differences were calculated as follows: Austria=OVP-FPO; Czech Republic= (ODS- KDU/CSL); Hungary=Fidesz-(Jobbik-MIEP); Poland=PiS-LPR; Slovakia=SDKU-SNS

**Socialcutlrual dimension: average distance of the following three issues: Immigration Policy, Multiculturalism, and Ethnig Minority Rights

*** Data only available for 2002 and 2010.

**** Some change toward the mean, albeit from an extremely low/moderate initial position.

✓Conforms to theoretical expectation

Gray shading denotes dominance of socioeconomic cleavage strutcure

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Trend file 1999-2010, http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php

Party positions were measured using the following scales: 1) Position on EU integration: from 1=strongly opposed to 10=strongly in favor; 2) Minority Rights: from 0=strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities to 10=strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities; 3) Immigration: from 0=strongly opposes tough policy to 10=strongly favors tough policy; 4) Multiculturalism: from 0=strongly favors multiculturalism to 10=strongly favor assimilation; 5) Economy: 0=extreme left to 10=extreme right; 6) Left-Right dimension: 0=extreme

left to 10=extreme right;

Appendix I: Election results – Višegrad countries – vote and seat shares

Czech Republic

Election	Party	Votes (%)	Seats (%)
2002	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	30,2	35
	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	24,47	29
	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	18,51	20,5
	Coalition (KDU-ČSL/US-DEU)	14,27	
	- Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)		11
	- Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU)		4,5
	Association of Independents (SN)	2,78	0
	Common Sense Party (SZR)	0,22	0
2006	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	32,32	37
	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	35,38	40,5
	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	12,81	13
	Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	7,22	6,5
	Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU)	0,3	0
	SNK-European Democrats (SNK-ED)	2,08	0
	Common Sense Party (SZR)	0,46	0
	Green Party (SZ)	6,29	3
2010	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	22,09	28
	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	20,22	26,5
	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	11,27	13
	Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	4,39	0
	Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU)	-	-
	SNK-European Democrats (SNK-ED)	-	-
	Sovereignty/Jana Bobošíková Bloc (SUV)	3,67	0
	Public Affairs (VV)	10,88	12
	TOP 09 (TOP 09)	16,71	20,5

* 2002 only SN; 2006 as SNK; ** 2002 and 2006 only SZR; 2010 as SUV

Sources:

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Hungary

Election	Party	Votes (%)	Seats (%)
2002	Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	42,05	46,1
	Fidesz-MDF	41,07	
	- Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party		42,5
	- Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)		6,2
	Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)	5,57	5,2
	Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP)	4,4	0
	Unifying for Hungary Centre (Centrum)*	3,9	0
2006	Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	43,2	49,2
	Fidesz-KDNP	42	
	- Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party		36,5
	- Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)		6
	Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)	5	2,8
	Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)	6,5	5,3
	Party of Hungarian Justice and Life/Jobbik The Third Way (MIÉP-Jobbik)**	2,2	0
	Unifying for Hungary Centre (Centrum)	0,3	0
2010	Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	19,3	15,28
	Fidesz-KDNP	52,7	
	- Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party		58,55
	- Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)		9,59
	Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)	2,67	0
	For the Right Hungary (Jobbik)	16,7	12,18
	Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP)	0,03	0
	Politics Can be Different (LMP)	7,5	4,15
	Others	3,8	0,26

* In 2002 KDNP was 2002 part of Centrum. ** MIÉP and Jobbik on joint list in 2006;

Sources:

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Slovakia

Election	Party	Votes (%)	Seats (%)
2002	Movement for Democratic Slovakia - People's Party (HZDS)	19,5	24
	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ)**	15,09	18,67
	Direction/Social Democracy (Smer-SD)	13,46	16,67
	Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK)	11,16	13,33
	Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	8,25	10
	Alliance of a New Citizen (ANO)	8,01	10
	Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)	6,32	7,33
	True Slovak National Party (PSNS)	3,65	0
	Slovak National Party (SNS)	3,32	0
2006	People's Party/Movement for Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS)	8,79	10
	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union/Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS)	18,35	20,66
	Direction/Social Democracy (Smer-SD)	29,14	33,33
	Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK)	11,68	13,33
	Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	8,31	9,33
	Slovak National Party (SNS)*	11,73	13,33
2010	People's Party/Movement for Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS)	4,32	0
	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union/Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS)	15,42	18,66
	Direction/Social Democracy (Smer-SD)	34,79	41,33
	Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK)	4,33	0
	Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	8,52	10
	Slovak National Party (SNS)	5,07	6
	Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	12,14	14,66
	The Bridge (Most-Híd)	8,12	9,33

* PSNS and SNS at this point in time re-united as SNS. ** 2002 only SDKÙ

Sources:

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Poland

Election	Party	Votes (%)	Seats (%)
2001	Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)/Labour Union (UP)	41	
	- Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)		43,5
	- Labour Union (UP)		3,5
	Civic Platform (PO)	12,7	14,1
	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP-Samoobrona)	10,2	11,5
	Law and Justice (PiS)	9,5	9,6
	Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	8,9	9,1
	The League of Polish Families (LPR)	7,9	8,3
	Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right (AWSP)	5,6	0
	German Minority	0,4	0,1
2005	Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	11,3	11,9
	Civic Platform (PO)	24,1	28,9
	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP-Samoobrona)	11,4	12,2
	Law and Justice (PiS)	27	33,7
	Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	7	5,4
	League of Polish Families (LPR)	8	7,4
	German Minority	0,3	0,4
2007	The Left and the Democrats (LiD)*	13,15	11,5
	Civic Platform (PO)	41,51	45,4
	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP-Samoobrona)	1,53	0
	Law and Justice (PiS)	32,11	36,1
	Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	8,91	6,7
	The League of Polish Families (LPR)	1,3	0
	German Minority	0,2	0,2

* The Left and the Democrats (coalition of: SLD, Polish Social Democracy (SdPl), Labor Union (UP) and Democratic Party (PD).

Sources:

Jasiewicz, Krzysztof/Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2002). Poland, in: European Journal of Political Research 41(7-8): 1058-1059.
Jasiewicz, Krzysztof/Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2006). Poland, in: European Journal of Political Research 45(7-8): 1236.
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[1] Data for Austria is also available for 1999.
[2] Failing to conclude the accession process successfully would have been too unpopular with their respective electorates.
[3] The Nations in Transit database (NIT) developed by Freedom House to assess the political progress of transition nations confirms the success of the Czech Republic as does the *European Commission Progress Report* 1999.
[4] Klaus perceived the European Union as posing a threat to the Czech Republic in terms of infringing on sovereignty, imposing an undue regulatory burden, and representing undemocratic decision-making and technocratic rule (Vachudova 2008).
[5] The Republicans pursued an *"anti-Roma campaign [that] was too openly racist even for many of their supporters"* (Saxonberg 1999: 105).
[6] The party and its autocratic leader Victor Orbán sparked international criticism for implementing what observers and European Union officials considered an increasingly nationalist-authoritarian agenda.
[7] While the former two parties were re-established formations dating back to the pre-Communist period (Mészáros et al. 2007: 808), the latter rallied the more nationalist minded forces of the opposition to the Communist regime (Palonen 2009: 323). The three parties formed the first government after the breakdown of Communism (Ilonszki and Kurtán 1992: 421), and, in view of the general 'Euro-enthusiasm' of the early years, it is reasonable to explain their reluctance to adopt eurosceptical positions based on strategic calculus. Eventually, they toned down their pro-EU position or, in the case of the MDF, experienced political fragmentation due to internal dissent over the questions of Europe and national identity.
[8] For an overview of election results for all countries included in the paper, see Appendix I.
[9] Another interesting strategic coalition was one forged between Fidesz and Jobbik in the western Hungarian city of Székesfehérvár (Barlei and Hartleb 2010: 92). Incidentally, Jobbik had justified its racist anti-Roma policy objectives by making economic and not socio-cultural argument (Halasz 2009: 493).
[10] In addition, the early negotiations were complicated by the participation of the Christian National Union (ZChN) in government. That party harbored strong reservations about EU membership for fear that would subvert Catholic and national values. Thus, the government led by the Solidarity Electoral Action had to portray itself as a tough negotiator, which resulted in further tensions between Poland and the EU (Szczerbiak 2012: 11-13).
[11] Due to Poland's semi-presidential system and the cohabitation situation from 2007 onwards, pitting the Prime Minister Donald Tusk (PO) and the President Lech Kazcyński (PiS) against one another, permanent conflicts arose (Szczerbiak 2012: 21.The most controversial issue between the Prime Minister and the President was the Treaty of Lisbon, when the President refused to sign the ratification bill until the Irish had voted 'Yes' in the second referendum in 2009 (ibid.: 23). Following Kazcyński's death in a plane crash the former president was succeeded by Bronislaw Komorowski of the PO in subsequent elections.
[12] In the years 2001 and 2005 a part of the party called itself Real Slovak National Party (*Pravá slovenská národná strana*, PSNS). In 2006 the various groups reunited as Slovak National Party.
[13] Following independence, the rhetoric by HZDS and other parties against the ethnic Hungarians grew more intense, which re-enforced the socio-cultural while marginalizing the Hungarian parties in the Slovak party system. Along with socio-cultural issues, the HZDS sought to appeal to the losers of economic transition (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008: 535).
[14] The coalition consisted of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the right-centrist KDH, the liberal Democratic Union (DÚ), the liberal-conservative Democratic Party (DS), as well as the old Social Democrats and the Green Party (ZS). To build a common front against Mečiar, the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the newly established Party of Civic Understanding (SOP), and the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) composed of three Hungarian parties also supported the new government.
[15] The SDKÚ was established after the breakdown of the broad alliance SDK (Rybář 2006: 162).
[16] SaS party chairman Richard Sulík blamed Smer for the economic and moral decline in Slovakia, opposed the socioeconomic policies pursued by the Fico government and even before the elections refused a government coalition with Smer (Mesežnikov 2013: 62-63).
[17] The SDKÚ merged with the small Democratic Party (DS) in 2006.

[18] Party positions were measured using the following scales: 1) Position on EU integration: from 1=strongly opposed to 10=strongly in favor; 2) Minority Rights: from 0=strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities to 10=strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities; 3) Immigration: from 0=strongly opposes tough policy to 10=strongly favors tough policy; 4) Multiculturalism: from 0=strongly favors multiculturalism to 10=strongly favor assimilation; 5) Economy: 0=extreme left to 10=extreme right; 6) Left-Right dimension: 0=extreme left to 10=extreme right;
Salience was measured using following scales: 1) Position on EU integration: 0=European Integration is of no importance to 4=European integration Is the most important issue; 2) Minority rights: from 0=Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities to 10=strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities; 3) Immigration: from 0=not important at all to 10=extremely important; 4) Multiculturalism: from 0=not important at all to 10=extremely important.

[19] Nonetheless, the literature suggests that there were widespread perceptions of (especially Muslim) immigrants as posing a threat to the Polish identity (de Lange and Guerra 2009: 539).

[20] There was also no incentive to do so because the change in election rules provided Fidesz with a comfortable super majority after 2010.