‘Returning to Europe’ -- East Central Europe’s Complex Relationship with European Integration and its Repercussions

by Reinhard Heinisch and Christa Landsberger

Introduction

The transition process following the collapse of Communism throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 1989 has been generally described as a ‘return to Europe’. The project of ‘reconnecting’ with Europe reflected a desire on the part of the elites and at least a significant portion of the publics in CEE to (re)claim a heritage that, in political terms, entailed the creation of liberal democracy, and, in economic terms, the establishment of a market economy. The vehicle by which this was to be achieved most effectively was the participation in European integration and the Single Market. By 2007 most Central and East European countries had in fact become member states of the European Union. Only the Western Balkans and several countries that were once part of the Soviet Union have remained outside the EU but even for some of those cases, a road to future membership had been mapped out to them. The CEE countries that already joined the EU generally developed into stable democracies and open societies. Buffeted by foreign investments, the economic growth of CEE economies outstripped that of their Western counterparts for much of the past two decades. Wholesale modernization and numerous reforms have made these countries overall wealthier, economically more efficient, and significantly better governed. Moreover, countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary that may once have been viewed as too backward, too poor, or too different to really belong to the modern European family of nations no longer bear this stigma. They have emerged as equally respected members that carry their own weight in the European political affairs. As Southern Europe was once transformed into ‘Western Europe’ when Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal underwent their successful economic transformations as a result of EU accession, so too, did CEE benefit from the same process. Superficially viewed, the process of ‘returning to Europe’ can thus be considered an unmitigated success.

Yet, at a second glance the picture that emerges is a more complicated one. First and foremost, the road to EU membership was longer and more arduous for the CEE countries than had been the case for Southern Europe. In this context, it bears to remember that accession to the European Union was a broadly, but not a universally shared aspiration so that arguments about tempering or forgoing the EU membership process resonated with important constituent groups. So-called transition losers included workers in state-subsidized heavy industries, the public sector, small farmers on inefficient plots, and

people on fixed income such as pensioners. Others objected to accession on religious, cultural, or ideological grounds. As the process dragged on, it provided many opportunities to political entrepreneurs to take advantage of shifting preferences and momentary setbacks. In the generally less consolidated political systems of the new CEE democracies with their more volatile partisan environment, such opportunities were naturally more numerous than would have been the case in a more settled party-political landscape. At the same time, the political and economic transition process entailed severe redistributional conflicts that sharpened party-political competition and resulted in constituent groups that could be mobilized against different aspects of the reform agenda. This is not to say that such mobilization was necessarily directed against the European Union per se since the transformation to a market economy and the integration into the global economy were occurring regardless of accession. Often the ire was directed at domestic level when the transition process was poorly managed and corruption, political incompetence, and poor governance became all too obvious. By the same token, the people in CEE expected also significant financial support and a monitoring of underperforming national governments by Brussels and were thus generally willing to tolerate the conditions imposed for accession. The principal point here is that the accession process was a complex one with overlapping developments that could reinforce or neutralize one another. As such, the countries of CEE varied significantly both in their preparedness for EU membership and with respect to the political effort they were willing or able to undertake to move closer to accession. This, in turn, had important consequences for the reception of the candidate countries by the relevant European institutions and the perception of the integration process in the accession states themselves.

All this suggests that the relationship between 'Europe' and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has been governed by a large variety of factors and conditions. The following chapter seeks to trace this process by assessing which patterns have emerged and how we might best explain the sentiments toward Europe, specifically, the notions of Euroscepticism that subsequently developed across Central and Eastern Europe. While the focus will lie on party-based Euroscepticism, because political parties represent the major political institutions whose decisions most decisively translate into political outcomes, the following analysis will also provide an overview of the ebb and flow of popular support for Europe among CEE countries and trace the evolution of popular Euroscepticism.

Euroscepticism – A Brief Conceptual Introduction

The conceptualization of Euroscepticism has been a topic of considerable scholarship and intense debate for about 20 years now. Despite these efforts, none of the proposed conceptualizations has as of yet been universally accepted. Despite such difficulties, both scholarly and public interest in this research agenda have only increased as more and more so-called Eurosceptic parties have been successful in national as well as European elections and have, in some cases, even entered national governments.

For most of the postwar period there had been broad public support for European integration, which nearly all major parties in the respective member states eventually came to support. However, for most of that time period, 'Europe' remained to many people an abstraction or idealistic goal entailing the need to overcome past grievances and prevent future conflict. As the process of European integration continually added new member states, the emerging political system became more complex, increasing the potential for conflict. Simultaneously, the process of institutional deepening meant that its decisions increasingly affected the lives of ordinary people. Nonetheless, until the early 1990s European policy-makers could clearly point to a general consensus permitting them to proceed with further integration. Since then, however, this permissive consensus has been called into question. As public support for the EU and the integration process declined (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), it produced various effects on national party systems, most notably the emergence of Eurosceptic parties.

Among the best known conceptualizations and definitions of the phenomenon is the following by Paul Taggart (1998: 366): *"Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration"*. Taggart and Sczcerbiak (2001: 7), whose work on Euroscepticism includes Eastern European and is especially well-known, distinguish between "Hard Euroscepticism", the principled opposition to the EU and European integration[1], and "Soft Euroscepticism" defined as qualified opposition to the EU based on concerns about one or several policy areas where the national interest is believed to be at odds with the EU's trajectory (ibid).

Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 300) criticize the category of Soft Euroscepticism as too broad because "[…] *virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included*". In short, the definition of "Soft Euroscepticism" fails to account for bargaining hard in the national interest and thus lacks clear and fast criteria and decision rules (ibid.). Based on David Easton's (1965: 124) distinction between "diffuse and specific" forms of political support, Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 300) propose instead a conceptualization matrix of Euroscepticism that distinguishes support for the general ideas of European Inte-

gration that underlie the EU ("diffuse support") from "*support for the general practice of European Integration; that is the EU as it is and as it is developing*" ("specific support") (ibid.).

While there is no need to delve further into an academic discussion of typologies and variants of Euroscepticism, conceiving of Euroscepticism both in terms of magnitude and position serves as the point of departure for our own understanding of Euroscepticism that we will employ throughout this analysis.

As mentioned already in the introduction, we will focus primarily on party-based Euroscepticism because, ultimately, political opinions and sentiments never translate directly into outcomes but require the aggregation, interpretation, and translation by political parties. In doing so, we look not only at a party's position on Europe but also to the salience of such a position. In short, we are interested in the extent to which a party affords Eurosceptical positions prominence in its pronouncements, behavior, and programmatic manifestos. The salience that a party and its voters ascribe for instance to Euroscepticism is an important defining characteristic because it competes with a multitude of other agenda items in the political arena and, therefore, parties must make careful and effective choices about which issue to advance relative to others.[2]

In a final note here, we need acknowledge that the literature on Euroscepticism covers a range of other aspects and includes different conceptualizations that are only tangentially relevant for our purposes here.[3]

As this short literature review shows, the salience and position the 'European question' enjoys in political parties as they compete in an evolving electoral arena should be thought of as distinct and equally important dimensions. The analysis will return to this point later in this chapter. The following segments, however, are designed to provide an overview of the evolution of Euroscepticism in CEE, highlight common trends, and point out differences to developments in West European party systems.

The CEE Countries and Their Relationship with Europe – Common Trends

Existing literature generally describes the evolution of the public debate over Europe in Central and East Europe after the fall of Communism in terms of several periods. Although experts differ on the exact divisions and precise labels for this post-transition time span, all scholarship acknowledges that a clear shift in the public debate took place starting with the launch of accession negotiations by the EU with

five CEE countries in 1998 (Henderson 2008: 122, Neumayer 2008: 125). These included Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. A year later Romania, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta followed. These changes in the perception of Europe could be observed in the entire region at least to some degree and allow us to highlight common trends in the CEE countries' relationship with Europe.

The Transition and Post-Transition Period

Prior to accession negotiations, the public debate was generally dominated by the desire for a 'return to Europe'. This term had highly symbolic implications by expressing not only a historic aspiration but also by serving as a rallying cry to overcome a legacy of political and economic conditions that were seen as obstacles not only for the swift reintegration with Europe but also to a national modernization process. Also West European countries like Austria that had found it difficult to initiate en endogenous modernization process because of many domestic veto players opted for accession to European Union largely to bring about domestic economic change and boost competitiveness (Heinisch 2002). Political leaders in transition societies certainly found it easier to justify painful reform measures by pointing to a popular national goal—getting ready for EU membership—than to defend it in other ways.

A particular problem for all CEE countries was that they had historically been dominated by outside empires, not only the Soviet Union but also previously imperial Russia, the Habsburg Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. External domination had not only delayed modern state-formation but structured industrial development and economic progress along center-periphery relationships. As such, modernization and industrialization had occurred unevenly and were shaped to a large extent by economic and political interests outside the affected region.

Imperial domination had also created multiple ethnic narratives and competing historical claims of victimhood. Thus, the 'return to Europe' was seen not only "[…] *as a way of definitively exiting from the Soviet orbit, but also as a means of returning as quickly as possible to where the states would have been if the Communist takeovers of the 1940s had never happened*" (Henderson 2008: 121). Nevertheless, in many CEECs the long history of foreign domination had resulted in a strong preference for intergovernmentalist concepts of European integration. Therefore, a vision of a 'Europe of nations' has been promoted by major political actors in the region, such the major Hungarian party Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union, which rejects the idea of an 'European Super State' (Batory 2008a: 56). As a consequence,

debates about the finality of the integration process and the transfer of national sovereignty to yet another remote political center, Brussels, seem to be much more pronounced in CEE than in Western Europe.

Nevertheless, accession to the European Union was widely perceived as inevitable. The aim of becoming part of the 'elite club' of European states was mainly motivated by the emotional need to be accepted as inherent part of Europe and to gain recognition for the country's status as a modern European state. In addition, economic benefits expected from EU membership due to better access to markets, investments, and knowhow were used by political elites to justify the need for EU accession. However, economic considerations were clearly secondary motivations for seeking EU-membership during the post-transition period (Grabbe and Hughes 1999: 188). In short, the early discourse over Europe remained on quite a general and rather superficial level characterized by a "[…] *positive, if only romantic and illusory, consensus among the political elites and the public alike to become part of Europe"* as Petr Kopecký (2004: 226) puts it when referring to the Czech case.

As a consequence, the initial post-transition period provided little space for skeptical views on European integration and, therefore, political competition over issues related to Europe remained muted. This stands in marked contrast to Western Europe, which in the early 1990s saw a resurgence of critical attitudes toward Europe (Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 28). The growth in Euroscepticism both in terms of public opinion and party politics among the then 15 EU member states was mainly a result of European-level decision-making becoming more evident in the daily life of citizens.

If we conceive of European integration as three interconnected processes —a largely Franco-German peace and stability project, a market-building project, and redistributive project from Europe's core to its periphery— the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the realization of several milestones in this regard from which the Central and East European states were summarily excluded. At the time the 12 (and later 15) Western and Southern EU-member states successfully had created an integrated single market for goods and services, were preparing for the introduction of a single currency by the end of the decade, and were about to embark on a political union that promised to integrate political decision-making not only in market-related matters but also with respect to foreign and security policy as well as justice and home affairs.

The foundational document on which this new political union was to be based was the Treaty on European Union, better known as the Maastricht Treaty after the city where it was signed. As the Maastricht

process pushed political integration forward, West European publics became increasingly aware of the consequences of European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). The backlash came most ominously in the form of a rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by Danish voters in a referendum in 1992. However, despite growing opposition and a near defeat in another referendum in France, the Maastricht Treaty entered into force on November 1, 1993, thus transforming the European Community into the European Union. Yet, the perception that pro-European elites went ahead with deepening European integration despite growing popular misgivings only increased anti-EU sentiments. Besides the deeper institutional integration of political decision-making, the EU also embarked on a strategy of widening its membership. In successive rounds of enlargement, it took in new member-states, adding to the complexity of the Union. However, once nearly all of the prosperous West European nations had become member-states, future rounds of enlargement threatened to bring in only poorer countries from Europe's periphery. These would subsequently not only have unfettered access to Western labor-markets and draw away investments but also be entitled to significant transfers in resources through the so-called EU structural funds. The latter had been created under the auspices of cohesion policy to reduce regional disparities across Europe and were an important incentive for poorer countries to pursue EU membership. The prospect of Eastern enlargement and the possibility of the future accession of Turkey also increased public apprehension about the EU, particular in those countries that saw themselves most affected by these developments.

Meanwhile, large parts of the public in CEE remained highly 'Euroenthusiastic' throughout the 1990s as they lacked any experience with the so-called Maastricht process or European integration more generally (Riishøj 2004: 7). Consequently, while the 'permissive consensus' to further integration began to erode in Western Europe, general pro-integration sentiments prevailed in CEE until the end of the decade.

With regard to party competition in CEE polities, the broad consensus precluded a debate over Europe from developing. This is not to say that European issues did not play a role in the political discourse. However, the principal political actors neither questioned the goal of attaining EU membership nor did European issues offer political parties an opportunity to distance themselves from their competitors. As a consequence, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008a: 349-350) likened the political debate over Europe in most CEE countries to those common in 'systems of constrained' rather than 'open contestation' to highlight the exceptional nature of the situation in which an entire issue area was artificially closed off from political competition.

Nonetheless, also in the early post-transition period there were some political parties that opposed, or were critical of European membership. However, even most of these Eurosceptical groups differed from their counterparts in the West by centering their opposition on two ideological sources that would not have been mixed together in a Western party political context. In Western Europe, groups critical of the EU either tended to have traditionalist, authoritarian, and nationalist leanings and thus perceived integration as threat to the national identity; or, groups rejected European integration on the grounds of their opposition to the free market principle (Hooghe and Marks 2008), which applied typically to parties of the socioeconomic left. However, whereas traditionalist, authoritarian, and nationalist formations belong to the socioeconomic right and are thus prone to hold pro-market views, the parties of the socioeconomic left are generally more libertarian in sociocultural terms. As a consequence, some West European parties, like their constituencies, have been internally divided over European issues. What is more, Euroscepticism is rather dispersed than concentrated in West European party systems.

The situation was markedly different in CEE political systems. There, the two ideological sources of Euroscepticism—anti-market and anti-libertarian orientations—were frequently bundled together as a programmatic agenda for a single political party. Karen Henderson (2008: 121-122), taking after Herbert Kitschelt's work on Eastern party systems (1992), explains this as follows: During the initial development stage of party systems in post-Communist transition countries, the main conflict was between post-Communist parties representing authoritarian sociocultural views and anti-market attitudes on one side and culturally libertarian parties with pro-market orientations on the other. The latter had emerged from the civic and political opposition to the Communist regime and thus rejected what the latter had represented in terms of sociocultural and economic policies.

In order to understand the relationship between the initial condition of Euroscepticism and the transition dynamics better, it is useful to recall several insights by Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tóka's (1999) work on regime legacies. They distinguished bureaucratic-authoritarian Communism from national-accommodative and patrimonial Communism. The first type requires (a) the presence of a recalcitrant, orthodox ruling party "*[…] steeped in a strong working-class movement with pre-Communist origins*" (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 70), (b) a highly professionalized bureaucracy, and (c) a "*[…]potentially strong civil society with skills and political interpretations that in part derive from a functioning interwar democracy and the memory of capitalist industrialization*" (ibid). In that society, early industrialization and secularization removed religious and gender-related issues from political contestation but ethnic cleavages nonetheless remained. Yet, these were not strong enough to

translate into president political cleavages. The history of heavy-handed repression against all potential challenges precluded a regime change based on a negotiated transition with reform elements of the Communist regime, which would have been able to secure gains for the post-transition environment. However, the preceding period of utter repression left civil society without an institutional inventory to build on, requiring the emerging parties to begin from a position of relative weakness.

As sociocultural and national-cosmopolitan divides were less relevant in this type of society, the party system formed principally around the economic dimension where positions may range from unfettered laissez-faire market competition on the other extreme end of the spectrum to significant protections from unfavorable distributional transition outcomes. The strong demand for market-liberal reform policies was precisely a consequence of the presence of a highly-skilled, urban professional workforce used to operating in an advanced industrial structure. This created a political environment in which new political entrepreneurs "*[…] engage in programmatic product differentiation*" (Kitschelt et al.1999: 70) by offering a range of primarily economic policy alternatives from the left to the right. However, the resulting strong push for sweeping economic and societal change was opposed by all those who saw their past privileges jeopardized. Eventually, the very aggressiveness of the reform agenda provided elements of the discredited former Communists with a path back to political respectability as they subsequently morphed into the guardians of groups who saw themselves as transition losers.

In such a society, the question of Europe tended to turn on the socio-economic divide and was shaped ultimately by an economic calculus. The country that is most commonly associated with this type of Communist legacy is the Czech Republic and to a lesser extent the Former East Germany. Because of reunification and the incorporation of the former GDR into the larger Federal Republic, the East German case is indeed so special that it may not be useful as a comparison case here. However, the Czech Republic as we shall see below, displayed indeed a surprisingly ambivalent trajectory in its relationship with Europe. Whereas its fitness for EU membership based on its political and economic record was never really questioned either by international observers or the Czech people, the Czech Republic developed one of the few genuinely Eurosceptic mainstream parties, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The country also ended up with the poorest compliance record with EU accession requirements of any of the eight applicant countries (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007).

In what Kitschelt et al. (1999: 23) dubbed “patrimonial Communism” the political regime was based on a mixture of cooption and repression. It tended to rely on vertical chains of personal dependence between leaders in the state and party apparatus and their entourage. This in turn resulted in elaborate patronage and clientelistic networks, whose power was concentrated around small coteries or individual rulers when the system was at its apex. As a result of rent-seeking by political insiders, pervasive personalistic network and nepotistic appointments, bureaucratic-rationalist institutional development remained stunted. Lacking a sufficiently large proletarian base in formerly mostly agrarian societies, Communist rulers constructed an industrial society that delivered unprecedented economic progress in an otherwise traditional society, largely by subsidizing heavy industry at the expense of an utterly exploited peasantry. This allowed the Communist rulers to co-opt the beneficiaries of the material gains of modernization into the party, reinforcing clientelistic networks and creating positive memories of genuine progress. By the same token, the lack of any popular memory of either a successful pre-Communist modernization or an urban middle-class removed political alternatives to a continued Communist participation in politics from the public’s consciousness. It is these sentiments to which elements of the former Communist establishment could appeal during and after a transition process. Generally, such regimes sought either to engage in preemptive reforms or at least manage the transition process. As a result, the democratic successor regime had to contend with a deeply corrupt and an unprofessional state apparatus penetrated by clientelistic networks. Moreover, the emerging political system was characterized by a weak and disorganized anti-Communist opposition without either practical experience or memory of a non-socialist project of societal development.

Whereas the post-Communist forces clearly continued to favor protectionist (and in some cases nationalist) positions, the anti-Communist strategies pursued by the other parties typically led them to embrace the principal area they could claim for themselves which was the exploitation of latent national, ethnic, and socio-cultural divides. As a consequence, we saw authoritarian-collectivist and nationalist positions gain currency accompanied by making appeals to traditionalism, religion, and mythology. Market-liberal, cosmopolitan, und universalistic-individualistic norms often remained limited to smaller urban-based political groups who required problematic political alliances with either traditionalist bourgeoisie parties or the post-Communists. Of the CEE countries, Kitschelt et al. (1999) grouped Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, Macedonia, and to a lesser extent Serbia, Slovakia, and the three Baltic states in this category. Needless to say, such a political legacy contributed to a poor performance record in terms of good governance, transparency, openness, and rule of law all of which were expected from an on-going member state of the EU. Not surprisingly, this threatened temporarily Slovakia's timely ac-

cession, caused a two-year delay and additional scrutiny for Bulgaria and Romania, and also thwarted the membership aspirations of Macedonia and Serbia for the foreseeable future.

This latter group of countries also shares traits with the third Communist legacy described by Kitschelt et al. (1999): National-accommodative Communism. This Communist regime type was typically imposed from without but had roots also in a domestic revolutionary labor movement. The Communist party was often merged with other proletarian parties, creating the seeds for later internal divisions. Prior to the establishment of the regime, bourgeoisie parties and civil institutions were strong enough that remnants continued to play a role during Communist rule and served as a nucleus for opposition. National Communist leaders adopted an accommodative strategy by allowing selective reforms designed to achieve a modicum of independence from Moscow and thus some popular legitimacy. When the external support for the regime vanished, the power structure fragmented along a reform agenda. The ensuing transition typically took the route of negotiated pacts with the emerging civic opposition, which allowed the reform Communists to lock in some advantages for the post-transition period. When faced with the uncertainties of economic reforms and the challenges of the EU-accession, the post-Communists rapidly changed their reputation and popular appeal. This, together with their residual organizational strength quickly enabled them to "[…] *become serious democratic alternatives to the former dissidents' parties*" (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 30). Whereas this Communist regime type included countries such as Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia, Kitschelt et al. (1999) regard Poland a mixed type by sharing also characteristics of the bureaucratic-Communist regime legacy. By comparison, the Baltic States along with Slovakia and Serbia are seen as sharing both national-accommodative and patrimonial Communist legacies.

The work of Kitschelt and others (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999, Huntington 1991) is important as it allows us to understand the initial condition following regime transition. As a result, Euroscepticism was initially almost exclusively found in 'residual Communist' parties and among Communist hard-line groups that had split from more the reform-minded Communist successor parties. There were also exceptions to this rule such as the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which will be discussed in more detail further below. In general, the pro-/anti-EU conflict was largely congruent with the conflict between reformers and unreconstructed Communists. The overlap in conflict dimensions was naturally exploited by the reformers as an additional means to distance themselves from the former Communists and brand the latter as 'Eurosceptics'. Applying such a label proved advantageous with an electorate for which a pro-European stance was the 'political norm' (Neumayer 2008: 135).

The work on regime transitions also allows us to gain an understanding of the kinds of cleavages that emerged in CEE. Whereas, in the Czech Republic, the political division revolved around socioeconomic questions, in countries associated more with national accommodative and patrimonial Communist regime legacies, sociocultural fault lines became more prominent. While these divisions did not immediately manifest themselves in terms of Euroscepticism, many of these regime legacies would eventually bring forth political parties, typically of the protest variety, for which questions of ethnicity, national identity, and authoritarian dispositions were central. Often, these new protest parties would in due course adopt also Eurosceptical positions for reasons of ideology, strategy, or both. In short, the role of regime legacy mattered in terms of creating conditions that were conducive to creating anti-European sentiments beyond the socioeconomic dimension. However, the role of past regime types should not be seen as either deterministic or adequate to explain the variations in Euroscepticism that eventually emerged between political parties within a political system or between entire CEE polities.

Negotiating Membership -- The Accession Process

With the opening of accession negotiations, a shift in public debate over Europe took place (Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2006: 143). The accession requirements entailed both the *Acquis Communautaire*— the EU's accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions—, which must be negotiated chapter by chapter, and the so-called Copenhagen Criteria. The latter define the eligibility for membership based on certain standards of democratic governance, human rights, and a functioning market economy as reflected in the existing institutions, political practice, and the norms and values governing a society. Subject to negotiations were above all agricultural and regional subsidies, the sale of real estate, and the free movement of labor. Furthermore, negotiators expressed worries about a loss of (recently regained) national sovereignty and the undermining of Catholic values as a result of EU. Finally, against the background of how the negotiation process was perceived, the question of the institutional representation of smaller (and larger) states also became a hot topic (Henderson 2008: 122). In instances where economic reforms seemed particularly painful, where accession countries wanted to protect vulnerable economic sectors from Western competition or a financial takeover, and where the treatment of ethnic minorities had run afoul of EU standards, the emerging disagreements with Brussels could be exploited by domestic political entrepreneurs for political advantage. The extent to which the EU imposed criteria by which it measured the progress of candidate countries was called 'conditionality', an index of which

provided a rough gauge of the burden that the national political systems had to bear. The greater the cost and the higher the conditionality, the greater was the potential for political opponents of the government to exploit the accession process (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007). By contrast, the parties locked in intense negotiations with the European Commission and the EU member states had rather little room to maneuver and were largely unable to modify their positions with respect to accession. This meant that they had to absorb the brunt of criticism that came from the opposition and the public. In those countries where conditionality was lower, political parties including those in the government were freer to maneuver. In turn, the lower cost of membership provided also fewer opportunities for political exploitation.

As EU membership drew nearer, the public and political elites became more aware of possible consequences of EU accession which increased the salience of the European issue and moved the debate from generalities to specifics. What is more, the exclusion of the Central and East European states from the European integration process until their actual membership in 2004 and 2007 respectively, and the long pre-accession periods also undermined the initially strong pro-European sentiments. Although the formal accession process between application and membership took about ten years for East European countries and was therefore not longer than had been the case for Southern Europe, the lapse of time between the return to democracy and EU accession was much more drawn out (15 years). Whereas for countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain, EU accession was closely connected with the process of democratic transition and consolidation (cf. Diez-Medrano 2003), this was less the case for CEE. As Leconte (2010: 73) observes, in countries where such processes are especially lengthy, the "[…] *perception of a link between the two processes can be eroded*" (ibid.).

Besides the frustrations shared by all CEE countries in the negotiations with Brussels, each country had specific problems and faced accession conditions that touched upon locally particular sensitive issues such the fear wholesale foreign landownership in Hungary and Slovenia or the issue of smallholders in Poland. These led to negative political reactions domestically and contributed to a growing perception that the negotiation process was asymmetrical and protracted (Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 28). When 'accession fatigue' was beginning to set in across the EU and admission criteria were more selectively applied so that the conditions imposed on Bulgaria and Romania became more stringent than for the rest (Grabbe 2002, Vachudova 2005), there was also a growing perception across CEE that the admission process was manipulated for political gain by the West Europeans. Thus, a clear shift from a superficial, very enthusiastic discourse about EU membership to a more nuanced discussion about specific aspects

of the European Union and the pros and cons of accession took place. In due course, the initial 'Euroenthusiasm' was partly replaced by growing 'Eurorealism' and even 'Euroscepticism' both on part of the elites and the population at large (Riishøj 2004: 7).

It is useful at this point to recall the earlier reference to David Easton's distinction between diffuse and specific political support, which offers an insight into the development of Eurosceptical attitudes in CEE publics. At the beginning, when other alternatives had failed and national isolation was the less appealing option, all transition countries sought to anchor themselves in a 'New Europe'. The road to Europe offered the most obvious promise of economic and political advancement. Naturally, diffuse support for Europe was relatively high as long as the cost of integration was perceived to be low, or at least much lower than the potential gains. Therefore, party competition in the early post-transition phase did not turn on the question of whether or not Europe should be the goal but centered instead on the speed and extent of the economic reforms in preparation for eventual accession.

However, just as had happened in Western Europe, the apprehension toward EU membership grew when 'Europe' morphed from an abstract goal into concrete policies and requirements that exacted a political toll. At that juncture, political actors had to adopt positions vis-à-vis the specific requirements in the accession process because candidate countries were reviewed regularly on their progress by the European Commission. To the extent that parties represented an agenda that overlapped with the requirements imposed by the European Union, party elites were naturally supportive whereas in areas where sticking points had developed in the negotiations with Brussels, a political space for party competition opened up.

This shift in the national debates on Europe made it easier for political actors to adopt critical views on the entire process and especially on the way accession negotiations were conducted. Opposition parties, in particular, took aim at the 'weakness' of the government in defending national interests (Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 29). What is more, in most of CEE, completely autonomous national decision-making was a new experience. This gain appeared to be in jeopardy once countries had opted for membership in a supranational system of governance like European Union dominated by powerful Western European states. It is easy to understand the fear of those such as the Czech leader of the ODS Vaclav Klaus who concluded that his country risked replacing one remote center of domination in the form of Moscow with another called Brussels (Vachudova 2008).

The normative pro-European stance was replaced by a pragmatic 'yes-but' position toward EU accession. In order to avoid possible disadvantages resulting from being perceived as too Eurosceptic, politicians in the CEE introduced the label of 'Eurorealism', i.e., "[…] *support for the principle of European integration and disapproval of the accession conditions offered to the CEECs* (Neumayer 2008: 136.). These developments were accompanied by a realignment of political parties that ran counter to the initial assumptions that the political conflict in CEE would be between a pro-market/libertarian and anti-market/authoritarian political forces. Parties on the economic right, most notably the Fidesz in Hungary and the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) in Poland moved increasingly from the libertarian to the traditional and nationalist pole in terms of value orientations. Also, the subsequent emergence of a Polish mainstream party, the Law and Justice Party (PiS), with similar traditionalist orientations and considerable Eurosceptical leanings further underscores this transformation of Central and East European party systems (Henderson 2008: 122-123).

As already mentioned, CEE countries with national accommodative and/or patrimonial Communist roots— to draw once again on Kitschelt's analysis of regime legacies (Kitschelt et al.1999)—were more prone to develop traditionalist, authoritarian, and nationalist parties. Although they were for the most part national protest parties that formed around cultural, religious, and ethnic cleavages, they often included a degree of Euroscepticism in their programmatic mix. This was in some cases little more than a strategic move intended to secure a momentary advantage in the political market place. In other instances, such parties were motivated by ideology and culture in that they perceived the EU as inimical to religion, national identity, and tradition. Examples include the Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona), the League of Polish Families (LPR), Jobbik in Hungary, and Ataka in Bulgaria. To the extent that accession imposed limits to which these parties could pursue their radical goals because they conflicted with the Copenhagen criteria and other norms, the EU came into the political crosshairs of political activists who resented such strictures.

Generally speaking, the accession process resulted in a realignment partially transforming Europhile into Eurorealistic positions in a majority of parties and allowing for the emergence or strengthening of fringe parties, many of which also adopted Eurosceptical positions.

At the same time, the majority of Communist successor parties that had previously been expected to be potential obstacles to accession were forced to moderate their anti-market attitudes. Not doing so would have been incompatible with the EU's economic criteria for admission and was also increasingly unpopular with the electorate. As a consequence, many of the ex-Communist parties transformed

themselves into variants of Social Democracy. In fact, Vachudova and Hooghe (2009: 190) assumed that the evolution of former Communist parties would be crucial for the dynamics of party competition, and, in particular, for positions that other parties would adopt toward European integration. In their research they expected that by rejecting European integration, an unreformed communist successor party would induce other parties to a Eurosceptical stance as well because this would represent an *"[…] authoritative voice for demarcation*" (ibid.) limiting the system's exposure to EU leverage. However, as post-Communist parties have frequently moderated their view on Europe, newly established parties have been trying to fill the Eurosceptic gap left by the reform Communists. What is more, the overlapping cleavage between the pro-/ anti-EU and non-Communist/Communist conflict, so characteristic of the early transition years eroded, which made it easier for non-Communist parties to adopt critical attitudes toward the EU.

With regard to their orientation toward Europe, this shift meant that the Communist successor parties were no longer Eurosceptic or Europhobe but became, paradoxically, Europhile. This in turn, freed Catholic parties like the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in Slovakia from having to forge an alliance with pro-EU parties against the Communists. As a result, they became increasingly critical of the secularism and cultural liberalism associated with European integration (Henderson 2008: 122).Hence, the European issue was now of limited use for non-Communist parties to differentiate themselves from former Communist parties. By contrast, 'Europe' was increasingly used to draw a clear dividing line between mainstream parties and protest parties, reflected by the opposition between 'Eurorealism' and 'Euroscepticism'. In addition, mainstream politicians employed the two labels to blame each other for jeopardizing the country's successful integration and to present themselves as forces supporting EU membership while also delivering on questions of national interest (Neumayer 2008: 155).

All these developments led to a leveling of the differences between CEE and Western Europe in terms of the public debate over Europe. Whereas in Western Europe the 'permissive consensus' has begun to erode at the latest with Maastricht, the experience of accession negotiations diminished the 'Euroenthusiasm' in CEE. As the European issues were increasingly incorporated into party competition, Central and East European party systems substantially converged on the Western model. Eurosceptic forces were no longer concentrated at a unitary authoritarian/anti-market pole but became more dispersed. By the same token, also some former pro-European parties of the economic right increasingly adopted critical positions toward Europe, thus mimicking developments we have seen in Western Eu-

rope. However, unique to CEE were the 'Eurorealistic' or 'Europragmatic' parties that emerged from the perception of asymmetrical accession negotiations with the more powerful EU (Henderson 2008: 125).

The Post-Accession Period

The realignment of the CEE party systems along with its convergence on the Western model makes regime legacies less useful as a tool for understanding both cross-national differences and the behavioral choices of individual parties. Kitschelt and others working on the influence regime types (Kitschelt et al. 1999) provide us with an understanding of both the initial post-transition period and the subsequent emergence of political cleavages such as rural versus urban, secular versus religion, market versus non-market, and ethnic minority versus majority. However, such insights can give us at best a better sense of the sociocultural context in which parties make decision but do not allow us to make predictions about strategic choices a given set of parties is likely to pursue in the future. In fact, the implication of Kitschelt's work that East European party systems would predict a persistent cleavage between pro-market/libertarian and an anti-market/authoritarian orientations, which turned out not to be case (Henderson 2008: 122-123). Moreover, recent findings (c.f. Rovny 2011) suggest not only that the CEE political systems approach the Western template but that ,in fact, West European party systems appear to be converging on trends once characteristic of Central and East European polities. Across the old member states, political volatility has increased and radical new parties have begun challenging long entrenched party systems. Previously, an important difference between old and new member states had been that in the latter, the political mainstream and even government parties tended to adopt a 'Eurorealist' approach whereas in West Europe the major parties were notably more pro-European with the exception of the Conservatives in the UK (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004: 14).

As perceptions of integration changed, the overall support for membership among the Central and East European including the Baltic States (50.7 percent) had fallen, by 2010, even below the averages shown by the old 15 EU member states (57.6 percent) (cf. Figure 1). However, when one accounts for the extreme case of Latvia, which is clearly an outlier with only 23 percent approval of membership[4], average membership support between old and new member states is rather similar. Among the new EU members, Hungary has a substantially lower level of support with 43 percent than the rest with a combined average of some 53percent. By comparison, Slovakia (68 percent), Poland (61 percent), and Romania (64 percent) are the most enthusiastic about the EU. Although the general trends in support for member-

ships in both Eastern and Western Europe have been downward, there are notable exceptions in three CEE countries. More Slovaks, Bulgarians, and Estonians thought in 2010 that membership was "a good thing" than did so only two years earlier (*Eurobarometer* 69.1; *Eurobarometer* 75)

<Figure 1 about here>

Yet, the question of whether membership was a 'good thing' as is regularly posed by the *Eurobarometer* surveys is a complex one that subsumes many different aspects and turns also on the subjective understanding of whether 'good' is meant in an absolute or relative (to other realistic alternatives) sense. Therefore, a much more useful measure for our purposes is the 'trust in European institutions' relative to the trust placed in national governments (*Eurobarometer* 70.1, 71.2). As Figure 2 clearly reveals, there are generally higher levels of trust in the EU among CEE publics than among their West European counterparts. More strikingly, there is a clear difference in the pattern between Eastern and Western EU member states when it comes to trusting the EU versus the national government. In CEE countries the public places on average considerably more trust in EU institutions (53.3 percent vs. 25.6 percent) than people do in their own national political system whereas among the old member states the trust in the EU and in their own governments runs about even with 43.9 percent versus 42.7 percent.

<Figure 2 about here>

Also when people are asked about the benefit of EU membership, a slightly higher ratio of Central and East Europeans agree that "*their country has on averaged benefited*" from membership (cf. Figure 3) then do West European respondents. Even in extremely Eurosceptic Latvia, some 47 percent of the people concede that their nation has drawn benefits from membership. Among the Central European states, Poland and Slovakia score the highest on this question with 73 percent and 72 percent approval respectively.

<Figure 3 about here>

In short, the slow rise of Euroscepticism across CEE polities should also not be overstated because parties rejecting European integration ('Hard' Eurosceptics or Eurorejects) have been less relevant and less electorally successful in most of the region than in several Western party systems (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 16-17). Although, critical views about Europe have become more widespread and accepted in CEE, the generally affirmative consensus concerning EU membership has prevailed.[5]Particularly the fact that trust in EU institutions has remained comparably high among CEE publics, leads one to conclude that Eurosceptic parties have so far not been as influential where Europe is concerned as one would assume on the basis of election outcomes.

Despite these common trends in the evolution of the public debate about Europe in CEE countries there exists also significant variation between them in terms of the level and manifestation of party-based and public Euroscepticism. When we graph the support for EU membership among CEE countries from 2001 to 2010, we notice a curious pattern in that only the Czech Republic and Slovenia started with levels of support below 50 percent if we leave aside the Baltic States with their particular circumstances (cf. Figure 4).

In the Czech case, a mainstream party represented a Eurosceptical course, which was advocated by its leader and later national president Vaclav Klaus. In tiny Slovenia, concerns about land acquisition by German, Italian, and Austrian investors, protectionist fears about local businesses, and a recent hard-fought struggle for independence were all factors in the public debate about the EU. Both the Czech Republic and Slovenia saw an upswing in support prior to accession to be followed by a decline and another peak before dropping off again somewhat. Nevertheless, overall levels of support remained fairly constant and became even slightly stronger in the case of Slovenia. We may assume that as the Slovenes' fear about their role in the EU eased, membership support stabilized and even picked up.

<Figure 4 about here>

Poland and Slovakia exhibit a different pattern in that initial support for the EU was significantly higher than in the previous two cases. Yet, in the course of the decade, support for membership declined somewhat, which in Poland coincided with the government of the Eurosceptic Law-and-Justice Party (PiS) along with its junior partners Self-Defense and League of Polish Families (LPR). Nonetheless, the drop was not particularly pronounced in either case and by 2010 support had rebounded in Slovakia to levels even higher than at the beginning of the decade.

Hungary is the clear standout among the three Central European countries. In 2000 its support was the highest (59 percent) among the so-called Visegrad Group that includes also Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Yet, subsequently, support plummeted in two stages, first after accession in 2004 and then again after 2006. By 2010 support for EU membership was less than half of what it had been a decade earlier (cf. Figure 4).

In the cases of the 'late-comers' Bulgaria and Romania which joined in 2007, we notice extremely high levels of membership support early on with 80 percent for the former and 74 percent for the latter. What followed was a precipitous decline, especially around the time when the more successful CEE countries managed to enter the EU. Nonetheless, support for the EU rebounded, settling above 50 percent for Bulgaria and 60 percent for Romania (cf. Figure 4).

The overall pattern that emerges shows a considerable spread in the levels of Euroscepticism among CEE member states in the binning of the decade. Subsequently, as the accession process continued, we notice a tightening in the pattern as the trend lines in EU-support converge around the middle of the 2000s only to diverge once more toward the end of the decade. We also clearly notice in Figure 4 that the developments are not uniform, resulting in a significant variation in EU-support at every period between 2001 and 2010. Only the accession and immediate post-accession stage had some constraining effect in that support levels (along with expectations) tended to build before entry, only to decline somewhat thereafter.

Summing up, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe increasingly diverge with respect to their support for Europe so it has become exceedingly difficult to establish common patterns as we move away from the constraints of the accession process. Additional factors such as economic hardship in the wake of the global financial crisis, which hit some countries harder (e.g., Hungary) than others (e.g., Poland), have certainly been factors as well. As it becomes harder to treat these countries as a single group, it is useful to look at each case separately to develop a better understanding of what explains the respective

perception of the EU and European integration. Nonetheless, the fact that the support for membership continues to be strong and that the trust placed in EU-institutions as opposed to national institutions is still relatively high makes us wonder why we have seen the emergence of some many Eurosceptic parties across CEE. This remains an interesting puzzle which we will explore in the subsequent section.

Determinants of the Success of Eurosceptic Parties in CEE

In the following, we turn to the question of why Eurosceptic parties have done rather well among largely pro-European CEE electorates. As Table 1 shows, overall support for Eurosceptic parties in CEE has been substantial and generally larger than in West European party systems. However, it is important to note that the cumulative totals were driven mainly by preferences for 'Soft' Eurosceptic parties and not, as in Western Europe, by support for 'Hard' Euroscepticism.

>Table 1 about here<

Yet, the influence of such parties on undermining popular trust in the EU has been comparatively minor (cf.Figure 2). What is more, the electoral success of parties embracing critical positions toward European integration varies over time and across countries as the following graph illustrates:[6]

>Figure 5 about here<

As already suggested, a large majority of these Eurosceptic parties are in formations whose ire is directed to a large extent at domestic politics. Very few of them appear to be genuinely Eurosceptic at their core. From this point of view, Euroscepticism represents only one other element within an overall protest strategy that aims to attract voters dissatisfied with domestic politics. One may argue therefore that the electoral success of most of these 'Eurosceptic' parties is not a function of their Euroscepticism but rather of popular dissatisfaction with the actual behavior of the mainstream parties resulting from (a) the (perceived) lack of programmatic differences between the mainstream parties and (b) the (perceived) underperformance of the mainstream parties.

Consequently, we may assume that most of the so called 'Eurosceptic' parties in CEE have to be understood as Mixed Protest parties, which, like other populist parties, try to capitalize on protest votes against domestic politics but differ from Nationalist Protest parties by using Euroscepticism to send an

additional signal to the electorate that they are different. By contrast, 'genuine' Eurosceptic parties do not pursue a strategy of mobilizing protest against domestic politics but rather want to attract voters opposed to European integration. Therefore, we may distinguish between three subtypes of protest parties: Two of them (Nationalist and Mixed Populist parties) direct their protest toward domestic politics while only one subtype (Genuine Eurosceptic parties) can be regarded as a party intent on mobilizing protest against European integration.

The considerable discontentment with national politics is born out not only by the low trust CEE publics place in their own national political systems but also the widespread perception of corruption, clientelism, and lack of transparency, reflected in data such as those compiled by *Transparency International*. Based on its *Corruption Perception Index* (CPI), all CEE countries score relatively low compared to most West European countries with the exception of Italy and Greece and to a lesser extent Spain and Portugal. Figure 6 provides an overview of average CPI scores for CEE countries from 2001 to 2011.

>Figure 6 about here<

Overall Slovenia and Hungary performed relatively the best with scores about 50 percent higher than the laggards Bulgaria and Romania. The other countries were somewhere in the middle. Except for Poland where the perception of corruption has been declining in recent year (CPI scores[7]: 2009 (5); 2011 (5.5)), the trend in all other CEE countries has been pointing in a negative direction. It is therefore plausible that the support for protest parties is primarily driven by the public's frustration with national politics and the political mainstream. To disassociate themselves from the major parties, many (but not all) populist parties adopt Eurosceptical positions.

A way to test the importance of the Eurosceptical dimension to those parties is to assess the salience they attribute to European issues compared to other political topics. It follows that we may differentiate protest parties from the mainstream parties in that the latter are unlikely to ascribe much salience to either Eurosceptical or nationalist populist positions.

We may, therefore, differenciate three types of protest parties—Eurosceptic, mixed, and nationalist protest parties: Genuine Eurosceptic parties will give a clear preference to European issues, national protest parties will focus on domestic matters, and mixed protest parties will seek to combine the two issue dimensions. However, instead of focusing on the position a party adopts, it makes sense to use the salience attributed to a position as our measure of a party's commitment to an issue. This process allows for a differenciation among divergent party types within the spectrum of protest parties. Consequently,

genuine Eurosceptical parties are characterized by a high degree of salience attributed to Eurosceptical positions in combination with low levels of salience ascribed to nationalist populist positions (if demonstrating such positions at all). By contrast, nationalist protest parties attribute a high degree of salience to nationalist populist positions and a low degree of salience to Eurosceptical positions (if demonstrating such positions at all). Mixed protest parties demonstrate an approximately equal degree of salience toward Eurosceptical as well as national populist positions.[8]

Drawing on this typology of classifying parties, we used data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey to test this argument in three selected CCE countries. The data set offers the advantage that it features information on the parties' positions as well as on the salience parties attach to these positions. Using straightforward computational techniques[9] , we obtain a measure of the salience of EU-related positions versus national-populist positions which we call Sal_{rel}.

The resulting coefficient for Sal_{rel} ranges from +1 (only EU-Dimension is salient to party) to -1 (only Nationalist Populist-Dimension is salient to party) while equaling 0 if both dimension are equally salient to a party. The findings are depicted in Figure 7.

<Figure 7 about here>

As the results clearly indicate there are only three instances in which Eurosceptical attitudes seem more salient to protest parties than 'Nationalist populist' issues. But only the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) is exclusively devoted to a Eurosceptical agenda. By contrast, in the cases of the Polish party Self-Defense (S) and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), the Eurosceptical position is only a little more salient to the parties than is their stance on the populist dimension. Similar to Self-Defense and the KSS, but in reversed order, other well-known CEE parties such as the Polish parties Law-and-Justice (PiS) and the League of Polish Families (LPR), but also the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and the Hungarian party Jobbik turned out to be Mixed Protest parties. Finally, seven parties can be identified as Nationalist Protest parties: the Hungarian parties Fidesz, Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), as well as the Slovakian Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Slovakian People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS), the Slovak National Party (SNS), and SMER.

With regard to the effects of a party's Euroscepticism on the three levels (the party's behavior, other parties' behavior, and voting behavior) we hypothesize considerable differences between Genuine Eurosceptic parties and the two other subtypes of protest parties. That is why we advocate classifying only

those parties as Eurosceptic that can be expected to translate their critical position toward Europe into behavior and, therefore, affect voting behavior as well as the strategic interaction with, and between other parties:

>Table 2 about here<

Since in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia all of the parties with views critical of European integration belong to the type of Mixed or Nationalist Protest parties, we expect their Euroscepticism neither to affect the party's behavior, nor the behavior of other parties, nor voting behavior as such. As a consequence, we caution against overstating the impact of Mixed Protest parties with respect to Euroscepticism and thus the potential danger such parties represent for the future of the integration process. First and foremost, these parties are unlikely to translate their Euroscepticism into action. With regard to the electorate, we suggest that the success of these parties should not be interpreted as sign of a withdrawal of support to European integration on part of the public. In short, we find little evidence that so-called 'Eurosceptic' parties in CEE will affect the future of the European Union in as a negative a way as some analysts fear.

Summing up, in the course of transition and accession, support for the EU has declined both among East European publics and parties. This was clearly linked to a process whereby rather abstract ideas about Europe clashed with the hard reality of policy choices and difficult tradeoffs that resulted from membership constraints. Since accession also held out important rewards and as applicant countries varied in their level of preparedness for membership, publics and parties across the region did not react uniformly to the challenges. Nonetheless, there were noticeable common trends in that the declining enthusiasm for European integration did not translate into outright rejection, not even on the part of the Czech ODS, but rather into varying degrees of Eurorealism. The same can be said for CEE publics. Declining support did for the most part not translate into outright alienation. Across CEE the populations typically place greater trust in EU institutions than in national ones and even in the relatively Eurosceptic Czech Republic, some 77 percent of the people opted for accession in the national referendum. To the extent we have seen the emergence of radical protest parties with Eurosceptical messages across the region, the data we present here support the conclusion that voting for them has been mainly due to domestic considerations. Lastly, its needs to be emphasized that the political landscape in CEE is a fluid one and attitudes continue to evolve. In fact, they may be particularly shaped by the experiences with the financial crisis after 2008 and the subsequent difficulties in the Euro-zone. However, the long-term impact and repercussions of these developments are as of yet unclear.

To provide a more nuanced picture and gain a better understanding of the evolution of the relationship between the European Union and CEE, we provide three case studies that illustrate important aspects of the so-called return to Europe.

Czech Republic

In 'returning to Europe,' the Czech Republic enjoyed clear advantages compared to all other transition countries. Having 'unburdened' itself of less modernized Slovakia following the velvet divorce in 1991, the country was ethnically fairly unified, could look back at a successful pre-Communist bourgeois democracy, had a tradition of endogenous societal and economic modernization, and was also less encumbered by a large backward agricultural sector than either Poland or Hungary. In fact, during the early and mid-1990s the Czech Republic was generally considered *"[…] the most successful transition economy in Central and East Europe*" (World Bank 1999). Moreover, its sweeping privatization program was launched at a rate faster than was the case in other transition countries. At the same time Prague managed to avoid excessive levels of inflation and unemployment as well as other economic disruptions so typical of post-Communist economies. As a result, the Czech Republic (along with Slovenia) topped the rankings of European transition economies in terms of GDP growth, curbing inflation, and fiscal stability. This cemented the country's international reputation as the frontrunner among the post-communist successor states (cf. Shepherd 2000). The economic success was matched by political progress in terms of good governance, respect for civil liberties, and political transparency.[10] The so-called 'Czech miracle' was accompanied by a clear sense of national identity and a general consensus about the country's direction. Whereas Catholicism exerted a special pull in Polish society while Hungary continued to wrestle with the 'trauma (of the Treaty) of Trianon', resulting in both cases in political agendas that conflicted with modernization, Czech society seemed free from such political distractions. This sense of inevitability that the Czech Republic would quickly take its rightful place among the more advanced West European states was shared by a self-confident and forward-looking public that regarded the return to Europe as a national destiny long denied to them by an unfair history.

In party political terms, the disintegration of the Civic Form in 1991 paved the way for the creation of a new mainstream party—the Civic Democratic Party (ODS)—formed around a staunchly anti-communist and market-liberal philosophy. Surprisingly, it would also emerge as one of the few gen-

uinely Eurosceptic parties in CEE. Unusual was the fact that this was a mainstream party that nonetheless devoted a great deal of attention to the European issue. In most other cases, Euroscepticism was confined to populist and/or protest parties for which an anti-European rhetoric offered a means to distinguish themselves from the mainstream and/or their competitors. By contrast, the ODS was a major democratic party in the most advanced transition country. The driving force behind the *"[…] radicalization in the party's Euroscepticism*" (Hanley 2002) was arguably the leadership of Vaclav Klaus and his personal agenda. Influenced by a quasi-Thatcherite understanding of the European Union, he consistently portrayed the former as a *"[…] dangerous socialist experiment*" that threatened national sovereignty (Vachudova 2008). Although the party never went as far as rejecting EU membership outright, it continuously nurtured Euroscepticism, culminating in a party program in 2002 that included a special chapter on the EU in which two thirds of the references made to European integration were negative (Hloušek and Pšjea 2009).

As had been predicted by a careful reading of Kitschelt's analysis of regime legacy, the central political cleavage in the Czech Republic was socioeconomic so that the speed and extent of economic reform was the predominant agenda. Ironically however, it was the pro-market ODS and not the leftist opposition that regarded European integration as a problem. As a result, in its 1992-1996 tenure in government, the ODS brought the relations with Brussels occasionally to a standstill. However, the government party was weakened in 1996 elections, depending subsequently on the support of two opposition social democratic members in parliament.

In 1997 the ODS was further weekend by a brief financial crisis and rocked also by a corruption scandal. This caused a pro-EU faction calling itself the Freedom Union (US) to leave the party and eventually triggered the ouster of Klaus as prime minister. Since the majority of the ODS' electorate continued to favor EU membership, Klaus' relentless stance on Europe was seen as out of touch (Hanley 2002, cf. Bugge 2000). More generally, the Eurosceptical position advanced by the ODS in the face of a largely pro-European electorate[11] provided the opposition with new political opportunity. As Czech party competition was primarily fought over the economic divide, a less unrelenting market-liberal but generally pro-European political agenda provided a path back for the left to political power. As a result, the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)—supported ironically by an arrangement with the ODS to neutralize the Communists from exercising an influence on government formation—ended up governing during the crucial years in the run-up to membership. Although

Klaus lost the subsequent two elections in 1998 and 2002, the Eurosceptical stance of the ODS hardily abated. Along with the aforementioned party program of 2002, a so-called Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism warned the government against making a "*strategic mistake*" (ODS 2001). The document tried to reframe the debate about Europe by accusing the government that it had sold out Czech national interest in exchange for a swift integration.

In the run up to accession, EU Commission reports on Czech progress toward membership became more critical[12] and the difficult relationship between Prague and Brussels was also taking a toll (Mungiu 2007). In retrospect, the Czech Republic ended up with the worst record on compliance with, and implementation of the internal market *acquis* (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007) as indicated by the lowest compliance score among the eight 2004 accession countries.[13] It is perhaps also no surprise that the Czech Republic was the last member state to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 after a reluctant Klaus, who had become national president by then, agreed to accept the decision of the Czech constitutional court and signed. Nonetheless, Czech accession was always a foregone conclusion as long as national political and economic development did not fall behind that of other transition countries several of which had to contend with more difficult legacies than Prague. As a result, the EU signaled in 1997 that the Czech Republic would be included among the first wave of accession countries due to join the EU by 2002[14]. What is more, Brussels exerted less political pressure on the Czech Republic than on other post-Communists successor countries to comply with EU conditionality[15] for accession. Facing fewer external constraints provided Czech political parties with room to maneuver so as to take up more nuanced positions on Europe that were a better match for their respective party political interests (cf. Vachudova 2005).

From the vantage point of those supporting Czech membership, it is perhaps fortuitous that the ODS did not return to power until after Czech accession. Moreover, we may assume that its position on Europe may have actually boosted the success of the ČSSD given that a majority of the electorate favored membership (Vachudova 2008).

A second party—the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and successor organization to the Communist party of Czechoslovakia (KSČM)—also opposed EU membership for ideological reasons that were, however, fundamentally different from those of the ODS. Nonetheless, as Linden and Pohlman (2003) show, the Euroscepticism of KSČM evolved from an ideologically motivated antagonism to a more moderate type of protest-based Euroscepticism that is often employed by

protest parties when wanting distinguish themselves from the political mainstream (Kopecký and Mudde 2002). In fact, Taggard and Szczerbiak (2002: 14) both rate the ODS and KSČM as Hard Eurosceptic, particularly during the 1990s.

In time, the softening of the KSČM's position on Europe allowed for its strategic repositioning as a leftist protest party against the political mainstream which subsequently boosted its electoral fortune. In 2002 it won 18.5 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections, emerging as the third largest formation in the legislature. The KSČM performed even better in European parliamentary elections in 2004, the year of EU accession, by winning 6 of the 24 seats on the Czech slate to the European Parliament. The party maintained its spot as the third largest parliamentary formation also in 2006 by winning 12.8 percent of the national vote.

In 2010 the KSČM lost its place to a new protest party called Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 (TOP 09) and led by Karel Schwarzenberg. Known for its support of free market politics, TOP 09 is center-right, advocating a "genuine" rule of law and the country's "moral revival"[16]. It distinguishes itself from the established ODS by expressing a clear commitment to the European Union.

The 2010 elections brought success also to yet another protest party: Public Affairs (VV), a right-of-center formation led by the anti-establishment publicist Radek John. By pushing a range of populist policy goals and advocating a more direct form of democracy, it gained enough votes to enter the parliament's lower chamber. The emergence of all these protest-based parties along with other groupings such as the Party of Free Citizens advocating a mix of Eurosceptic and populist views as well as Sovereignty – Jana Bobošíková Bloc (SUVERENITA - blok Jany Bobošíkové) exemplified the growing protest spectrum outside the established Czech mainstream. Whereas TOP 09 and KSČM have become firmly ensconced, other protest-based groups may be more short-lived. Nonetheless, it should not be surprising that political protest increased after mainstream parties were perceived as convergent despite apparent ideological distinctions. After all, it was an agreement between ČSSD and the opposition ODS that kept the former in power until 2002. Afterwards the ČSSD continued on in government by forging a coalition with Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and Liberals (US-DEU). By doing so, this alliance brought together parties that despite ideological differences were all convergent on their support of EU-membership.

The Czech Republic represents in many ways a typical CEE political landscape: It has moderate levels of corruption and some mainstream party convergence and thus its fair share of populist and Eurosceptic

political operators. It differs mainly from other countries in the region because of the role of the ODS. This has resulted in a division of attitudes toward Europe which cuts across the political mainstream. As a consequence, the combined vote share of Eurosceptic parties in the Czech Republic soared from 20 percent in the run-up to accession to cumulative total of nearly 50 percent in 2006 thereby exceeding the levels of neighboring CEE countries including Poland (cf. Figure 5). Even after this peak, the combined vote share for Eurosceptic parties of above 30 percent remained higher than that of other Visegrad group countries.

The fact that the Czech Republic represents a case in which a determined ideologically Eurosceptic party persistently challenged the pro-elite EU consensus over the years cannot be ignored when we look at the overall popular attitudes toward European integration, especially if we consider that the Czech public has been among the most Eurosceptic besides Hungary and Latvia. In fact, support for the EU has declined from its peak in 2006 by some 23 percent. Nonetheless, given the extraordinary role of the ODS in Czech politics and allowing for the emergence of other parties that also take aim at Brussels, the overall levels of support of EU membership have been surprisingly constant over the length of the first decade of the new century and thus appear more stable compared to most CEE countries.

Summing up, the Czech case exemplifies the gradual transformation of sentiments toward European integration from Euroenthusiasm to Eurorealism. Although, this was invariably also a consequence of the consistent opposition by Klaus and the ODS to the integration agenda, there were other factors during the accession process that mattered when, for example, Prague had to comply with a multitude of political conditions imposed by the EU.

Because accession was never seriously in doubt and the Czech Republic had long enjoyed a frontrunner status of sorts, political parties were less constrained in their discourse on Europe than was the case elsewhere in CEE. Nonetheless, to the extent that there was a convergence among mainstream parties about Europe and other important political goals, protest parties of the left and right emerged or became stronger after 2000. Despite the growth in vote share of Hard Eurosceptic parties after 2005, the decline in support for the European Union appeared not as pronounced if we consider a longer time horizon or the sharper swings in other CEE countries.

In terms of cleavages that mattered in Czech politics, the socioeconomic division and the clash over European integration were the most important ones. The latter represented a clear split among the elites and major parties and not between the mainstream and the fringe. This division also affected the dy-

namics between government and opposition. On one hand, there was an ideologically diverse group of reform Communists, Christian Democrats, and Liberals, all of which were generally supportive of European integration. On the other, we find two major Eurosceptic parties that were otherwise ideologically completely incompatible and thus unable and unwilling to move against the government in any coordinated fashion. The fact that the pro-integration Eurorealists were in office in the run-up to accession clearly ensured that the country entered the EU successfully in 2004.

Among the Eurosceptics, the ODS faced the additional problem that its natural constituency was rather pro-European whereas the KSČM found a receptive constituency among the 'transition losers'. Subsequently, as the transition process faded from memory, KSČM moderated its criticism of Europe and began focusing more on domestic concerns.

Membership in the EU mattered to those who supported the process because it brought important economic advantages in terms of access to capital and markets. The need to receive external validation of the country's successful post-Communist transition was clearly a lesser motive for the Czechs. Nonetheless, even the pro-European Czech elites have remained wary of a European super-state and prefer instead an intergovernmental form of cooperation whenever possible. This was particularly obvious in questions of foreign policy when Prague allied itself more with Washington in the run-up to the War in Iraq than with the major Western EU members.

It is difficult to predict the future of the Czech discourse on Europe. However, as the country is facing the question of adopting the single currency, which three quarters of the population opposed in a poll in 2011[17], policymakers and political parties will once again face having to take difficult decisions. The Euro-Crisis will undoubtedly provide more nourishment for the conflict over further integration. Whereas EU leaders see the panacea to the problem in further and deeper integration, Eurosceptics such as Klaus regarded flawed integration precisely as the cause of the problems.[18] The relationship between the Czech Republic and 'Europe' remains, therefore, a work in progress.

Hungary

During the post-transition period, the new Hungarian political elite and the public at large agreed on the goal of 'returning to Europe'. In contrast to the Czech Republic, this aim was not motivated primarily by economic considerations but the conviction that Hungary "[…] *had always been at the 'heart of Europe*'" (Batory 2008a: 64). Drawing on historical experiences as part of a multinational political entity, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, accession to the EU was widely perceived as an emotional need and crucial step on the road to modernization and to breaking with the Communist past.

Nevertheless, in view of the fact that Hungary was dominated by external forces for the much of the time of its existence there has been a breeding ground for nationalism. With the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1867, Hungary officially regained its independence after 170 years of Ottoman rule and 200 years of being part of the Habsburg Empire. Yet, Hungary remained in fact dominated by Austria. After the First World War, the Treaty of Trianon ended the historic Kingdom of Hungary that had been founded in 1000 and existed for about 500 years. Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and around 3.2 million ethnic Hungarians were separated from their motherland. The 'trauma' of Trianon is kept alive in the Hungarian collective memory until today and is repeatedly invoked by various nationalist forces (Mayer 2010: 21-23).

In contrast to the Czech Republic, historical experiences have contributed to a main cleavage structure in Hungary in which party competition is not socioeconomic but sociocultural. Hence, party competition in Hungary is based on first of all conflicts about identity politics due to the *"[…] historical disjuncture in the region between language, culture and ethnicity on the one hand and state on the other, which in case of Hungary is made especially evident by the presence of large Hungarian minorities in the neighbor countries*" (Batory 2002: 529). As a result, political parties in Hungary differ mainly with regard to cultural issues and, in particular, to the conception of nationhood they prefer (Batory 2008a: 48). While some political actors are committed to the idea of the nation as a political community, others emphasize that all ethnic Hungarians should belong to the nation. As the first conception is more compatible with the ideas underlying European integration since it has been related to civic and cosmopolitan views of political community, ethnic nationalist views tend to clash with the integration into a supranational political community building on common values and ideas.

The importance of sociocultural issues in Hungarian party competition completely corresponds to the theoretical argument put forth by Kitschelt et al. (1999). As outlined above, they expected the legacies

of national-accommodative Communism to bring cultural issues to the forefront of political debate. By contrast, the legacy of bureaucratic-authoritarian Communism was assumed to result in the dominance of socioeconomic issues in political competition as the Czech case illustrates. Thus, the debate about European integration in Hungary has been mainly framed in cultural and not in economic terms.

In contrast to other party systems in CEE, the two sources of Euroscepticism, anti-market and authoritarian-nationalist positions, did not converge in the main Hungarian Communist successor party. Instead, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was one of the 'immediate reformers' that had already begun its transformation to modern Social Democracy in the late 1980s (Vachudova and Hooghe 2009: 196). This rapid transformation led to a distinct pro-EU profile of the MSZP as it declared EU membership a first priority for Hungarian foreign policy (Batory 2008a: 52-23). Thus, the cleavage between Communism and anti-Communism that structured party competition in Hungary in the early 1990s (Körösényi and Fodor 2004: 348-349), did not coincide with a pro-/anti-EU cleavage as it did in other countries during the post-transformation period. This observation holds true even in view of the existence of another Communist successor party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) that rallied the Communist hardliners. The party clearly rejected European integration on grounds of its anti-Capitalism (Batory 2008s: 51) but failed to secure parliamentary representation (Körösényi 1994: 12). As a result, during the post-transition period, all parliamentary parties were in favor of EU accession. Thus, the pro-/anti-EU cleavage did not have any relevance in Hungary in the early 1990s. This 'Euroenthusiasm' at the elite level was matched by public opinion. As the *Central and Eastern Eurobarometer* indicated, four out of five respondents supported EU accession in 1992 (Batory 2008a: 64).

Nevertheless, in this early period some parties located in the nationalist camp were already prone to adopt Eurosceptical positions for ideological reasons. Among these 'national-populist' parties were the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP) and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) (Kitschelt 1992: 30-31). While the former two parties were re-established formations dating back to the pre-Communist period (Mészáros et al. 2007: 808), the latter rallied the more nationalist minded forces of the opposition to the Communist regime (Palonen 2009: 323). The three parties formed the first government after the breakdown of Communism (Ilonszki and Kurtán 1992: 421), and, in view of the general 'Euroenthusiasm' of the early years, it is reasonable to explain their reluctance to adopt Eurosceptical positions based on strategic calculus. As we will see,

some of them tended to mitigate their pro-EU position or, in the case of the MDF, experienced political fragmentation due to internal dissent with regard to questions of identity and Europe in later years.

However, a very remarkable development was the transformation of the Fidesz from a liberal youth party to the main right-wing force in Hungary. Fidesz was founded by young activists, first of all students from the Universities in Budapest. Its ideological profile was characterized by liberalism, radical anti-Communism and an anti-establishment orientation (Körösényi 1994: 16). In order to maintain their image as a youth party, only persons under 35 years could became member of Fidesz in their early period (Palonen 2009: 232). In the late 1990ies, Fidesz mitigated its pro-market profile and increasingly placed emphasis on the role of the nation. Thus, the party realigned itself along the sociocultural dimension from libertarian to more nationalist-authoritarian values while, at the same time, its socioeconomic position lost relevance. Victor Orbán, the party leader, repeatedly underlined the importance of defending national interests and introduced the concept of 'Hungarianness' (Batory 2008a: 47-48) that, to some extent, stood in contrast to the above-mentioned notion of 'Europeanness'. In 2000, the Fidesz advanced its transformation toward a center-right party by leaving the Liberal International and joining the European People's Party (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2001).

This realignment was obviously motivated by strategic considerations. Since the MSZP had reached an absolute majority of seats in the 1994 parliamentary elections and was the only relevant party of the left (Ilonszki and Kurtán 1995: 359), Orbán aimed to establish a single major actor on the right. Until then, the right was fragmented into several minor parties. In view of the dominance of the cleavage, it was reasonable to adopt a sociocultural position that ran counter to that of the MSZP. As the latter held liberal values in sociocultural terms, the Fidesz shifted toward the nationalist end of the dimension. What is more, in 1998 the extreme rightwing Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) was the first new party that managed to enter the Hungarian parliament (Ilonszki and Kurtán 1999). This nationalist, revisionist, and anti-establishment party was created after the expulsion of István Csurka from the MDF in 1993 following statements about the notion of Hungarian *Lebensraum* (Batory 2008a: 59). The success of the newcomer provided incentives to the Fidesz to further stress their nationalist profile.

Thus, in 1994 a process of concentration on the right had started culminating in 2002 when Fidesz became the only party of the nationalist conservative camp to be represented in parliament. Of the other parties, the FGKP had dissolved in 2001, while the KDNP as well as the MDF in view of decreasing electoral support built electoral alliances with the Fidesz and became, therefore, de facto incorporated by

the latter. Furthermore, the extremist MIÉP failed to secure re-entry into parliament (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2003).

The transformation of the Fidesz was also accompanied by a shift of its position toward European integration. Starting as a liberal party strongly supporting Hungary's 'return to Europe', the Fidesz has increasingly stressed the importance of defending national interests in the EU since the late 1990s. Furthermore, Fidesz leader and Prime Minister Victor Orbán stated in 2000, that "[…] *there [was] a life outside the Union*" (Batory 2008b: 270). With respect to the highly salient EU-related question of foreign land ownership, the Fidesz clearly positioned itself against a 'sellout' of Hungarian land to foreign persons or corporations. In 2002, the Fidesz stated that it would only agree to EU-related constitutional amendments if the government accepted the party's economic program in order to prepare Hungary effectively for accession. Thus, the Fidesz did not change its general support for European integration but took an increasingly critical stand toward specific aspects of the EU, particularly where the latter were perceived as opposing national interests.

This change in the party's attitudes to Europe can also be explained, first of all, by strategic motivations. On one hand, demanding 'hard bargaining' with the EU was part of a strategy of negative campaigning against the Socialist-Liberal government, which was *"[…] pictured by the Fidesz as overly servile toward the EU*" (Batory 2008b: 270) in the run-up to the 1998 parliamentary elections. On the other hand, playing the 'national interest card' can be interpreted as making an attempt at capturing the votes of the radical right. However, as Batory (2009: 436) notes, this "*nationalist interest Eurosceptic rhetoric*" was not actually translated into policy while Fidesz was in government (ibid.).

Paradoxically, Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 308) classify the Fidesz as Euroenthusiast. They justify their classification by comparing the party with the Czech ODS arguing that Victor Orbán has expressed only his disappointment about the "[…] *slowness of the accession process*", while Vaclav Klaus *"[…] criticizes the fundamentals of the EU*" (ibid.). Drawing on the expert survey we used to distinguish between different types of protest parties the Fidesz does not show any Eurosceptic attitudes but is, by contrast, "*somewhat in favor of European integration*". However, with the realignment of the Fidesz and the launching of accession negotiations in 1998, the rhetoric of party leader Orbán clearly changed from an generally pro-EU stance to a more nuanced 'Eurorealist' approach. By doing so, he clearly had the decline of support for EU membership in mind (Batory 2008a: 65), and took the opportunity to blame the MSZP for neglecting national interests during the negotiations.

What is more, there has been a significant difference with regard to the preferred concept of European integration within the national-conservative bloc dominated by the Fidesz and the socio-liberal alliance consisting of the MSZP and the Union of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). While the latter stand for a federalist approach aiming to transfer more competences to the EU level, the former advance an intergovernementalist direction demanding more influence for member states (Batory 2008a: 56). These differences are obviously related to the diverging conceptions of nationhood mentioned above.

With the launch of negotiations with the EU in the late 1990s, criticism of European integration and, especially, the accession conditions increased in Hungary as it did in other CEECs. The support of the Hungarians for EU membership substantially and continually decreased after that point of time (cf. Figure 4). This development in public opinion partially explains the Fidesz's gradual turn from Euroenthusiasm to Eurorealism but, as we have seen, this shift in attitudes was also a result of a more general transformation. However, political elites do not only respond to public opinion but also influence public views, in particular, on such complex issues as European integration. Thus, the Fidesz's turn to Eurorealism is crucial for explaining the growth of the criticism of the EU on the part of the public. Needless to say, an increasingly critical tone in the Hungarian press also contributed to a change in perceptions of European integration (Batory 2008a: 65-66).

The shifting view on Europe resulted in a re-positioning on part of other parties of the political right. Although strongly EU-optimistic when in government, the KDNP became more Eurosceptic after the loss of parliamentary representation in 1998, stating that it was *"[…] deeply concerned about the potential loss of sovereignty*" (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 310). Also the agrarian party, the FGKP, which was initially supportive to EU accession mainly due to the advantages expected from EU development funds and agricultural subsidies modified their pro-EU stance. This growing criticism was triggered by the aforementioned controversy over foreign land ownership that was a key issue in the accession negotiations. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections 2002, the party campaigned against a deal between Hungary and the EU, which allowed the purchase of land by EU nationals with the slogan "*Our motherland is not for sale*" (Batory 2008a: 57). However, both parties continued to speak out explicitly in favor of EU accession, and were obviously motivated by not diminishing their coalition potential.

Another Hungarian party, the extremist MIÉP, was critical toward the EU. Mainly motivated by ideology, its nationalist, revisionist orientation clearly led to a general rejection of European integration on principle. Thus, we may categorize the MIÉP as Hard Eurosceptic party (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008b: 12; Batory 2002: 531). Nevertheless, the party hesitated to rule out EU accession explicitly, probably in or-

der to become acceptable as a coalition partner of the Fidesz. In a similar vein, the aforementioned Communist successor, the Workers' Party, mitigated its Hard Eurosceptical stance in 2000 in order to improve its electoral chances after failing to enter parliament in three consecutive elections (Batory 2008b: 265).

Except for the Fidesz, all of the parties that had, from time to time, expressed positions critical of Europe disintegrated or became irrelevant. However, with Jobbik, another party established skeptical or opposed to Europe emerged as a force in Hungarian politics. In the election campaign in 2009, Jobbik used radical anti-system rhetoric opposing European Integration and Globalization as well as foreign capital and international markets. Furthermore, it made references to 'Gypsy crime' and openly expressed anti-Semitism. Jobbik also blamed the mainstream parties for the economic and social situation, accusing them of ignoring the 'real' problems of the population. Finally, Jobbik presented itself as the *"[…] only party that 'genuinely' stands up for the interests of the people*" (Batory 2010: 9). However, it is reasonable to assume that the electoral success of Jobbik (winning almost 15 percent of the votes in 2009) was not due to their Euroscepticism. This is because the party attaches much more salience to its national populist agenda than to its Euroscepticism (cf. Figure 7).

Summing up, we could indeed observe a shift from Euroenthusiasm to more Euroealism in Hungary, both at the party level and in public opinion. Nevertheless, issues related to European integration are normally not of great relevance in public debate. However, specific events can bring EU-related topics to the forefront of the debate such as the so-called Status Law of the Orbán government in 2001. In dealing with the highly sensitive domestic political issue of the millions of ethnic Hungarians living abroad, the government passed a law granting social rights to ethnic Hungarians holding foreign citizenships. The criticism of the law by the EU and other international organizations was a hot topic in the media as well as in political and public debate (Batory 2008a: 56).

After the beginning of Orbán's term in 2010, the relations between Hungary and the EU steadily deteriorated. Controversial legislation like the media law triggered stern criticism on part of the EU. In that case, the EU did not only condemn the actions of the Hungarian government but also threatened with sanctions on the basis of violations of EU law and refused to approve a €20 billion standby loan for Hungary from the IMF. As in 2008, the Hungarian economy was once again seriously affected by the financial crisis and in need of IMF support. Victor Orbán responded to the EU sanctions with provocations stating that Hungary would not be a colony, comparing EU officials to their 'Soviet predecessors'.[19] Thus, it is not easy to predict the future relationship between Hungary and Europe but at the time these lines

were written no one could exclude that the tensions would mount. As the attitudes of Hungarian political elites and the population toward European integration became increasingly negative, political parties were likely to give more prominence to EU issues.

Poland

Poland is an interesting case because the development of the public debate about Europe differs from other Central and East European countries by showing new Euroenthusiasm or a 'second return to Europe' (Szczerbiak 2012: 20) after having been governed by Eurosceptic parties. This development at the party level is mirrored also in public opinion: With the beginning of the accession negotiations, support for EU membership had fallen from nearly 80 percent in 1994 to between 55 and 60 percent in the mid-1990s. At the same time, a sizeable bloc of anti-EU public opinion emerged that, according to the CBOS polling agency, was made up by between 20 and 25 percent of the Poles surveyed (Szczerbiak 2008: 223). Until 2007, the percentage of those who considered EU membership a 'good thing' remained below 60 percent (with the exception of 61 percent at the time of the accession referendum in 2003) (see Figure 4). However, in that year a genuine Europhile party, the Civic Platform (PO), won the national elections and support for EU membership jumped to 67 percent.

Previously, the relative success of parties critical of, or opposed to EU membership, especially their victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections, was interpreted by many commentators as a 'Eurosceptic backlash'. As was the Polish veto against the Constitutional Treaty[20] at the EU summit in Rome 2003. This development especially drew public and academic attention to the phenomenon of Polish Euroscepticism. The famous slogan 'Nice or die'—referring to the so-called Nice Treaty—formulated by the legislative became a symbol of the Poles' strong intentions to defend their national interest; e.g., the refusal to accept new voting principles in the Council of the EU which would have resulted in a reduction of Polish vote shares (Riishøj 2004: 19-20). What is more, from 2005 to 2007 the party of the Kazcyński twins, Law and Justice (PiS), governed in a coalition with the radical parties Self-Defense (*Samoobrona*) and the League of Polish Families (LPR). While the former mainly supported the necessity of defending national interests, Self-Defense used radical-populist rhetoric to mobilize those voters who saw themselves as the losers of the economic transition. The LPR was a coalition of various Catholic-nationalist parties and right-wing groupings whose appeal to the radical religious right was enhanced by the support of Radio Maryja[21] (Szczerbiak 2006: 94-95).

As the latter two parties held positions that were to varying degrees critical of Europe they campaigned against EU membership in the run-up to the 2003 accession referendum. The LPR opposed European integration due to the perception of the imminent *"[…] destruction of Polish conscience and culture*" (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 312). By contrast, Self-Defense had a rather ambiguous approach to Europe by combining principal support for European integration with an extreme criticism of Poland's position in the accession negotiations and within the EU. There were also concerns about a possible loss of national sovereignty (ibid.).

Although ideological motives for why the two parties criticized European integration are quite clear, it is useful to highlight how one of the major Polish parties used Europe in party competition. During the 2001 election campaign, the PiS adopted a critical stance toward the accession negotiations because the EU was to offer a 'second class membership' to Poland. This rhetoric was accompanied by some legislative initiatives aiming to improve the accession conditions and maintain national sovereignty in sensitive policy fields like jurisdiction, moral values and culture as well as land ownership. Many commentators interpreted this behavior as de facto 'Eurosceptic turn' while the party leaders described themselves as Eurorealist. Concerning the motivations behind this 'Eurorealism', electoral-strategic as well as coalition-tactical factors appear the most probable. Obviously, the party reacted to the success of the LPR in the 2001 parliamentary reactions: By enhancing the profile of its critical attitudes toward the accession conditions, the PiS intended to send a signal that it would be prepared to ally itself with the LPR if the latter would soften its radical anti-EU stance. In addition, the party clearly tried to attract voters from the LPR who were concerned about Poland's EU membership (Szczerbiak 2008: 133). Yet, in terms of classifying the PiS, one of the major parties in Poland, the literature has not come to a consensus. Some researchers interpret the emphasis the PiS has sometimes placed on sharply defending national interests within the EU as well as its preference for intergovernementalism as clear signs of a Eurosceptic turn of the party, while others, like Szczerbiak (2008) more recently, remarked that the party neither opposes European integration in general nor articulates clearly any critical position toward the current or future trajectory of integration.

Generally speaking, we can discern several factors that contributed to this so-called 'Eurosceptic backlash': First, the negotiations between Poland and the EU proved difficult and proceeded only slowly. This slow progress was due mainly to the size of Poland with its population of nearly 40 million and the structure of its economy, in particular the large underdeveloped agricultural sector. Thus, Poland's accession required a significant increase in the EU's budget. In addition, the early negotiations were complicated

by the participation of the Christian National Union (ZChN) in government. That party harbored strong reservations about EU membership for fear that would subvert Catholic and national values. Thus, the government led by a broad formation called Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) had to portray itself as a tough negotiator which resulted in further tensions between Poland and the EU. Hence, the negotiations were generally seen as protracted and asymmetrical (Szczerbiak 2012: 11-13).

From a more general point of view, the development of attitudes toward the EU both in the political elite as well as in public opinion can be attributed to the important role national sovereignty plays in Polish political and social life. After decades of Soviet oppression, the 'return to Europe', associated with high expectations of modernization, was the primary goal of Polish foreign policy, which nobody questioned. But the experience of foreign rule increased the importance attached to national sovereignty, thus, weakening the willingness to give up a great part of this newfound independence. As a result, Poland as well as other states experienced a so-called 'integration dilemma'; i.e., maintaining national sovereignty risked being isolated while giving up of it risked being 'absorbed' by the integration system. This dilemma is more pronounced in Poland's case than in other states because the perception of not being welcomed by the EU-15 and of being treated as a 'second class member' was so dominant in that country (Riishøj 2004: 7-8).

What is more, the status as the largest new member state increased the demand for exerting an appropriately influential role in the European Union. Furthermore, Catholicism is quite dominant in Poland and therefore a major source of political orientations. Not surprisingly, the liberalism represented by the EU has been perceived as a threat not only to national traditions but also Catholic values (Wysocka 2009: 6-7). Finally, there was fear that economic liberalization would flood the Polish market with foreign agricultural products – this concern made farmers become more skeptical toward European integration. In view of the size of the agricultural sector, this group could not be ignored by political decision makers. Consequently, many Poles expected a strong defense of national interests in the EU and preferred, like several political parties including PiS an intergovernementalist approach to European decision making (Riishøj 2004: 7-8). This importance of the sociocultural cleavage sets Poland, like Hungary, apart from the Czech Republic and clearly conforms to the theoretical expectations of Kitschelt et al. (1999) who had classified Poland's regime legacy as *a* mixtype of national-accomodative and bureaucratic-authoritarian Communism .Poland is thus an example of a political culture in which there are two distinct sources of Euroscepticism.

The parallel developments of the sentiments toward Europe in public opinion and in the Polish party system gave rise to the assumption that both processes were closely linked. On one hand, the growing Euroscepticism in public opinion in the run-up to accession was partly a result of the emerging dissensus in the political elite which for the first time caused some kind of political debate about EU membership (Szczerbiak 2008: 223). On the other hand, the success of so-called Eurosceptic parties in the 2001 parliamentary elections was interpreted as a 'Eurosceptic backlash', i.e., as an expression of increasing criticism of the EU in Poland (Markowski and Tucker 2010). But in view of the low salience the three parties PiS, Self-Defense and LPR attach to their Euroscepticism, they were in fact Mixed Protest Parties rather than Nationalist Protest or Genuine Eurosceptic Parties. Hence, we would not reasonably expect a large effect of their Euroscepticism on voting behavior.

And indeed, Poland has not shown to be affected by growing Euroscepticism until at least 2012 but rather seems to have experienced a 'second return to Europe'. Since the country's accession to the EU in 2004, popular support for membership has constantly increased. This can partly be explained by the favorable economic development in Poland since 2004. In particular, the agricultural sector profited from access to new markets and the Common Agricultural Policy instruments as well as from EU subsidies (Szczerbiak 2012: 32-33). Nevertheless, the vote share of Eurosceptic parties in the 2004 EP election and the 2005 parliamentary and presidential election remained relatively high. This puzzle finds again an explanation in the low salience of EU issues in those elections both in terms of the parties' campaigns and the voters' preference order. Furthermore, most Poles support European integration in principle but adopt a 'realistic' approach to EU politics by being suspicious of the large EU member states and supporting a 'tough' stance on defending Polish interests. Hence, such 'Eurorealistic' positions have been able to find support by a considerable portion of the electorate (Szczerbiak 2007: 37-39).

The 2007 parliamentary elections resulted in a clear victory of the pro-EU forces and intended the 'second return to Europe', a process that also affected the political elites. The Civic Forum (PO) led by Donald Tusk obtained about 42 percent of the votes cast with the PiS placing second. What is more, the LPR as well as the Self-Defense clearly failed to secure re-election by reaching only around one percent of the votes. The PiS government was faced with growing criticism from the opposition and parts of the public on several grounds. First, in its attempt to establish a 'Fourth Republic'—a new law-and-order regime that was to put an end to corruption and powerful insider networks behind the scenes. In the pursuit of this goal the Kazcyński government applied controversial methods, often in close cooperation with President Kazcyński, such as by using law enforcement agencies, for example, to intimidate political

opponents. What is more, the alliance of the PiS with extremist parties became subject of much criticism. In international affairs, the government's actions led to tensions with the European Union as well as with Germany (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2008). It seems clear that the PO succeeded in blaming the Kazcyński government for its handling of foreign and domestic policy. What is more, the party's pro-EU stance seemed to attract voters who perceived the impact of EU accession on Poland's development and on individual living conditions more positively than before accession. It can be shown empirically that the increase in support for the EU resulted in vote switches in favor of the PO to the detriment of the PiS. Therefore, it can be assumed that the change in government can be largely explained by changes in attitudes toward the EU (Jackson et al. 2011).

The new Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, leading a government coalition between the PO and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) succeeded in adopting a more pro-European course and in improving Poland's relations with the EU. In the first years of his incumbency, he was confronted with President Kazcyński who attempted "*[…] to pursue a parallel foreign policy*" (Szczerbiak 2012: 21). The most controversial issue between the Prime Minister and the President was the Treaty of Lisbon, when the President refused to sign the ratification bill until the Irish had voted 'Yes' in the second referendum in 2009 (ibid.: 23).

The permanent conflicts between the President and the Prime Minister contributed to the unpopularity of Kazcyński, reminding voters *"[…] of the apparent disruptiveness of the Law-and-Justice led governments*" (Szczerbiak 2010: 3). These are the reasons why the success of the PO's candidate, Komorowski, in the subsequent presidential elections scheduled for the fall of 2010 was all but assured. But the death of Lech Kazcyński in a plane crash at Smolensk changed this situation. First, the presidential election had to be held early. Second, the Smolensk tragedy caused great public sympathy for the Kazcyński family. Hoping to capitalize on this new public mood, Jaroslav Kazcyński decided to run for the presidency in that place of his dead brother. Due to the traumatic event, the election campaign was less acrimonious than usual and the race was rather close in the first round. However, in the end Komorowski won the final elections with 53.01 percent of the votes cast (ibid: 7).

As expected, the Tusk government managed to be re-elected in 2011, which bods well for continuing improvement of the relationship between Poland and the EU. But, given the nationalist mobilization potential, no one can exclude a development in the opposite direction. In particular, a deterioration of the economic situation in Poland, resulting from the Euro-Crisis, could affect also non-members of the Eurozone and might does change the way Poles perceive EU membership.

APPENDIX:

Figure 1: Support for EU Membership Among CEE Member States



Own calculations based on data provided by *Eurobarometer* 75, Spring 2011

Figure 2: Trust in the National Government versus Trust in the EU among Member States



Own calculations based on data provided by *Eurobarometer* 75, Spring 2011

Figure 3: Perceived Benefit of Membership



Own calculations based on data provided by *Eurobarometer* 75, Spring 2011

Figure 4: Trends in Support for EU-Membership among CEE Countries



Own calculations based on data provided by *Eurobarometer* 75, Spring 2011

Figure 5: Cumulative Vote Share of Eurosceptic Parties in CEECs[22]



Source: Own calculations based on data provided by http://www.parties-and-elections.de/countries.html

Table 1: Electoral Success of Eurosceptic Parties in West and Central and East Europe

Western Europe				**Central and Eastern Europe**			
Country	**Hard**	**Soft**	**Total**	**Country**	**Hard**	**Soft**	**Total**
Spain	0	0	0	Bulgaria	0	0	0
Italy	0	4.5	4.5	Slovenia	0.59	4.38	4.97
Ireland	0	5.9	5.9	Lithuania	0	6.94	6.94
Finland	.8	5.2	6.0	Romania	0	19.48	19.48
Greece	5.5	2.7	8.3	Latvia	0	27.1	27.1
Germany	3.3	5.1	8.4	Estonia	2.43	30.68	33.11
Portugal	0	9.0	9.0	Slovakia	0	36.1	36.1
Belgium	9.2	0	9.2	Poland	18.07	18.48	36.6
Luxembourg	0	13.0	13.0	Czech Republic	11.0	31.6	42.6
Netherlands	0	15.9	15.9	Hungary	9.6	42.0	51.6
Sweden	16.4	5.1	21.5				
Austria	0	26.9	26.9				
France	26.7	3.7	30.4				
UK	2.1	32.4	34.5				
Denmark	29.9	7.1	37.0				
Average	***5.62***	***9.1***	***15.37***	***Average***	***4.2***	***21.7***	***25.9***

Source: Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002: 13; 15)

Figure 6: Corruption Perception Index, Average 1995-2011[23]



Source: Own calculation based on data provided by the *Corruption Perception Index* http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/

Figure 7: Protest Parties in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia



Source: Own calculation based on Chapel Hill Data 2006

Table 2: Predicted Effects of Types of Protest Parties

Level	Party Type	Effect
Party Behavior	Nationalist Protest	Eurosceptical attitudes do not translate into behavior
	Mixed Protest	
	Genuine Eurosceptic Party	Voting against further integration steps in national and European decision making process and direct communication of Eurosceptical positions vis-à-vis electorate
Party Competition	Nationalist Protest	No response by other parties to the party's Euroscepticism
	Mixed Protest	
	Genuine Eurosceptic Party	Response by other parties to the party's Euroscepticism in terms of change in positions toward Europe and increased salience attributed to EU issues
Voting behavior	Nationalist Protest	Voting decision in favor of the party not due to the party's Euroscepticism but due to dissatisfaction with domestic politics
	Mixed Protest	
	Genuine Eurosceptic Party	Voting decision in favor of the party due to its Euroscepticism: EU issue voting

Source: Authors

Notes

[1] This can be seen in parties that think that their respective countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies toward the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Taggart and Sczcerbiak 2001:7).

[2] This can be measured empirically by comparing the importance voters attribute to Europe in relation to other political topics and by assessing the significance political parties afford the European question in their manifestos and public statements when contrasted with other issues.

[3] For example, Catharina Sørensen (2008) distinguishes between utilitarian, sovereignty-based, democratic and social Euroscepticism. In a similar vein, Cécile Leconte (2010) makes a distinction between utilitarian, political, and value-based, and cultural Euroscepticism. Furthermore, concepts of Euroscepticism developed to capture different forms of opposition to European integration in public opinion (e.g., Krouwel and Abts 2007, Weßels 2009) are quite sophisticated but have also little to offer with regard to our analysis here.

[4] The EU's pressure to grant full citizenship rights and minority protections to the ethnic Russian population contributed significantly to the plummeting popularity of membership.

[5] By contrast, in some of the old EU-member states propositions have been discussed that seek to devolve political competences from the EU back to the national level.

[6] Eurosceptic parties are classified according to experts' judgements on the general position to European integration the leadership of a party holds. The values on the scale range from 1 (=strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (=strongly in favor of European integration). Values below 3.5 are seen as indicating a Eurosceptical position.

[7] The CPI score ranges from 0 (worst) to 10 (best/cleanest).

[8] This latter category is especially relevant for further research seeking to explain why some protest parties show a higher degree of salience on Eurosceptical positions than others and whether this is due to vote-seeking, policy-seeking, or coalition-seeking considerations of the parties or the parties' elites.

[9] We simplified the position by only differentiating between parties not adopting Eurosceptical or Nationalist Populist positions (-1), adopting such positions (1), or being undecided about it (=0). In a second step we multiplied the respective position measures with the salience measures (that is (Euroscepticism_pos)*(Euroscepticism_sal), etc.). Finally, we calculated the degree of salience attributed to one issue dimension in relation to the other dimension. The formula used here follows conventional methods of representing relative values:

$$Sal_{rel} = \frac{Sal_{EU} - Sal_{NatPop}}{Sal_{EU} + SAL_{NatPop}}$$

where Sal_{EU} is the amount of salience attributed to the Euroscepticism-dimension and Sal_{NatPop} is the amount of salience attributed to the Nationalist Populism dimension.

[10] The Nations in Transit database (NIT) developed by Freedom House to assess the political progress of transition nations confirms the success of the Czech Republic as does the *European Commission Progress Report* 1999.

[11] Some 77 percent of Czechs ended up voting in favor of EU membership in the accession referendum in June 2003.

[12] Cf. European Commission Progress Report 1999. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/czech_en.pdf (03-18-2012).

[13] Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) show that in 2007 in terms of the "Compliance to the internal market acquis: Notification and transposition of EC directives in the EU-8" the Czech Republic still had 360 (23.6 percent) directives not yet notified and 160 (10.7 percent) not yet transposed compared with a group average of 162 (10.6 percent) and 140 (9.2 percent) respectively. A compliance index score of -1.89 renders Prague as the worst performer. See Table 5 at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/tf/2007-005t.htm#TableII (03-18-2012).

[14] The date was eventually pushed to 2004 for all first wave candidates.

[15] Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) show that the "intensity of conditionality index" (mean score: '97-'03) ranks the Czech Republic (.019) roughly equal with Slovenia (0.16) and Hungary (0.17) but ahead of the other CEE countries Poland (0.27), Slovakia (0.28), Bulgaria (0.31), and Romania (0.34). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2007_005a/52#7 (03-18-2012).

[16] http://praguemonitor.com/2010/04/28/top-09-launches-election-campaign-promises-moral-revival

[17] Radio Prague. http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/nearly-three-quarters-of-czech-population-oppose-introduction-of-euro-poll-suggests (04-23-2012).

[18] RIANOVOSTI http://en.rian.ru/world/20111009/167504367.html (04-23-2012).

[19] *The Economist* March 24th 2012 http://www.economist.com/node/21551100

[20] The Constitutional Treaty, officially called the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), intended to establish a EU Constitution replacing all previous treaties. The Treaty was signed by the then 25 member states but, in 2005, the two negative referendums in France and the Netherlands stopped the ratificiation process. The intergovernmental conference (IGC) made a compromise by agreeing on a new treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, taking over the majority of reforms of the Constitution but avoiding the term Constitution. In many cases, the latter had created the impression of aiming to replace national constitutions by a European Constitution and had, therefore, contributed to growing scepticism (http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSTREAT/TR6.htm).

[21] Radio Maryja is a fundamentalist Catholic broadcaster strongly opposing EU membership (Szczerbiak 2008: 226).

[22] Note that there does not exist any Eurosceptic party in Romania and Latvia.

[23] The coefficients depicted are based on the *Transparency International Corruption Perception Index* (CPI) scores.

References

Batory, Agnes (2010): "Europe and the Hungarian Parliamentary Election of April 2010," *EPERN Election Briefings* No 51, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/no_51_epernhungary2010.pdf.

Batory, Agnes (2009): "The Dog that Did Not Bark? Assessing the Impact of the EU on Party Politics in Hungary," in: *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25 (4): 427-446.

Batory, Agnes (2008a): *The Politics of EU Accession: Ideology, Party Strategy and the European Question in Hungary*, Machester: Manchester University Press.

Batory, Agnes (2008b): "Euroscepticism in the Hungarian Party System: Voices from the Wilderness," in: Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart (eds.): *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press: 263–276.

Batory, Agnes (2002): "Attitudes to Europe. Ideology, Strategy and the Issues of European Union Membership in Hungarian Party Politics," in: *Party Politics* 8 (5): 525-539.

Bugge, Peter (2000):"Czech Perceptions of the Perspective of EU Membership. Havel vs Klaus," *EUI Working Paper* No 2000/10., Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre.

Diez Medrano, Juan (2003): *Framing Europe: Attitudes toward European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Easton, David (1965): *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Eichenberg, Richard C. and Russel J. Dalton (2007): "Post-Maastricht Blues: The Tranformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004," in: *Acta Politica* 42 (2): 128-152.

Grabbe, Heather (2002): "European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire," in: *International Political Science Review*, 23 (3): 249–268.

Grabbe, Heather and Kirsty Hughes (1999): "Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political debates and public opinion," in: Henderson, Karen (ed.): *Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, London/ Philadelphia: UCL Press: 185-202.

Hanley, Sean (2002): “Party Institutionalisation and Centre-Right Euroscepticism in East Central Europe: the Case of the Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic,” Paper presented at 30th ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March 2002.

Harmsen, Robert and Menno Spiering (2004): “Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate,” in: ibid. (eds.): *Euroscepticism: Party politics, national identity and European integration*, European Studies 20, Amsterdam/ New York: Editions Rodopi B.V.: 13-35.

Heinisch, Reinhard (2002): *Populism, Proporz, Pariah: Austria Turns Right, Austrian Political Change, its Causes and Repercussions*, Huntington NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc.

Henderson, Karen (2008): “Exceptionalism or Convergence? Euroscepticism and Party Systems in Central and Eastern Europe,” in: Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart (eds.): *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Vol. 2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University 103–126.

Hloušek, Vít and Pavel Pšeja (2009): “Europeanization of Political Parties and the Party System in the Czech Republic,” in: *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25 (4): 513-539.

Hooghe, Liesbeth and Gary Marks (2008): “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,“ in: British Journal of Political Science 39 (1): 1-23.

Huntington, Samuel P (1991): *The Third Wave: Democratizationin the Late Twentirth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Ilonszki, Gabriella and Sándor Kurtán (2003): „Hungary,“ in: *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (7-8): 967-974.

Ilonszki, Gabriella and Sándor Kurtán (2001): „Hungary,“ in: *European Journal of Political Research* 40 (3-4): 320-325.

Ilonszki, Gabriella and Sándor Kurtán (1999): „Hungary,“ in: *European Journal of Political Research* 36 (3-4), 409-418.

Ilonszki, Gabriella and Sándor Kurtán (1995): „Hungary,“ in: *European Journal of Political Research* 28 (4): 359-368.

Ilonszki, Gabriella and Sándor Kurtán (1992): „Hungary,“ in: European Journal of Political Research 22 (4): 421-427.

Jackson, John E., Bogdan W Mach and Jennifer L. Miller-Gonzalez (2011): “Buying support and regime change: the evolution of Polish attitudes towards the EU and voting between accession and 2008,” in: *European Union Politics* 12 (2): 147-167.

Jasiewicz, Krzystof and Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2008): “Poland,” in: *European Journal of Political Research* 47 (7-8): 1096–1107.

Kaniok, Petr (2009): “Party Based Euroscpeticism: Opposing the Commission or the European Integration?” in: *Contemporary European Studies* (2): 25-45.

Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski und Gábor Tóka (1999): *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. (1992): “The formation of party systems in East Central Europe,” in: *Politics and Society* 20 (1): 7-50.

Kopecký, Petr (2004): “An Awkward Newcomer? EU Enlargement and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic,” in: Harmsen, Robert and Menno Spiering (eds.): *Euroscepticism. Party politics, national identity and European integration*, European Studies 20, Amsterdam/ New York: Editions Rodopi B.V.: 225–245.

Kopecký, Petr and Cas Mudde (2002): “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions in European Integration in East Central Europe,” in: *European Union Politics* 3(3): 297-326.

Körösényi, András (1994): “Relative Stabilität, strukturelle Dilemmata. Parteien, Eliten, Gesellschaft und Politik in Ungarn 1989-1992,“ in: Hatschikjan, Magarditsch A. and Peter R. Weilemann(eds.): *Parteienlandschaften in Osteuropa*, Paderborn: Schöningh: 11-40.

Körösényi, András and Gabor C. Fodor (2004): “Das politische System Ungarns,“ in: Ismayer, Wolfgang (ed*.)*: *Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 323-372.

Krouwel, André and Koen Abts (2007): “Varieties of Euroscepticism and Populist Mobilization: Transforming Attitudes from Mild Euroscepticism to Harsh Eurocynism,” in: *Acta Politica* 42 (2): 252-270.

Leconte, Cécile (2010*): Understanding Euroscepticism,* Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Linden, Ronald H. and Lisa M. Pohlmann (2003): “Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Anti-EU Politics in Central and Southeast Europe,” in: *European Integration* 25(4): 311–334.

Markowski, Radoslaw and , Joshua A. Tucker (2010): “Euroscepticism and the Emergence of Political Parties in Poland,” in: *Party Politics* 16 (4): 523-548.

Mayer, Gregor (2010): “Ungarn”, in: ibd. and Bernhard Odehnal: *Aufmarsch. Die rechte Gefahr aus Osteuropa*, Salzburg: Residenz Verlag: 17-102.

Mészáros, Józef, Norbert Solymosi and Ferenc Speiser (2007): “Spatial distribution of political parties in Hungary 1990-2006,“ in: *Political Geography* 26: 804-823

Mungiu Alina (2007): “Is East Central-Europe Backsliding? EU Accession Is No “End of History,” in: *Journal of Democracy* 18 (4): 8-16.

Neumayer, Laure (2008) “Euroscepticism as a Political Label: The Use of European Union Issues in Political Competition in the New Member States,” in: *European Journal of Political Research* 47(2): 135-160.

ODS (2001): *The Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism-- Document from the ODS (Civic Democratic Party) conference on party principles and ideology.* http://www.zahradil.cz/assets/files/publikace/ *JanZahradil_aj_manifest.pdf* (05-03-2012)

Palonen, Emilia (2009): “Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary Hungary,” in: *Parliamentary Affairs* 62 (2): 318-334.

Riishøj, Søren (2004): “Europeanisation and Euroscepticism. Experiences from Poland and the Czech Republic,” in: *Středoevropské politické studie / Central European Political Studies Review* 4 (4), http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=211

Rovny, Jan (2011): “The Westernization of Eastern European PoliticalCompetition: How Do Non-Economic Issues Restructure Eastern European Party Competition?” Paper presented at the 18th International Conference of Europeanists, Barcelona, Spain, June 20-22, 2011

Shepherd,Robin H. E. (2000): *Czechoslovakia: The Velvet Revolution and Beyond*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sørensen, Catharina (2008): “’Love me, love me not... 'A typology of public euroscepticism,” *EPERN Working Paper* No 19, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-working-paper-19.pdf.

Steunenberg, Bernard and Antoaneta Dimitrova (2007): "Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The Limits of Conditionality," *European Integration online Papers* (EIoP) 11 (5).

Szczerbiak, Aleks (2012): *Poland within the European Union. New akward partner or new heart of Europe?* London/ New York: Routledge.

Szczerbiak, Aleks (2010): "Europe and the June/July 2010 Presidential Elections in Poland," *EPERN Election Briefing* No 55, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-election-briefing-no-55.pdf.

Szczerbiak, Aleks (2008): "Opposing Europe or Problematizing Europe? Euroscepticism and 'Eurorealism' in the Polish Party System", in: Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart (eds.): *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Vol. 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press: 221-242.

Szczerbiak, Aleks (2007): "Why do Poles love the EU and what do they love about it? Polish attitudes towards European integration during the first three years of EU membership," *SEI Working Paper* No 98, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/sei-working-paper-no-98.pdf.

Szczerbiak, Aleks (2006): "Power without Love: Patterns of Party Politics in Post-1989 Poland," in: Jungerstam-Mulders, Susanne (ed.): *Post-Communist EU Member States. Parties and Party Systems*, Surrey: Ashgate: 91-124.

Taggart, Paul (1998): "A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems," in: *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (3): 363-388.

Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2008a): "Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition over Europe," in: ibid. (eds.): *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys,* Oxford: Oxford University Press: 348-365.

Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak [eds] (2008b): "Introduction. Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe," in: ibid. (eds.): *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1-15.

Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2004): "Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe," in: *European Journal of Political Research* 43 (1): 1-27.

Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2002): "The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States", *EPERN Working Paper No 6*, http://www.admin.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-working-paper-6.pdf.

Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2001): "Parties, Positions and Europe. Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe," *SEI Working Paper No. 46*,http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/sei-working-paper-no-46.pdf.

Vachudova, Milada (2008): "Tempered by the EU? Political Parties and Party SystemsBefore and After Accession," in: *Journal of European Public Policy* 15 (6): 861–879.

Vachudova, Milada (2005): *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vachudova, Milada and Liesbeth Hooghe (2009): "Postcommunist politics in a magnetic field: How transition and EU accession structure party competition on European integration," in: *Comparative European Politics* 7(2): 179–212.

Weßels, Bernhard (2009): "Spielarten des Euroskeptizismus," in: Decker, Frank and Marcus Höreth (eds.): *Die Verfassung Europas. Perspektiven des Integrationsprojekt*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 50-68.

Whitefield, Stephen and Robert Rohrschneider (2006): "Forum Section. Political Parties, Public Opinion and European Integration in Post-Communist Countries. The State of the Art*," in: European Union Politics* 7(1): 141-160.

World Bank (1999): *Czech Republic: Toward EU Accession - Main Report*, Washington DC: World Bank.

Wysocka, Olga (2009): "Populism in Poland: In/visible Exclusion," in: Freeman, Lauren (ed.): *In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion*, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, Vol. 26.