Regional Radical Right-Wing Populism in Austria: Exploring Causes and Consequences

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Introduction

The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is remarkable not only for its enduring success as a radical right-wing populist party (RRPP)[1] since the 1980s but also for its participation in government at the federal and state level. Besides the better known case of the FPÖ's participation in the national government (2000-2006)[2], the party only recently entered two regional coalition governments in Upper Austria and Burgenland (2015- present). At the same time the FPÖ remains frozen out of power in other states such as Salzburg or Vienna. In fact, when we compare the Freedom Party across the nine Austrian federal states we find a significant variation in both the electoral success and the circumstances under which it entered public office. We therefore pose the following research question: *What can account for the subnational differences in the success of the Freedom Party and under what conditions does electoral performance for a RRPP such as the FPÖ translate into public office.*

An underlying puzzle we want to investigate is why a radical-right wing populist party that enjoys considerable success nationally does have such differing electoral results at the state-level. To answer this question we assess the regional dimension and analyze the political context and opportunity structures in each of the nine states. More broadly speaking, we are also interested at the state level as a distinct political arena for RRPPs between the national and local level due to this level's distinct characteristics: Its setting is typically less diverse than the national level, its voter groups are more homogenous, its media environment is less varied, its campaigns are less logistically challenging, and its political problems are usually less complex. Major 'political action' takes place at the national level. This is because political competitors tend to pool their own political talent and resources typically at the national level. Thus, political contests are comparatively fierce and political developments unfold at a relatively rapid pace. In fact we would expect outside and/or new parties to struggle in a national political environment. But all this raises the question of what happens if the setting is more uniform, the voters more homogenous, the competition less fierce, the expectations more modest, and the political issues less complex. Specifically, we wonder how populist parties perform at the subnational level.

When we compare the vote shares of the Freedom Party for all states, we clearly see in Figure 1 how electoral performance has varied both across time and regions. For example, in the most recent state-level elections, the vote shares for the FPÖ range from over 30 percent in Vienna and Upper Austria to just above 8 percent in Lower Austria. Throughout the 1990s the differences between the states were even larger when the Freedom Party achieved an all-time

high with nearly 27 percent nationally and over 42 percent in the state of Carinthia while remaining at about 13 percent in the state of Burgenland. Some overall trends are nonetheless clearly discernable: There was a general upward development in the electoral results from 1985 onward, reaching a peak during the 1999s. Thereafter, the Freedom Party fared poorly in all states but Carinthia due to its disastrous performance in the federal government and national-level politics (starting in 2000). Yet, despite these broader trends, the electoral potential of the FPÖ remained at different rates of success across different states, as is clearly indicated in Figure 1 shows. The party did not achieve uniform rates of success across Austria so that identifying the underlying causes of this within-country variation is a core aim of this paper.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

We selected Austria because of its federal organization in which its states resemble constitutionally and politically the national political organization in nearly all respects except for a reduced level of responsibilities, limited taxation authority as well as less demographic diversity and smaller geographic size. The states have significant areas of political autonomy as do the political parties, which are organized federally (Dachs 2006). The regional party branches have important areas where they can act independently from the federal level as has been often the case in the Freedom Party (Heinisch 2016). The political organization of Austrian states and its institutions does not only resemble the federal level but is practically identical and therefore lend themselves to undertaking horizontal and vertical comparisons. The focus on one country also keeps many context factors constant, such as the (national) issue environment, the electoral rules, and the party system while the success rates of the radical right-wing party vary both across regions and across time.

The relevance of this research is twofold. On the one hand populist radical right-wing parties continue to gain in electoral support across Europe, and, therefore, a regional comparison allows us to identify the opportunity structures and underlying conditions that cause these developments. On the other hand studies about the regional success of populist parties are (for a notable exception see Stockemer and Lamontagne 2014) and we therefore aim to contribute to this literature.

This article is structured as follows. In the first section, we summarize existing explanation of populist party success and formulate our expectations as to what might explain the subnational variation in the success of the Freedom Party. This section is followed by an analysis of the FPÖ in all nine regions, in order to assess the underlying opportunity structures and conditions that lead to the state-specific outcome. We conclude with a comparative discussion of our findings.

The Theoretical Basis:

Before we proceed, we need to define radical rightwing populism as we use the concept in this paper: We understand populism as a set of ideas that encompass the belief in a homogenous virtuous people capable of articulating a general will which the populists purport to represent. Populism also entails a Manichean outlook, claiming that the people are threatened by self-serving elites and outsiders whose interests are at odds with those of the people (cf. Mudde 2004; Kaltwasser 2014; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013; Rooduijn 2014). In RRPP the conceptual populist core is fused with the ideas of the radical right: These generally represent anti-egalitarian and thus anti-western positions founded on the belief in the natural inequality of humans. The rejection of the European enlightenment tradition, that is liberalism, universalism, and humanism, is used to advocate cultural and ethnic autonomy. The racism, xenophobia, and cultural relativism of the old right have been resuscitated by the new right to justify extreme measures in the name of protecting the sanctity of one's own ethnos (Heinisch 2003). Whether populism is conceived as a thin-centered ideology (Mudde 2004) or discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015) is less relevant. What matters is that the underlying ideas form the reference points for any action taken by populist actors, which form the empirical basis for this analysis.

Standard theories explaining the success of radical right-wing populism point to a variety of factors from the demand and supply side. These include modernization, the emergence of crises, the cultural context, the media environment, and the electoral system all of which are considered to influence the electoral fortunes of RRPPs (for a detailed overview see Mudde 2007; see also Minkenberg 1998; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Taggart 2000). However, most aspects associated with radical rightwing populism impact a country as a whole and thus they cannot account for variations in the regional success of a party. Arguments based on national legacies, authoritarian traditions, political culture and socialization should also apply to all

states within the country. This is not to say that the impact of globalization and liberalization is not felt more acutely in some regions than in others, such as in bigger cities that draw in migrants, or areas where people cross borders. However, generally these factors matter less at a regional, but more on a national level.

Among the more plausible explanations of populist success at the regional level, we would have to look for factors that pertain more to some sub-national territories than others and may thus be readily exploited through political mobilization. These include exiting ethnic and sociocultural cleavages as well as historical legacies that pertain to certain regions and not others. These may create a sense of center-periphery competition or conflict (Alonso 2012) and a separate identity vis-à-vis the nation state, providing a fulcrum for populist mobilization because it allows populist actors to portray the (majority) population of that state as the "good people" (cf. Mudde 2007) threatened by (elite) outsiders. Populists can then campaign on a platform against national elites, the media, and other outside 'meddlers' who are claimed to be ignorant of the region's true history and culture. This response would also apply if regions perceive themselves as uniquely impacted by developments beyond their borders and regard the national response as inattentive or insufficient.

Another set of literature on the success of populism has centered on political systems suffering from crises of legitimacy due to political corruption, influence peddling, and inattentiveness to voter demands. This explanation follows also the arguments about former mass parties having turned into cartel parties which, through the penetration of state institutions, can extract resources to such an extent that they become isolated from voters and their own activist base (Katz and Mair 1995). Furthermore, the predominance of one party, which governs over a long period of time with an absolute majority (Sartori 1976; see also: Nwokora and Pelizzo 2014), might ultimately lead to a sense of standstill and discontent among voters, creating opportunities for (populist) contenders. Lastly, the competition from other parties, especially the size of the right-wing competitor, is seen as influencing the success of a RRPP (Van der Brug et al. 2005; Stockemer and Lamontagne 2014).

Other accounts of RRPP success have centered on the issue environment and on the populists' ownership of new salient issues, which they are able to embrace because these parties less beholden to the conventional socioeconomic left-right division (cf. Schedler 1994: 302). This too, is unlikely to explain differences between the regional and national level unless they pertain uniquely to a particular region and would have to be linked to some of the aforementioned causes.

Finally, among the supply-side explanations for why populist parties have enjoyed political success we find charismatic leadership (Zaslove 2004; Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007).[3] Since political talent tends to be distributed unevenly and, due to the pool available, is generally rarer in smaller political systems, this effect may be felt more acutely in a country like Austria where differences in performance between regional party branches may hinge on caliber of local leadership.

Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following empirical expectations: (1) RRPPs are more successful in regions in which ethnic and sociocultural cleavage conditions apply. This refers to circumstances that contribute to a unique sense of regional identity which can be exploited by the populist right-wing party. (2) RRPPs are likely to be more successful in a state where the local political system is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy due to abuses of power by traditionally dominant political party. (3) Branch organization with the most extensive organizational scope are more likely to succeed than other. (4) Lastly, regional RRPP branches with the most talented and charismatic leadership are more likely to succeed than others.

More generally speaking, variations in the opportunity structures and winning formulas may help explain regional differences in the success of populist parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). When it comes to the latter RRPPs may pursue different strategies. Generally, such parties are assumed to be exclusively voter-seeking (Strøm and Müller 1999) but to the extent they have the opportunity and are willing to enter a coalition government, we would also expect to see moderation (Akkerman et al. 2016).

A key measure of political success is when a party enters government. However, accepting the burden of government has proved difficult because this step may taint the ideological purity of a RRPP and compromise its credibility (McDonnell and Newell 2011). Joining a government entails also organizational challenges for opposition parties as they require competent people and need to communicate nuanced policy decisions to their base (Bolleyer 2008). This would lead us to expect that the more electorally dominant and thus less dependent on a coalition partner a RRPP is, the better it can shape the public agenda. As a result, it will be less forced to engage in compromises and risky tradeoffs (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2007; Van Spanje 2011). Such a party also has fewer difficulties in recruiting political talent and occupying positions of power successfully.

More generally we operationalize party success both in terms of electoral success (share of votes) and government participation. However, in the Austrian states government participation per se is not necessarily a valid indicator for success, as in some regions government positions are allocate proportionally to all parties, depending on their share of the votes (further details below). Therefore we will also take into account the role of the FPÖ in the respective government.

The FPÖ's Success at the Regional Level

Austria, officially a federal republic, has sometimes been called a unitary federal system (Fallend 2010) because of the limited ways in which its nine states can influence national legislation. However, at the state level, governments enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy and have certain discretion even when implementing national policies. Moreover, states regularly push regional interests along the lines of Austria's vertically integrated party system. Modern Austria was founded and has been dominated by the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the center-right Christian-democratic People's Party (ÖVP), which have governed the country through power-sharing arrangements (dubbed *Proporz*—see below) and grand coalitions. Although the major's parties share of electorate has dwindled from over 90 percent still in the 1980s to about 50 percent in the most recent elections in 201, they still have dominant prepositions at the state level where one the two usually holds the governorship. As these lines were written, three governors were from the SPÖ and six from the ÖVP, which typically dominates the Western and Northern provinces. State governors are extremely powerful political figures, in part because they represent key constituencies in the party. State elections serve also as an important political barometer and provide an arena for parties to test ideas, strategies, and personalities. For the Freedom Party, state elections have routinely supplied an opportunity to continue campaigning during the long hiatus between national races. Provincial party branches enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy while receiving generous state financing without which also the national party would find it difficult to run campaigns.[4]

In marked difference to the national level, most Austrian state governments have had the peculiar feature of parties being automatically represented in proportion of the votes received on state's executive government. In Austria this is dubbed *Proporz* referring to influence based on proportionality. Until 1999 seven of the nine Austrian state constitutions with the

exception of that of Vienna and Vorarlberg mandated that parties can take part in government in proportion to their strength in the polls. This practice was intended to help with postwar reconciliation and stability and proved remarkably durable because it requires a two-thirds majority to change it. However, even under *Proporz* rules, two other parties can form a coalition to limit the authority of a third party in government by allocating to the latter an undesirable or unimportant portfolio or undercut the necessary funding. However, even in such shared government systems, parties can opt not to join an executive and go into opposition instead. By the same token, even in states without *Proporz* such as in Vorarlberg, a majority party may nevertheless invite a second party to join the government. In part, this seemingly unusual behavior by a majority party is intended to show that regional politics are less ideologically fractious while signaling a greater proclivity for inclusiveness and problem solving.

The role of *Proproz* is important when we try to understand why a rightwing radical party may be part of a regional government although at the national level, the other parties maintain a policy of ostracization (*Ausgrenzung* – the Austrian version of a *cordon sanitaire*). Thus, a RRPP may be in state government based purely on *Proporz* but relegated to unimportant matters or it may be a coalition partner exercising political influence. Of the nine Austrian provinces, only two never had a *Proporz* system, Vienna and Vorarlberg. Curiously, it was in that latter state that the dominant People's Party invited the FP into government from 1974 through 2009. Of the states with mandatory shared government, Salzburg, Tyrol and (more recently) Styria, Carinthia, as well as Burgenland abolished their *Proporz* systems until 2014.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Both at the national and the regional levels, the fortunes of the Freedom Party since it transformed into a RRPP have varied considerably. Following the party's breakthrough election in 1986 when the FPÖ nearly doubled its vote share with 9.7 per cent (see Figures 1) it continued to increase its electorate in every subsequent election except for 1995 until peaking in 1999 with 26.9 percent and even surpassing the People's Party. Figure 1 also shows the aggregate performance of all nine regional party chapters.After initially mobilizing against excessive regulation and public corruption, the FPÖ under Haider focused increasingly on immigration and Euroscepticism in the 1990s. Eventually, the Freedom Party

began to shift to a more office seeking strategy, converging on long-held positions of the (People's Party ÖV). The two parties then formed a national coalition from 2000 through 2005. Proving unfit for national government, the FPÖ subsequently collapsed in the polls, losing nearly two of every three voters. In 2005 its internal crisis resulted in a split of the party when, led by none other than Jörg Haider, the moderate office seeking wing broke away from the FPÖ to form a new party called Alliance Future Austria (BZÖ). At the time the rump FPÖ left the coalition and reverted to a more radical populist vote-seeking strategy under its new leader Heinz-Christian Strache. As the various state parties had previously benefitted from the successes of Haider nationally, their electoral fortunes from 2000 to 2005 generally mirrored the decline of national FPÖ buffered only by the vagaries of local election cycle (cf. Figures 1 and 2). Only Haider's own state party chapter proved immune from this trend. Following 2005 the FPÖ consolidated its position and gradually rebuilt its strength achieving 20.5% in the 2013 national elections, so that by 2015 it consistently led the other parties in national opinion polls with some 30% of the vote share.

In Austria's nine states, the FPÖ's electoral successes offer a mixed picture: While Carinthia certainly constitutes the party's most important government record to date, other regions have also shown to be politically fertile ground for the FP as well, such as Burgenland or the city state of Vienna. In Lower Austria and Tyrol, two state dominated by powerful local ÖVP party organizations, the Freedom Party has been least successful thus far. The following section we will analyze in detail the success of the Freedom Party and the underlying opportunity structures across all nine Austrian states.

Carinthia and Vienna

The Carinthian case is the most complex and requires a separate and detailed analysis further below. For one the local Freedom Party under Haider achieved an unprecedented level of political domination in that state after he had become governor in 1999. He was thus able to shape the national party and even the national political agenda. In fact, it was the Carinthian base from where Haider launched his takeover of the national party in 1986. Moreover, the Carinthian party (FPK) even switched federal affiliations from the national FPÖ to the BZÖ in 2005 and back again in 2013. Yet, despite Haider's sudden death in 2008 the FPK remained successful until a major financial corruption scandal destroyed its reputation and forcing early elections in 2013 when it plummeted in the polls (see Figure 2). At this point it should be noted that the FPK pursued a combination of vote-seeking and office-seeking strategies along with tactical alliances with mainstream parties to translate electoral gains into

political power and public office. Carinthia remains by far the biggest and most sustained success of the Freedom Party in Austria to date.

Both Carinthia and Vienna offer examples not only of the FP's electoral success but also of different strategies pursued and with different political outcomes in terms of government representation. While in Carinthia, the radical right-wing populists held the governorship for thirteen years without interruption, they remained frozen out of power and in opposition in the latter. The massive influx of foreigners into Vienna following the collapse of Communism and a noticeable increase in crime in the early 1990s provided an opportune issue environment for the local FPÖ.

Embarking on a voter-seeking strategy nationally, Haider and his surrogates in Vienna relentlessly stressed the connection between immigration and crime and painted a grim picture of the burden immigrants represented. The electoral success of this aggressive strategy silenced more moderate critics within the party while the FPÖ made major inroads into traditionally Social Democratic areas such as the working-class districts. Yet, despite the successes, entering public office in Vienna proved elusive because of the determined hostility by the reigning Social Democrats (SPÖ) and unfavorable constitutional arrangements that relegate the FPÖ to an opposition role unless it were to gain an outright electoral majority. Although the Freedom Party had permanently damaged the People's Party and certainly inflicted political wounds on the SPÖ, the latter's power to govern was never in question.

Since these basic parameters in Vienna have not changed thus far, the FP's strategic calculus has not either. Despite large increases in votes in the Vienna elections in 2010 and 2015, Strache's party remained locked out from power and was never seriously considered a coalition partner by the Social Democrats. The intensity of the political conflict in Vienna is heightened by the fact that both Social Democrats and Freedom Party are locked in direct competition for the support of the same demographic groups, especially the socially underprivileged and the blue-collar working class. It remains debatable whether the low probability of being invited into public office causes the FPÖ never to moderate its positions as has happened nationally or in other states or whether it is its radicalism that has made coalitions impossible.

Looking back at the Carinthian experience of populism in public office, some observers labeled it a distinct form of politics or even a "Carinhtian Model" (Skorianz 2001). The

success of the Freedom Party in Carinthia was due to the fact that it found much more favorable conditions in Austria southernmost province. First, the Social Democrats had long-dominated state politics but were demolished after the election in 1999, which allowed the FP to determine government formation. Second, with Jörg Haider, it had the dominant political personality and most popular political figure in the state at the helm of the party and the state government. Owing to the FPÖ/FPK's deep roots and long strength, the party also had a sufficiently large cadre of experienced politicians and professionals on which to draw for filling positions and policy expertise. Lastly, there was a simmering conflict about the use of the Slovene language in the public sphere in ethnic minority areas, which provided the Freedom Party with a favorable background for voter mobilization along this cleavage.

Moreover, the state of Carinthia always stressed its strong identity and awareness of history. The FPÖ was able to take advantage of this regional identity and even fueled the issue with the proposition of establishing Carinthia as a Free State (*Freistaat Kärnten*). The party used this claim for more autonomy to distance themselves from the federal government and framed Carinthia as "rampart in the South" [5] and "the forgotten province"[6] that had been neglected in the past.[7] FP governor Haider depicted the national government as "the elite in Vienna" and thus regularly used the image of "the others" versus the Carinthian people.[8] The Free State however was never implemented, not least, because in practice the constitutional amendment would not have changed the status of the region in any way and had only a symbolic value.

The relationship between Carinthia and the federal government in Vienna can nevertheless be described as especially distanced—both geographically and politically (Mölzer 1999). Notably criticism of the region from outside, especially from the national level, had mostly a rally-round-the flag effect--a feeling of which the populist FPÖ took advantage by claiming to protect the Carinthians against unfair treatment (Filzmaier and Hajek 2004). To sum up, the Freedom Party successfully used regionalist claims and referred to the regional identity while in office. Particularly Jörg Haider was able to establish this aspect of politics and strategically position himself accordingly.

The most consequential aspect of the FPK government in Carinthia was unprecedented series of corruption scandals involving kickbacks to political parties and groups associated with the Freedom Party but also other political actors. Furthermore a series of investments in prestigious but economically questionable projects drained much needed budgetary resources

and drove up public debt to €4.8 billion in an already relatively poor and economically depressed state. Finally, the collapse of the regional bank for which the FPK-led state government had underwritten the loan guarantees resulted in liabilities of nearly 25 billion for which a state with an annual budget of about €2 billion had to foot the bill. It was the combination of these blows and the death of Jörg Haider in 2008 which brought down the FPK government in 2013 when the party lost 28 percent of their voters. Owing to *Proporz* rules (then still in effect in Carinthia), the local Freedom Party remained a part of the new state government. This was also to ensure that the next government, which had to deal with the financial clean up, was not going to be stuck with taking unpopular decisions while the FPK would be in opposition.

Vorarlberg

In Austria's westernmost province of Vorarlberg, the dominant Conservatives were early on fairly receptive to working with a moderate Freedom Party. Although the state did not have constitutionally mandated *Proporz* rules, the Freedomites were represented in the state government from 1974 through 2009. Following a political culture that prided itself on relative political independence from the rest of the country, the Vorarlberg Freedom Party (FPV) opted not to pursue a radicalization strategy in the 1990s but instead embraced liberal economic ideas. Already in 1992 Hubert Gorbach, a political moderate, took the reins of the Freedom Party and subsequently led the FPÖ to 18.39 % in the polls in 1994 and to 27.41% 1999, respectively (see Figure 2). Gorbach became State Councilor for Transportation and eventually Deputy Governor, a position he maintained until joining the federal ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in 2003 where he rose to the rank of Vice Chancellor and Minister of Transportation, Innovation, and Technology. Far from following the leadership model practiced elsewhere in the FPÖ, there was broad internal support for the local strategy of moderation. Upon Gorbach's departure for Vienna, he was succeeded by his deputy Dieter Egger who vowed to continue the successful political course und putting Haider publicly on notice, not to go "back to the strategy of the past."[9]

Yet, the FPV was not immune from the national political trend that unfolded after 2000, which saw the People's Party strengthen everywhere at the expense of the Freedom Party. In order not to be completely smothered politically by the Vorarlberg People's Party, the FPV sought to raise their profile by becoming once again more voter-seeking. They began playing up the issue of immigration and alleged the Conservatives were corrupted by power[10] and

widespread nepotism[11]. In line with voter-seeking strategies nationwide, the FPV increasingly emphasized nativist and religious causes. Egger took issue with abortion rights and domestic partnerships for gays, opposed Islamic symbols like "minarets in public spaces," and regularly stressed the connections between foreign migrants and crime.[12]

Despite the tension the People's Party maintained the coalition with the Freedom Party but labeled it a 'marriage of convenience', signaling that the FPV would be kept on a short leash. When the Freedom Party leader made anti-Semitic remarks[13], the Conservatives vowed not to renew their coalition arrangement. In response, the FPV embarked on its most radical strategy in nearly two decades, drawing in their campaigning, advertising style, and rhetoric heavily on the Swiss People's Party of Christoph Blocher across the border (Fürlinger 2013). Incidentally, the FPV also used the same Zurich-based advertising agency GOAL as did Blocher's party, aimed specifically at an exclusionary social policy designed to deny services to people who did not have roots in that region. Despite doubling their share of the votes to 25.2 percent and achieving the coveted second spot in the local party hierarchy in the 2009 state elections, the People's Party rejected the FPV as promised as partner for government. The subsequent coalition consisting of the ÖVP and the Greens continued also after the 2013 elections in which the Freedom Party suffered slight losses and has remained in opposition to date. Nonetheless, Vorarlberg must be considered one of the regions in which the Freedom Party was overall most successful both electorally but also in sustained and substantive government participation.

Upper Austria and Styria

Certain regional sociocultural cleavages—a high percentage of Protestantism and associated German nationalism in Upper Austria and the remnants of an ethnic Slovenian minority in Styria—have made these two provinces a more natural terrain for an ethnocratic party like FPÖ—in fact, Haider himself had been raised and socialized in the German-nationalist milieu found in Upper Austria. Already in 1991 the growing strength of the Upper Austrian FP had enabled it to claim one position among the state's nine-member executive government. It doubled its share in government in 1997 and was given responsibility for the environment, price control and food safety, which is indicative that it was treated as a serious partner in public office. Ursula Haubner, one of the two FP members of the Upper Austrian government, was not only Haider's sister but generally regarded a moderate. Haubner would eventually go

on to take the reins of the national party between 2004 and 2005 and broke with FPÖ to follow her brother into the newly formed Alliance Future Austria (BZÖ) in 2005.

However, by 2009 the Upper Austrian FP had recovered gaining 15.26% of the vote and receiving a position (albeit with minor portfolios[14]) in the state's executive government. In the most recent elections of 2015, the party even doubled its share of the votes (see Figure 2) and subsequently joined a coalition government with the People's Party. This was not least due to the topic dominating the final weeks of campaigning prior to the 2015 state election in Upper Austria, which had been the refugee crisis (SORA/ISA 2015). Unsurprisingly, the FP was able to leverage the situation given that immigration had always been at the core of its electoral strategy. Furthermore the FP was able to leverage this favorable issue environment and influence the coalition agreement and government policies.

In the State of Styria the FPÖ followed a similar trajectory in the 1990s. An internal feud that threatened to destroy the local branch of the party forced Haider to intervene decisive in 1989. He installed Michael Schmid, a respected member of the local business community, who subsequently became the first Freedom Party representatives on the Styrian state government to manage important offices and later went on to become (briefly) national minister of infrastructure. The Styrian FP was long counted among the more policy-oriented and moderate branches. However, to combat the steep losses at the polls in the wake of the 2005 crisis when the FP dropped out of the national government, the Styrian party branch shifted to an intensive and largely islamophobic voter-seeking strategy. Despite substantial gains in the 2015 state elections, it missed out on an opportunity to form a coalition after the SPÖ had ruled out it would never cooperate with the Freedom Party.

Burgenland and Salzburg

In the southeastern province of Burgenland, the FP unexpectedly succeeded in entering government under *Proporz* rules following the 1996 election. However, the collaboration of the governing Social Democrats with the People's Party rendered the FPÖ's powers in public office severely curtailed. Following the losses in the 2000 elections however, the Freedomites dropped out of government again. The situation was made worse by the breakup of the national party in 2005. State elections held soon thereafter resulted elections in the Freedom Party's poorest showing since 1983 (5.8 percent, see Figure 2). A subsequent return to a

radical voter-seeking strategy led to considerable increases in the 2010 election and finally to the best electoral result to date for the Burgenland FPÖ in 2015 (15 percent).

As a result the long-dominant Social Democrats entered into a coalition with the Freedom Party in 2015, which was the first freely formed coalition after the *Proporz* had been abolished one year earlier. Given that both SPÖ and FP had taken similar positions on a number of issues, forming a coalition under such circumstances would not be remarkable if the Social Democrats had not passed a resolution nationally to ban any cooperation with the Freedom Party. In this context, however, the coalition was heavily criticized from both outside and inside the party. Furthermore, from Governor Hans Niessl's statements, we may infer that his approach was not merely situational and tactical but aimed at steering the SPÖ towards a genuine alternative to coalitions with the People' Party and the Greens. The Freedom Party, on the other hand, was especially eager to form a coalition with the Social Democrats, which FPÖ leader Strache had mentioned as potential partner at the national level, given that both parties had embraced similar views on social policy, economic regulation, and protectionism.[15]

In Salzburg, Haider initially faced a squabbling regional chapter when he came to power. He thus moved to reorganize the local branch, purging independent-minded regional officials and installing Karl Schnell, a Haider-loyalist with a penchant for radical rhetoric. After the latter served the joint executive government from 1992 to 1997, he was forced out by a vote of no-confidence by the other parties. In Salzburg as in Tyrol the legislatures reacted to the FP's growing strength in the polls by abolishing the constitutional *Proporz* rule. This prepared the ground for sequential ÖVP-SPÖ coalition governments until 2013 (Marko and Poier 2006). By 2015, Schnell had become one of the longest serving regional Freedom Party leaders but, by FPÖ standards, the regional branch continuously remained below its political potential and in third place behind ÖVP and SPÖ. In the same year, Schnell and his confidents were ousted by the national party under a technical pretext and replaced by a new and very young leadership team headed by the 24 year old Marlene Svazek. In response, Schnell and his group broke away from the FPÖ but continued to occupy their seats in the legislature. Thus, although Freedom Party has as of 2016 only one seat in the 36 member Salzburg legislature, it is poised to do much better in subsequent elections. Overall the party, while previously campaigning on the standard repertoire of FPÖ positions, has been among the more moderate branches in recent years, focusing on a local financial corruption scandal and transparency.

Lower Austria and Tyrol

The situation in Lower Austria differed from the others in that since 1992 the state has been dominated by an extremely powerful ÖVP governor whose style and self-presentation has has had an affinity to populism (Heinisch 2007: 75-76). and who completely dominated state politics. Because the state is traditionally Catholic but has also significant industry, it had been a favorable terrain for the Conservatives and the Social Democrats but was less friendly to the Freedom Party. Affected by the national downward trend, also the local FP suffered significant losses in 2003 but managed to climb back by 2008, reclaiming one seat on the state executive. Yet, this was little more than a token presence (with the portfolios animal rights and construction regulations). In the subsequent elections in 2013 the FP faced an unexpected challenge by a briefly successful new populist party, Team Stronach, which bested the Freedom Party and relegated it to fourth place in the legislature. With 8.2 percent the FP branch had the poorest showing of any of the regional party chapters and its fourth party status also meant that it failed to be included in the state government under *Proporz* rules.

In Tyrol, heavily dominated by the ÖVP, the FP made impressive electoral gains during the 1990 but remained frozen out of power. After 2000 the Tyrolean FP were dragged down by the problems the party was facing nation-wide and beset by internal squabbling over direction. While these issues have been resolved, electoral success has been moderate and the FPT remains in fourth place to date. Relegated to an opposition role, it has only four seats in the 36 member legislature and struggles with the competition by local protest parties and the dominant role of the ÖVP. In its strategy, the FPT has oscillated between social policy issues, sociocultural themes, and security but emphasized especially anti-Islamic positions in the last elections.

Discussion

If we look at the electoral performances of the regional party branches over time (Figure 2), we would conclude that all in all the Carinthinan, Viennese, and Upper Austrian chapters were the most successful, their peaks were higher and lows less pronounced than those of the other regional party organizations. The FP in Vorarlberg and Styria came second and the Freedom Party in Salzburg and the Burgenland were the third and forth most successful respectively in terms of voter support. When we add the criteria of substantive government participation then Carinthia, Upper Austria, Vorarlberg, and Burgenland stand out as

successes for the Freedom Party. Table 1 provides an overview of the various chapters of the FPÖ, their participation in government or opposition, and the party's context.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In the beginning of this paper, we formulated a set of empirical expectations: (1) RRPPs are more successful in regions in which ethnic and sociocultural cleavage conditions apply? Here we have to note that there are three states with traditional ethnic cleavages, Carinthia (Slovenes), Styria (Slovenes), and Burgenland (Croat and Hungarians). However, only in Carinthia has this issue been salient, long predating the rise of the FPÖ.[16] It is also in Carinthia that the sociocultural cleavage has been successfully used as a wedge issue dividing on one hand the Carinthia population and on the other the Carinthians from the rest of the country. The issue was also used repeatedly by the FPÖ to rally support in Carinthia by attacking out-of-state 'elite' institutions such as the Constitutional Court which had ruled in favor of the local Slovene petitioners. Along with the Carinthia, Upper Austria is another stronghold of the Freedom Party and it (along with Carinthia, Burgenland, and Styria) has had a relatively more protestant and thus anti-Catholic streak.[17] Opposition to the Catholic Habsburgs was a staple among pan-German nationalists and Nazi sympathizers which formed the nucleus of the FPÖ when it was established in 1955-56. In all these states, the FPÖ has shown to have greater potential than in the rest of Austria. In Carinthia, the Catholic Church has been often regarded as too closely aligned with pro-Slovenian interests. This deviation from the Austrian norm prevented the pro-Catholic People's Party from playing the kind of dominant role it does elsewhere in rural Austria. This allowed the Social Democrats to fill the political vacuum after Nazi rule was overthrown in 1945. In this context, it was commonly known that several of its former high-ranking officials had been members of the Nazi party. It is therefore easy to see how FP was able to exploit this cleavage for its own purposes. Moreover, for Haider's own affiliation with the German nationalist segment of the Carinthian FP was important for his career locally, his because he was not Carinthian himself but had moved there as a young party functionary. His subsequent close relationship with one of the leading local far rightwing exponents of the FP, Kriemhild Trattnig, established the young Haider in a party skeptical of outsiders.[18] Time and again, Haider made far-right nationalist

statements in Carinthia, praising the NS employment policy, denying that Austria was its own separate nation rather than another German state, referring to concentration camps as labor camps, and praising the SS while he was at same time moving away from such positions nationally. Thus, we may conclude that the sociocultural cleavages in Carinthia were if not necessary but nonetheless crucial condition for the electoral success of the FP. The same messages clearly played well also in the German nationalist milieus in Upper Austria and Styria but these states are more diverse, have larger industrial bases, and major urban centers, which required the FP to adapt to more complex environment and foreclosed any strategy aimed at becoming a "freestate"— this would not have been taken seriously.

(2) We also expected RRPPs to be more successful in a state where the local political system is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy due to abuses of power by a traditionally dominant political party. In Carinthia, the Social Democrats had long been criticized for influence peddling and abuse of power under their elaborate patronage scheme that had seen promotions in state-related job, schools, business contracts, housing, and other social services linked to a partisan affiliation with the SPÖ. In a famous case, a disgruntled school teacher passed over for a promotion in favor of a partisan tried to assassinate the Social Democratic governor. At trial, a sympathetic jury refused to sentence the assassin, who had admitted his guilt, so that the trial had to be moved out of state. In a country well-known for insider politics, Carinthia was one of the most notorious cases for political nepotism and influence peddling. It is of little surprise that the Haider FPÖ used public corruption as a key feature in their campaigns. Also Vienna is dominated by a quasi-hegemonic SPÖ so that "corrupt city hall" has been an often used staple message. However, because Vienna is generally governed and administered well, often toping the ranks in comparative indices of quality of living, other issues, especially immigrants and crime have been more effective for the FPÖ.

Superficially viewed, the situation in Vienna resembles that in Carinthia: In both states the FP has celebrated unprecedented victories and the two most important national FPÖ leaders, Haider and Strache, emerged from these respective branch organizations. In both states, a hegemonic SPÖ stood accused of being corrupted by power. Sociocultural issues and identity dominate the political debate in both cases. However, the issue in Vienna is not one of a traditional ethnic cleavage but being uniquely affected by the influx of foreigners. While this is not a separate topic because the FPÖ makes a similar case throughout the country, the issue resonates in Vienna more than elsewhere. This is because immigrants and problems associated with them in the public mind—integration, school quality, public safety,

competition for low wage work—are much more concentrated in Vienna, the population of which has increased by some 15 percent since 2001. In short, the case of Vienna is one where the general issue environment has had a special political resonance dating back to the early 1990s. This is remarkable because historically the FP had never been particularly successful in the capital and as such the Vienna branch was traditionally one of weakest regional chapters.

We also assumed that the FPÖ's regional branches with the most extensive organizational scope were more likely to succeed than others. While we do not have good detailed data on organizational scope, a somewhat suitable proxy measure we can use is the number of party cells and local organizations of a state branch in relation to the state population. This gives us a measure both of what Janda (1980: 101) calls the extensiveness and the intensiveness of a party. Thus, if we calculate the ratio of local organizations proportional to the state populations, we obtain a comparative measure. Tracing this ratio over time, we are provided with an estimate to what extent the organizational capacity keeps up with population change.

Table 1 presents an overview of party cells (dubbed base posts, units with fewer than 10 members) and local groups (unites with more than 10 members): Here we clearly notice that the FPÖ stronghold of Carinthia had a significant local organization already prior to the party's transformation into a populist party if we look at the number of cells and local groups in 1981. Subsequently, the organizational scope expanded and then number dropped back again in 2002 to the level of 1981 (unfortunately no newer data are available). However, population growth in Carinthia began to decline in the latter part of the 1990s and eventually turned native while the Carinthian branch already had one of the densest networks of local chapters (see Table 2). The Upper Austrian branch significantly extends its scope by increasing the number of local chapters from 18 to 97 in about 20 years. Also the Burgenland FP more than quadruples its organizational scope. Those regional branches in ÖVP-dominated western states of Tirol and Vorarlberg steadily built their operation, corresponding to their electoral growth. The trend in Salzburg points in the opposite direction despite the FP's successes in the polls. This is undoubtedly the result of Haider's disbanding and reformation of the state branch. In Styria, the FPÖ expanded its organization despite the state's significant decline in population during that time period. Also the Lower Austrian FP added local chapters due to the state's significant population growth especially around the capital Vienna. However, despite boasting more local groups than any other state in 2002, the province's large population (the second largest in Austria after Vienna) makes the

organizational network not quite as extensive as that of Upper Austria, Carinthia, and Burgenland. Interpreting the results for Vienna along the same lines is problematic because it is a city state with short distances to any location in the city. Thus, the FP branch organization largely corresponds to the number of districts in Vienna and has thus not changed over the years.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Table 3 provides us with a rough indicator of relative organizational strength and capacity over time. However, the connection between organizational scope and political success is not clear cut. For one, geographic factors and actual regional membership size, which the data do not allow to gage, may distort the results. Moreover, the organizational differences from state to state are not very pronounced. Nonetheless, two, Carinthia and Upper Austria, of the three state branches with the lowest ratio of local chapter to population are also politically the most successful (if we ignore the special case of Vienna). In terms of its growth overtime proportional to population change, Burgenland (81 percent growth) and Upper Austria (122 percent growth) top the list to be followed by Styria, Tirol, and Vorarlberg. In all these states, the FP grew throughout the 1990s but suffered losses after 2000.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Besides Carinthia also Vorarlberg and Styria became important new strongholds of the FP and their organizational scope has developed accordingly. By contrast, Salzburg has been a case of organizational decline but generally sold results at the polls although for reasons mentioned elsewhere in the paper, it election results there tended to remain below expectations. Generally, the data confirm that electoral growth went, for the most part, hand in hand with organizational development. They also show the FPÖ to be a member and mass party also at the regional level.

We also wanted to see whether regional RRPP branches with the most talented and charismatic leadership were more likely to succeed than others. Accounting for political talent

and charisma (McDonnell 2015) is notoriously difficult and to some extent subjective. This is especially the case at the regional level where a rising national political tide may lift all regional branch organizations regardless of local talent. Yet, with Jörg Haider, clearly the most charismatic and talent Austrian politician of his generation and in his party seems to confirm our expectation. As an outsider, he quickly rose through the ranks of the Carinthian party eliminating his all rivals in his way including his former mentors (Heinisch 2002: 78-98). He was nationally known politician long before he took control of the party at the federal level and dominated Austrian politics and his party for two decades—clearly he had no match in the small Carinthian political landscape. As he was the first Carinthian-based party leader of the FPÖ, it was also not the strength of the Carinthian branch organization but rather that of his personality that cemented his national role. Subsequent leaders of the FPÖ rose to prominence because they were promoted by, or associated with Haider and thus not independent actors. The other example of Freedom Party politician who in style, rhetoric, and overall appearance resembled the young Haider and who had already become a nationally known figure was Heinz-Christian Strache.

During the 1990s the FP's election victories in Vienna were largely owed to the FPÖ brand and Haider's campaigning in the city (curiously as sitting governor of another state) and less to the popularity of the local party leaders. This changed with Strache's ascent to the leadership of the FP branch in Vienna. When Haider left the FPÖ, Strache had already established himself as the heir apparent and logical successor. In short, both Haider and Strache took control of the regional party operations at an early stage in their career and became the unquestioned leaders. Importantly, Strache and his Vienna organization had always remained outside Haider's orbit and preserved a measure of independence from him. Just as Haider had emerged as a rightwing internal critic of the FPÖ's participation in government in the 1980s, Strache played a similar role vis-à-vis the ÖVP-FPÖ government in the 2000s. The fact that both individuals took control of a fragmented party in a time of crisis and led it to extraordinary political success as well as the long duration of their leadership is a testament to their unique political abilities and personality– for example, in the span of Strache's chairmanship of more than 10 years, the SPÖ has had no fewer than 3 party leaders and the ÖVP even 5. It is therefore not surprising that both the Freedom Party in Carinthia under Haider and Vienna FP under Strache are the overall most successful branches in terms of voter support and national impact.

We also wondered what strategies regional FPÖ chapters pursued and made a distinction between voter-seeking and office-seeking. We treated the former as roughly synonymous with a more radical direction and not seriously pursuing coalition opportunities whereas the latter connoted a more moderate course indicating a willingness to compromise and cooperate. As Table 3 shows from 1990 through 2005 four regional branches moved toward office seeking. On the whole they had individuals in leading positions that were known for their expertise and political substance. In all these states, the FP was also part of the government. In five cases the FP was following a vote-seeking strategy and found itself in opposition or relegated to unimportant portfolios under *Proporz.* After 2001 the Freedom Party moved to the populist right to sharpen its profile and rebuild its base, thus embracing voter-seeking strategies at the state level. Overtime all regional chapters except for Upper Austria, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia dropped out of their respective state coalitions. In Vorarlberg the coalition survived until 2009 when the ÖVP had had enough. The Carinthian Freedom Party remained office seeking but was at the time affiliated with the more moderate BZÖ. After 2010 the situation began to change and by 2016 two FP chapters were again in public office in Burgenland and Upper Austria (which entered the coalition as a full partner independent of *Proporz*). Generally, the evidence seems to support the assumption that more a moderate posture of the regional party is likely to be rewarded with inclusion in government whereas radical positions tend to rule the FP out as a potential partner for mainstream parties.

Table 4 systematically summarizes the strategies and their consequences. A checkmark indicates when the empirical expectations was validated showing that a certain posture had resulted either in opposition or government participation. Again it has to be emphasized that this is not a precise measure given that parties are not monolithic and harbor both more radical and more moderate members. Moreover other factors besides moderation and mainstreaming play a role in coalition formation. Nevertheless, the pattern of regional coalition formation is clearly influenced by the local FP's overall posture and its perception by the mainstream parties.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Preliminary Conclusions

We may summarize this review of the political success of the FPÖ at the regional level by noting that opportunity structures varied from state to state which accounts for the variation of political success of the FPÖ. In Carinthia and Upper Austria, the FPÖ was already well entrenched as a far right party before it transformed into a populist party. The political legacy and ethnic cleavages in combination with the county's most talented politician propelled the FPK to unparalleled regional success by any measure—it nearly achieved an absolute majority and held the governorship for 13 years. Other regional factors played roles in the political succeed of the FP in Upper Austria (sociocultural cleavages), Vienna, Burgenland (issue environment), and Vorarlberg (remoteness). Also the strategies pursued by the FP state branch organizations played a role: Initially many regional branches were divided between voter and office-seeking strategies resulting opposition or government participation. When the Freedom Party fell out of favor nationally after 2000, also the local branches tended to compensate the expected losses through voter-seeking strategies. More recently the regional FPs have become again more open to accepting a role in government.

Generally, research about RRPP at the regional level still suffers from a dearth of useful data and faces the familiar problem of too many variables and two few cases. Nonetheless, regions are an important test bed for party strategies and the political incubator of future national leaders. As such more research is necessary specifically on impact of RRPP on regional policy making.

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: State-level Percentages of Votes for the FPÖ 1980 to 2015



Sources: Federal Ministry of the Interior; Administrative office of the state of Upper Austria; own compilation.

Figure 2: Percent of votes for the FPÖ for all nine Austrian states and the federal level, 1980 to 2015



Sources: Federal Ministry of the Interior; Administrative office of the state of Upper Austria; own compilation.

Table 1: Overview of RRPP Development – Its role in Government and the national Context

	Cleavages	Dominant Party	Proporz	1990-2000	2001-2010	2011-2016
Burgenland		SPÖ	Until 2014	Opposition/ Proporz Government	Opposition	Opposition/ Government (junior)
Carinthia	Slovene-minority	SPÖ (-1989)	Yes	Proporz Government	Government (senior)	Proporz Government
Lower Austria		ÖVP		Opposition/ Proporz Government	Proporz Government/ Opposition	Proporz Government/ Opposition
Upper Austria	Protestant	ÖVP	Yes	Proporz Government	Proporz Government	Government (junior)
Salzburg		ÖVP (-1999)	Until 1999	Proporz Government	Opposition	Opposition
Styria	Slovene-minority	ÖVP (-2005)	Until 2011	Proporz Government	Proporz Government/ Opposition	Proporz Government/ Opposition
Tyrol		ÖVP	Until 1999	Proporz Government	Opposition	Opposition
Vorarlberg		ÖVP		Government (Junior)	Government (Junior)	Opposition
Vienna	Immigration, crime	SPÖ		Opposition	Opposition	Opposition

Note: Grey cells indicate the FPÖ in a relevant government position. Empty cells indicate the absence of e.g. an issue cleavage or a *Proporz* system. A dominant party is the party holding the governorship and achieving either an absolute majority or a difference in the vote share of at least 10 percent to the second party in the election.

Table 2: Number of Local Freedom Party Units by Type of Organization, State, and Year

	Burgenland		***Carinthia***		***Upper Austria***		***Lower Austria***		***Salzburg***		***Styria***		***Tyrol***		***Vorarlberg***		***Vienna***		***Austria***	
	BP	LG	BP	LG	BP	LG	BP	LG	BP	LG	BP	LG	BP	LG	BP	LG	BP	LG	BP	LG
1984	56	18	5	157	119	40	158	259	17	128	176	129	79	48	30	29	37	23	676	831
1992	0	23	5	171	264	145	98	328	15	105	130	171	45	70	19	48	0	23	456	1.084
1996	14	80	3	167	7	146	76	328	7	112	19	211	18	97	18	53	0	23	215	1.217
2002	53	97	15	157	13	189	80	339	9	110	8	218	15	107	0	52	0	23	237	1.248

BP=Base Post fewer than 10/LG=Local Group has at least of 10 members; *Note:* In grey, FPÖ under Haider's leadership; *Source:* Luther 2006: 375.

Table 3: Organizational Density of local Freedom Party Units and Organizational Growth

	Burgenland	***Carinthia***	***Upper Austria***	***Lower Austria***	***Salzburg***	***Styria***	***Tyrol***	***Vorarlberg***	***Vienna***	***Austria***
2002	Pop/LG	Pop/LG	Pop/LG	Pop/LG	Pop/LG	Pop/LG	Pop/LG	Pop/LG	Pop/LG	Pop/LG
	2,861	3,563	2,960	4,559	4,684	5,427	6,294	6,751	67,395	6,436
84-02	Gr. rate	Gr. rate	Gr. rate	Gr. rate	Gr. rate	Gr. rate	Gr. rate	Gr. rate	Gr. rate	Gr. rate
%	81	0	122	18	-38	41	42	34	-0.9	26.8

LG=Local Group of at least of 10 members; *Source:* Luther 2006: 375, Pop/LG = population per local group in 2002, Gr.rate = rate of growth of LGs proportional to state population in %

Table 4: Strategies by the FPÖ and Regional Branches 1990-2015

	1990 – 2005		**2005— 2015**	
State	**Voter-seeking**	**Office-seeking**	**Voter-seeking**	**Office-seeking**
Burgenland	?		√→	→√
Carinthia		√	(?)→	→√
Lower Aus.	?		√→	→√
Salzburg	√		√	
Styria		√	√	
Tyrol	√		√	
Upper Aus.		√	√	
Vienna	√		√	
Vorarlberg		√	√ ←	←√

Notes: "√" indicates strategy led to result as predicted by outcome with moderation resulting in government participation and radical posture leading to opposition; "?" denotes and unclear or ambivalent posture. "→" denotes a shift in posture in the direction indicated.

APPENDIX

[1] We consider the FPÖ radical right-wing populist because it fits the criteria commonly attributed to such parties: it engages in the "unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment [and] appeals to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense" (Betz, 1994: 4).
[2] The FPÖ participated in a Social Democratic-led government already from 1983 to 1986 but was not considered a radical right-wing populist party at that time.
[3] Cf. Van der Brug and Mughan (2007) for a contestation and empirical analysis of leadership effects.
[4] We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that despite their relative autonomy, state parties, especially RRPPs, are not completely free to determine their agenda but bound by national party statutes and constrained by national decision-making. The way in which state parties negotiate and manage this relationship to the national party and the extent of the regional party's chapter influence over the national organization is arguably an important factor in the regionalist-national dimension.
[5] Die Presse (09.02.2007).
[6] ORF (21.02.2007).
[7] Die Freiheitlichen in Kärnten-BZÖ (22.02.2007) https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS20070222_OTS0137 (20.07.2016).
[8] Die Presse (09.02.2007); ORF (21.02.2007).
[9] *Vorarlberger Nachrichten* June 6, 28, 2003: 3.
[10] *Vorarlberger Nachrichten* May 15, 2003: 6.
[11] *Vorarlberger Nachrichten* May 18, 2003: 5.
[12] Live-Recording of campaign stump speech by FPV Chair Dieter Egger, August 8, 2009.
[13] cf. *Vorarlberger Nachrichten* August 13, 2008: 3 and *Vorarlberger Nachrichten* August 24, 2009:5.
[14] Conservation and landscape preservation, savings & loans, public housing.
[15] ORF (09.10.2013) http://orf.at/stories/2201589/2201649/ (16.08.2016).
[16] In Burgenland the Croat community is isolated from any larger Croat population across the border and more assimilated. The Slovene population in Styria and the Hungarian population in Austria are too small to play a political role.
[17] Statistik Austria: Bevölkerung nach dem Religionsbekenntnis und Bundesländern 1951 bis 2001 http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/bevoelkerung_nach_dem_religionsbekenntnis_und_bundeslaendern_1951_bis_2001_022885.pdf
[18] Pelinka, Anton, *Die Zeit Online* (34) 16-08- 2012 /2012http://www.zeit.de/2012/34/A-Haider-Kaernten/seite-2 (22-09-2016)