The Euroskeptic Voter:
Attitudes and Electoral Behavior in Central and Eastern Europe

Reinhard Heinisch
University of Salzburg
reinhard.c.heinisch@sbg.ac.at

Monika Mühlböck
University of Vienna
mo.muehlboeck@univie.ac.at

Paper to be presented at the 4th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association held in Chicago, April 16-19, 2015

Work in progress - Comments welcome!

Abstract

People in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have traditionally been more Europhile than Western European citizens. However, with the initial euphoria of EU accession fading and the effects of the financial and Euro-crisis hitting home, Euroskepticism in CEE member states is on the rise and so is electoral support for parties displaying Euroskeptic sentiments. In this paper, we explore the effects of Euroskepticism on voting behavior. Specifically, we focus on the following questions: Is it indeed the (perceived) congruence between a person's own and a party's attitudes towards the EU that leads someone to vote for a specific party? Or, alternatively, are voters rather motivated by diffuse protest against mainstream parties when opting for a more extremist party that happens to be – among other things – also Euroskeptic? We study these questions drawing on novel data from public opinion surveys conducted in Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland –three CEE member states strongly associated with Euroskeptic and extremist party voting. Our empirical results support the argument that electoral behavior in CEE countries is indeed significantly affected by protest voting, with Euroskeptic attitudes playing a minor role.

The authors gratefully acknowledge that this project was supported through FP7 funding by the European Commission*

Introduction

Who are the Euroskeptic voters and what motivates voters to opt for Euroskeptic parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)? We pose these questions because the electorates in that region have traditionally been substantially more pro-EU than the Western European citizenry. In fact, prior to the peak of Euro-crisis in 2011, the average level of trust CEE citizens placed in European institutions (53.3%) relative to national institutions (26.6%) was significantly greater. This set the former Communist countries apart from their Western counterparts in the EU where the respective levels of trust lay much closer together with 43.9 and. 42.7 percent respectively—Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011. We know that support for the European Union has been declining across Europe. For example overall trust in the European Union has fallen from a high of 57 percent in 2007 to 31 percent in 2013. The most precipitous decline occurred between the peak years of the Euro-crisis between 2010 and 2012 when, after three years of relative stability, average trust plummeted from 43 to 31 percent (Eurobarometer79, Autumn 2013: 9). This trend has not spared the new member states but, there, the situation has been has been complicated by additional factors having to do with the countries' particular situation as post-transition societies and recent affiliates of the Union.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the perceived intrusion by Brussels on matters of national sovereignty, something so recently acquired, contributed to eroding public support for the EU as did concerns about preserving national identity in an integrated Europe. Moreover, the new member states often resented both the conditions imposed on them for being accepted into the Union and the complete economic dependence on their richer Western neighbors for investments, knowhow, and market access. However, this was generally tolerated in view of expected economic benefits and the perceived superior competence of Western institutions, especially of the European Union. Its difficulties in resolving the financial crisis and the imposition of austerity measures have undermined this confidence to some extent. Yet, about 60% of the citizens in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe continue trust the EU and they are also among the most optimistic about the Union's future. This pertains especially to the three countries surveyed in this study—Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. According to the Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer79, Autumn 2013), its population is not only optimistic but people also regard themselves overwhelmingly as European Union citizens. In fact, 75 percent of Slovaks, 70 percent of Poles, and 59 percent of Hungarian see themselves as such suggesting an important affinity to the idea of European integration (ibid). At the same time, the Central and Eastern Europeans still tend to have lower opinions of national political institutions. Despite such evidence of pro-integration sentiments, the region has also seen an unparalleled proliferation and growth of (typically protest) parties advocating Euroskeptic positions, prompting the question as to how to reconcile these trends.

Given the particular characteristics of the accession process and its ramifications for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we cannot assume that the basis and variation of Euroskepticism and its manifestation in voting behavior necessarily match those in the old member states. Hence, the "newcomers" form a distinct group that merits a specific investigation into the causes that motivate Euroskeptical voters and thus shape electoral behavior.

We do so, drawing on a survey we conducted in three CEE countries, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia between 2013 and 2014. Based on this novel data source, we study the motivations behind Euroskepticism, and, more specifically behind voting for parties that are (perceived to be) Euroskeptic. We focus on the following questions: Is it indeed the (perceived) congruence between a person's own and a party's attitudes towards the EU that leads someone to vote for a specific party? Or, alternatively, are voters rather motivated by diffuse protest against mainstream parties when opting for a more extremist party that happens to be – among other things – also Euroskeptic?

We approach these questions by investigating which independent variables explain a) a person's Euroskepticism (measured as the attitude towards EU integration), b) the Euroskepticisim that voters themselves attach to the parties they vote for, and c) the Euroskepticism that is in general attached to the party voted for. In line with our expectations, we find that indicators for protest voting are of considerable influence. Hence, claims about a surge in Euroskepticism as evidenced by recent electoral results may be overstated.

The paper is structured as follows: First, we will give an overview of the concept of Euroskepticism, the motives behind Euroskeptic attitudes, and the motives behind voting for Euroskeptic parties. Then, we proceed to introducing the specifics of the three CEE countries surveyed. After that, we turn to scrutinizing our survey data using descriptive as well as OLS-regressions. The final section concludes.

Conceptualizing Euroskepticism

Since the 1990s, a growing body of research has been grappling with questions related to critical attitudes about, and opposition to the process of European integration. Although this phenomenon has been mostly subsumed under the label 'Euroskepticism', the scholarship on this subject has struggled to clarify, operationalize, and measure the relevant core concepts. This went hand in hand with a steady proliferation of classifications and definitions intended to capture this phenomenon but resulting instead often in further conceptual confusion. Most poignantly, there is as of yet no generally accepted conceptualization of 'Euroskepticism' in the scholarly literature.

Research on Euroskepticism generally distinguishes popular from party-based Euroskepticism. The motivations for why individuals and parties oppose European integration generally overlap although parties adopt positions also for strategic reasons. Unlike voters, parties will take a position so as to compete more effectively in the political market place or may change that position if different groups or sentiments within that party gain the upper hand. A considerable portion of the literature on Euroskepticism has been devoted to defining its underlying core concept. Paul Taggart's (1998: 366) definition that Euroskepticism expresses "the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating an unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" is arguably still the most widely used and has the advantage that it can be applied to both individuals and parties. Later research, most notably, Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 300) argue that definitions such as that by Taggart are too broad. Drawing on David Easton's (1965: 124) concept of political support, they suggest instead a four-fold-typology combining diffuse support for European integration and specific support for the EU. Whereas so-called 'Euroenthusiasts' support the general idea of European integration and its current manifestation as embodied by the EU, 'Eurorejects' are opposed to both. By contrast, so-called 'Europragmatists' do not support the general idea of European integration but accept the EU for pragmatic reasons. Finally, the term 'Euroskeptic' is left for those supporting the general idea of European integration while rejecting the current gestalt of the EU. Although Kopecký and Mudde (2002) were focused on parties, their conceptualization lends itself also to popular Euroskepticism. However, some objected to this typology on the grounds that diffuse and specific support of European integration would be closely related to one another and should therefore not be listed as distinct categories (cf. Beichelt 2004).

Krouwel and Abts (2007) developed a model of popular Euroskepticism, combining domestic and EU-level factors along with personal traits, resulting in a typology that differentiates Euroconfidence (individuals does not monitor the EU but feels good about the system), Euroskepticism (tradeoff between dissatisfaction and confidence), Eurodistrust (frustration with the perceived failure of the EU to meet the expectations and demands of the citizens), Eurocynism (distrust toward EU authorities, disbelief in the functioning of EU institutions, and fatalism about the future of the project), and Euroalienation (enduring, profound rejection). A drawback of this approach is that it requires a rather complex multidimensional measuring instrument and the ability to distinguish sufficiently between very closely related categories.

By comparison, Timm Beichelt (2004) in his work on Euroskepticism in accession states proposes to focus on the difference between opposition to European integration on principle and opposition to the actual practice of European integration. Thus, he distinguishes 'Euro-skepticists' from 'EU-skepticists' (Beichelt 2004: 31), which dovetails with Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2002, 2008) well-known distinction between "Hard and Soft Euroskepticis" for assessing party-based Euroskepticism. Accordingly, Hard Euroskepticism is understood as a 'principled opposition to the

EU and European integration' whereas Soft Euroskeptics do not reject the EU and European integration per se but take a critical stance on one or more aspects of the current practice of European integration (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 7-8).

Other authors stress the necessity of constructing a typology that is not limited to negative attitudes but covers almost all possible dispositions toward European integration and the EU. Hence, such a typology is said to help distinguish Euroskeptic parties from non-Euroskeptic parties. For instance, Nicoló Conti and Luca Verzichelli (2002) supplement Taggart and Szczerbiak's dichotomy by adding the category of 'No stances referring to/No interest for European integration' and two variants of positive attitudes, 'Functional Europeanism' and 'Identity Europeanism'. In a similar fashion, Chris Flood and Simon Usherwood (2007: 7) propose a set of seven categories '[…] based on the degree of support for or opposition to EU integration in general or some specified aspect(s) of it,' ranging from a rejectionist to a maximalist position. Another typology designed to capture Euroskepticism was introduced by Jan Rovný (2004). It is centered on both the extent of, and the motivations behind their Euroskepticism and thus moves beyond other concepts that are purely position-based.

This overview of approaches provides an indication of the disagreement in the literature about an adequate conceptualization. A problem that all the above approaches share is that rating parties in terms of to their motivations does in itself not allow us to make predictions about the possible effects of a party's Euroskepticism on the behavior of individual and collective actors. A similar problem plagues those conceptualizations differentiating Euroskepticism according to different respective causes. Furthermore, there is no theoretically plausible argument that one form of Euroskeptic attitude is more likely to result in a vote for a Euroskeptic party than another. What matters, arguably, are the direction and intensity of a person's position on Europe. In response, we opted for a more straightforward 10-point measure of Euroskepticism by asking a respondent to rate his/her general position on European integration. This allows us nonetheless to distinguish this attitude by intensity ('harder' or 'softer' Euroskepticism), direction ('positive' or 'negative'). Conceptualizing party-based Euroskepticism poses a similar problem. However, we hope to sidestep the impasse presented by the different conceptualization in that we look at parties from the voter's perception. In short, we rely on the voters' own assessment of a party's position on Europe.

The motives behind Euroskepticism

Turning to the motives for Euroskepticism, research on the causes of citizens' positive or negative EU attitudes have suggested thus far that public opinion toward the European level is actually dependent on the citizens' national identity/pride, their own preferences toward international economic integration and supranationalism in general as well as their disposition toward cooperating with other

countries (cf. Boomgarden et al. 2011, Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Banducci et al. 2009; McLaren 2002, 2007; De Vries and van Keersbergen 2007). Furthermore, it was found that people oriented toward the left of the political spectrum are also expected to be more Euroskeptic due to an inherent skepticism vis-à-vis the free market and the often alleged neo-liberal orientation in EU policy making (cf. Follesdahl and Hix 2006). Among the commonly identified motives we thus find utilitarian, sovereignty-based, democratic, and social Euroskepticism (Sørensen (2008). In a similar vein, Cécile Leconte (2010) makes a distinction between utilitarian, political, value-based Euroskepticism, and cultural anti-Europeanism. More generally, there are concepts of Euroskepticism reflecting variations of opposition to European integration in public opinion (cf., Krouwel/Abts 2007, Weßels 2009).

In their work on Euroskepticism, Lisbeth Hooghe et al (2002) have pursued a different approach, arguing that the move from a permissive consensus on European integration to a constraining dissensus and thus the measurable increase in negative attitudes toward Europe reflect a divide between the public and the elite in terms of Europe. The elites are much more in favor of the European project than the public. This gap largely dissolves if EU integration is disaggregated into its specific policies. This is because public support for market regulation and redistributive policies is higher than that of the elites.

Other sources explaining the motivation of voters may be found in the literature on political psychology. We may assume that voters who display a general political openness as citizens may be more amenable to supranational politics than citizens that might be more status-quo-oriented, closed-minded, and risk-averse (e.g., Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Jost et al. 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997, also: Schoen 2007). Likewise people who generally perceive strong constraints or threats to society coming from outside the country (immigrants) or from distinct groups within the country (minorities) tend to be more hostile to European integration (see on connected research McLaren 2002, 2007; Curley 2009).

There is also a large literature on the relationship between trust—both in the form of trust in social relations and trust in institutions relative to others— as an important determinant of voting behavior—for the overview of the relationship between trust and Euroskepticism, see Abts/Heerwegh/ Swyngedouw (2009); for an overview of the role of political trust in CEE, see Braun (2011). A motive closely related to trust but which is also linked to the issue of utility is a person's expectations of the function and performance of institutions. Usually, we trust institutions that perform well in our mind and regard them also as useful and, thus, view them favorably whereas in the opposite case, we tend to react with skepticism. This has been shown also to be a factor in Euroskepticism (cf. Boomgaarden et al. 2012).

In addition, researchers have found that citizens are using their perception of the national political system as a proxi when asked about their opinion toward the EU (Anderson 1998).

Furthermore, citizens take on the position on the EU presented by those actors in which they trust (e.g., Hug 2002; Kaufmann and Waters 2004; Wagschal 2007; Hobolt 2007). Such an actor could be the political party they feel close to – yet of course the party might strategically adopt a position close to the one of its voters. This has led to the difficult question as to who is cueing whom (Steenbergen 2007, Gabel and Scheve 2007). Is it the party that influences the attitude of its voters towards Europe, or is it the Euroskepticism of the voters that trigger Euroskeptic party positions?

When explaining the motive for Euroskepticism in CEE, we cannot ignore also the specific economic, social, and political conditions of these countries as post-transition societies and latecomers to European integration. The transition from Communism to the delayed the process of European integration defines a collective experience that distinguishes the CEE countries from other EU member states (cf., Kopecký/ Mudde 2002, Jungerstam-Mulders 2006, Szczerbiak 2006, Rybář 2006, Batory 2008, Vachudova/Hooghe 2009, etc.,). Given the particular characteristics of the accession process and its ramifications for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we should not assume that the basis and variation of Euroskepticism and its manifestation in voting behavior necessarily match those in the old member states. Hence, the "newcomers" form a distinct group that merits a specific investigation into the causes that motivate Euroskeptic voters and thus shape electoral behavior.

It is not surprising that the former Communist countries were initially very enthusiastic about EU accession given the expected economic benefit and the psychological validation stemming from joining the 'elite club' of European Union countries. This, more than anything, provided recognition for their country's status as a modern European state (Grabbe and Hughes 1999). However, in the course of the accession negotiations between 1998 and 2004, the question of "Europe" turned from being a diffuse goal into a concrete issue (cf., Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 300). As a result, we see on one hand a broad convergence on support for membership across all CEE countries, reflecting both a strong desire to join the EU; but on the other, we notice that overall levels of support have dropped noticeably in several new member states since accession, indicating a sense of realism replacing the relative euphoria and excessive expectation that had prevailed previously (Heinisch 2015). This phenomenon was dubbed the conversion from 'Euroenthusiasm' to 'Eurorealism' and 'Europragmatism' (Henderson 2008: 125). Thus, we may argue that the Eurorealism' and 'Europragmatism, which had implicitly recognized the inevitability of EU membership as the only viable strategy forward, may have suffered a severe setback once the economic crisis beginning in 2007 exposed severe structural weaknesses in the competence and institutional architecture of the European Union. Not only has the willingness to join the Euro-zone declined across CEE countries since then but also the confidence in European institutions has been shaken.

As a result, Euroskepticism has become an issue even in the CEE countries, albeit to different degrees and generally less pronounced than elsewhere. Both in Hungary and Slovakia, the level of public Euroskepticism is now close to the average when compared to the other EU member states,

with Hungary having experienced the steepest decline in recent years (Eurobarometer 79.1, Braun and Tausendpfund 2014). In contrast, Poland is still among the most pro-European member states (or even the most pro-European member state, depending on the question asked) when it comes to public opinion (Eurobarometer 79.1). In all three countries, parties displaying different degrees of Euroskepticism have been on the rise – again, most notably in Hungary

What does all this mean for our analysis? For one we would expect that to see differences in the level of Euroskepticism across the country cases in our sample with Polish and Slovak respondents appearing *ceteris paribus* more supportive of the EU. We would also assume exclusivist and nativist sentiments to be important drivers of anti-European attitudes. However, we are more likely to see these factors reflected in negative views on local ethnic minorities rather than on immigration simply because there has been comparatively less influx of foreigners into CEE but there have been protracted ethnic conflicts throughout the region.

The motives behind voting for Euroskeptic parties

The straightforward cause for voting for a Euroskeptic party would be the assumed congruence between a voter's political orientation and a party reflecting such an orientation. This should lead us to expect there to be the same motives behind Euroskeptic attitudes as there are behind Euroskeptic voting behavior.

Nonetheless, there is yet another literature explaining voting preferences for Euroskeptic parties which we need to consider. By this we mean the theories on populism and protest/outsider parties, which appears especially relevant here given that most of the new anti-European parties in CEE have been varyingly described as rightwing populist and/or far-right extremist (Mudde 2007: esp. 32-62).

Although we are far from having a consensus on conceptualizations on populism, there has emerged a widely used distinction between populism as a political style and populism as something having a distinct political core –for an overview of the conceptualization debate see Canovan 1981, Betz 1994, Kitschelt, 1995, Ignazi 1996, Mudde 1996, Taggart, 1998, Decker 2000, Taggart 2000, Kopecký/ Heinisch 2003, Mudde 2004, Laclau, 2005, Hooghe/Marks et al. 2008, Albertazzi/McDonnell 2008, esp. Mudde 2007, Mudde/Rovira-Kaltwasser 2012. Drawing on the work of Canovan (1981), Mudde (2004) proposed the now well-established definition of populism as a "thin-centered ideology." As such it has two core characteristics: First, it portrays the people as one in the sense of being a homogenous whole without divisions of class or interest. Secondly, populism pits a "virtuous and homogenous people against elites that are inherently self-serving and depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice"

(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 3). Thus, attitudes and party behavior that show an affinity for populism exhibit both a defined anti-elitist component and a distinct common-man ethos. As such they try to distinguish themselves from the political establishment, for example by calling themselves "movements" instead of "parties".

The argument that the Euroskeptic voting may be explained also by domestic populist protest rather than anti-European sentiments *per se* is supported by the fact that, as already mentioned, CEE electorates have traditionally been more pro-European than their Western counterparts but rather skeptical of domestic politics. This result is hard to reconcile with the bewildering diversity of newly emerging Euroskeptic protest and populist parties. We question, therefore, whether one can indeed infer Euroskeptic motivations in all those cases in which parties are elected based on positions that more salient than those on Europe.

The reason for why protest motives and populist politics may play such an important role in CEE is that discontentment with domestic politics, as we know from Eurobarometer surveys and other sources, is much greater in the new member states than elsewhere in the EU; notably due to perceived widespread corruption, the distrust of national political institutions, and comparatively worse socio-economic conditions. As a result, Euroskepticism may represent one element within an overall protest strategy of emerging parties that aim to attract voters dissatisfied with domestic politics. This is because new parties search for ways to distinguish themselves from the mainstream in the volatile political landscapes in East Central Europe and adopt positions that deviate from the generally pro-Europe (or at least the Eurorealist and pragmatist) stance of most major parties. This may be an effective way to signal that one is "different" and perhaps "not corrupt like the rest". In this sense, Zapryanova (2010) has argued that the main reason for why there are so many Euroskeptic parties in relatively 'europhile' CEE is that the former use the anti-European label to distinguish themselves from the more established parties. The real motive for why people vote for them and the salient issue that these parties push is rather the perception of widespread political corruption and the idea that mainstream parties are "all the same" (Zapryanova (2010): 32). This important assertion forms a core argument of ours and will be tested based on several indicators identifying protest motives in conjunction with the decision to vote for a Euroskeptic party. Taking this argument to its conclusion, we would expect there to be a difference between the factors explaining the adoption of a Euroskeptic attitude and the voting decision *per se*.

A particularly noteworthy development in this connection has been the transformation of the Communist successor parties from Euroskeptic and europhobe political formations immediately after transition into variants of Social Democracy. Once these parties became increasingly liberal and pro-European, a host of new often radical parties of different stripes emerged to establish themselves in opposition to the pro-European political mainstream (Vachudova and Hooghe 2009: 190). For a new party to take up a Euroskeptic position was an effective means to signal distance from the political

establishment. As these groups rushed in to fill the Euroskeptic, anti-reformist gap, conservative forces were pulled along, either modifying or completely abandoning their previously staunchly Europhile position (cf., Heinisch 2015, Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007, Harmsen and Spiering 2004).

Hypotheses

In the following section, we present our hypotheses in which we test six common explanation of Euroskepticism on the basis of the above theoretical discussion. Two types of dependent variables will be employed. The first set of hypotheses aims at explaining the Euroskeptic attitudes and the second set the voting preference of respondents. All hypotheses are presented along with the respective rationale for the underlying causal connection.

I. Hypotheses on individual-level attitudes towards the EU

Social Protectionism Hypothesis

H.I-1: Voters who are skeptical about the free market are likely to be Euroskeptic.

Explanation: Despite its political progress, the EU is first and foremost an integrated market designed to create economies of scale so that cost can be reduced and competition can be more efficient. As such, Europe has been accused of imposing a deregulatory agenda and of being too friendly to big corporations. For a market-skeptic, the EU is likely to embody a laissez-faire system and will thus be seen more negatively.

Extremist Hypothesis

H.I-2: Voters who are located at the edges of the political spectrum are likely to be Euroskeptic.

Explanation: As in an inverted U-shaped curve, extremism on the Left/Right dimension leads to extremism on new issues arising on the agenda.

Elite-Mass Divide Hypothesis

H.I-3: Voters who are members of societal elites are likely to be pro-European

Explanation: Members of the elite are better positioned to take advantage of the educational, professional, and financial opportunities offered by a larger market and bigger political space. Thus elites are more likely to favor deregulatory policies and liberalizations. On the other hand, efficiency gains through market integration often come at the expense of groups with lower skill sets so that mass publics tend to prefer protections. Moreover, by virtue of their background and range of experiences,

elites, tend to be more cosmopolitan and may feel less threatened by external influences such as immigration and cultural diversity, typically associated with processes of integration.

Proxy Hypothesis

H.I-4: If voters are not satisfied with how democracy works in their country, they are likely to be Euroskeptic.

Explanation: As voters are less informed about European policy making, they are taking cues from what they experience at the national level. Thus, if they are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, they will thus be more likely to have positive feelings toward EU membership.

Socio-Psychological Hypothesis

H.I-5: Voters who trust European institutions less than they trust national institutions are likely to be more Euroskeptic.

Explanation: Since trust is a major perquisite for developing an affective positive relationship, the lack thereof is likely to result in the opposite.

Exclusivism-based Hypothesis

H.I-6: If voters lean towards exclusivism, they are likely to be Euroskeptic.

Explanation: Voters who are generally fearful of influences by groups other than their own as in the case of intense nationalism, are unlikely to be accepting European integration, a process which is perceived as increasing cross-border mobility and national openness toward a larger economic and political space. Needless to say, the perception of the EU as a direct threat to national decision-making power and identity of the majority would cause it to be viewed negatively. Hence, voters who have little regard for minority rights and fear immigration are unlikely to support the EU given its track record of promoting equal rights for minorities and immigration – at least of EU citizens.

II. Hypotheses on Voting for a Euroskeptic Party

Rational Party Choice Hypothesis

H.II-1: Voting behavior is motivated by the (perceived) congruence between a person's own and a party's attitude towards the EU.

Explanation: Selecting the political agent most likely to act on a voter's own preference is the most effective and thus rational way for a voter to achieve a desired outcome.

Protest-voting Hypotheses

H.II-2: Citizens who perceive a higher degree of mainstream party similarity will be likely to cast a protest vote.

H.II-3: Citizens who are more concerned about political corruption will be more likely to vote for domestic / mixed protest parties than for mainstream parties.

H.II-4: Citizens with extremist orientations in terms of minority rights will be more likely to cast a protest vote.

H.II-5: Citizens who are less satisfied with the way democracy works will be more likely to cast a protest vote.

Explanation: Voting behavior is motivated by diffuse protest against mainstream parties. Although voters mostly care about domestic corruption, incompetence, the role of self-serving elites, and a lack of political choice and although it is these issues that are at the forefront of the campaigns of protest parties, these formations often adopt Euroskeptical stances as a means of distinguishing themselves from the political mainstream. Votes for such parties are then taken to be an indication of Euroskepticism although it is in fact an expression of domestic protest. Likewise, voters with extremist leanings are likely to vote for parties on account of their perceived extremism on curtailing minority rights and civil liberties and not their position on Europe.

Case Selection

Our focus on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is motivated by two principal reasons: First, there has been a relative lack of empirical research on Euroskepticism in new member states and secondly there are important theoretical considerations underlying this specific case selection.

Generally speaking, the CEE countries faced both common and unique challenges associated with the different Communist regime legacies whose variation also affected post-transition party politics (Kitschelt et al 1999). These legacies are said to have influenced political development by structuring domestic political cleavages around socio-economic or socio-cultural fault lines—for an overview of the discussion on regime legacies see Minkenberg (2010), for specific examples, see Hloušek and Kopeček (2008), Barlei and Hartleb (2010), Gałązka and Waszak (2013). Economically, all CEE countries had to engage in an enormous exercise in market building and have since become highly dependent on the import of knowhow and capital while being forced to reorient their entire export structure from East to West. Politically, all Communist successor states have struggled with consolidating their party systems and developing institutions capable of responding, amidst great inequities, adequately to the conflicting demands of different constituencies. In many cases, these demands had previously been repressed or ignored and the systems only slowly developed the capacity to incorporate them in the political arena.

Thus, as a group, the relationship between the new member states and 'Europe' is rather different from that of their Western counterparts due to the special nature of the political development

in CEE. Their membership in the EU was never based solely on the prospect of economic benefit but also the idea that this strategy offered a clear path to societal and economic modernization (Grabbe and Hughes 1999). As such, support for membership was initially very high and above 50 percent in all Central European countries with some notable exceptions.[1] Even in the relatively less europhile CEE countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and the Baltic States, trust in European institutions tended to be higher than trust in domestic institutions and remained so even in 2010 after the onset of the Euro-crisis. On the whole, European institutions were seen as seen as less corrupt and more competent, thus deriving their legitimacy from their capacity. In short, there are important general reasons to focus on the motivations of voters in that region and their attitudes toward Europe

There are also valid theoretical concerns to look specifically at the countries selected for this study. Of all the CEE countries, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are especially well suited to test our theoretical assumptions. All three form part of the Višegrad group (along with the Czech Republic), which is in itself an acknowledgement of their relative similarity by being among the most advanced Central European political and economic systems. Thus, they are highly comparable in many important factors such as level of political and economic development, institutional capacity (when contrasted with Bulgaria and Rumania), geographic location and thus cultural and regional influences (when compared to the Baltic States and the Western Balkans). All three countries have historically had a Western orientation and share a parallel accession process as well as an especially strong connection to Western markets and capital. This sets these member states apart from their neighbors to the East and South East. Yet, all three cases differ also in key aspects which are of interest for this analysis and provide significant variation where it matters theoretically for this analysis.

First and foremost, the three countries differ in their overall level of Euroskepticism although support for the EU has fluctuated since accession. During the negotiations about EU membership, it was widely assumed in Poland that accession would represent a push toward greater liberalism and thus not only hurt the native economy but also undermine basic catholic values and national traditions (Wysocka 2009: 6-7). Support for EU membership fell from nearly 80 percent in 1994 to between 55 and 60 percent by 2000. The same concerns also propelled Euroskeptic parties into office following accession. From 2005-2007 Poland was governed by arguably the most Euroskeptic right party of the three countries in our study, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) (Szczerbiak 2006: 94-95). However, in 2007 PiS was decisively beaten in the elections by a new coalition led by the europhile Christian-democratic Civic Platform (PO) (Gałązka and Waszak 2013: 201). Quickly, the new government

[1] These were the Czech Republic, the only country with a main party (ODS) and a major national political figure (Vaclav Klaus) ideologically opposed to European integration; Slovenia, which feared that foreign, notably, Italian, German, and Austrian investors would buy up the tiny country's scarce real-estate and fledgling businesses; as well as Latvia and Estonia, which struggled with EU demands to grant their sizable Russian populations adequate minority rights. Although the ODS never went as far as rejecting EU membership outright, it continuously nurtured Euroskepticism, culminating in a party program in 2002 that included a special chapter on the EU in which two thirds of the references made to European integration were negative (Hloušek and Pšjea 2009).

embarked on a more pro-European course, vastly improving Poland's relationship with Brussels and the neighbor Germany. Whereas as Poland tended to be on average more Euroskeptic before and immediately after accession, it later become more pro-European with 62 percent of the population thinking by 2010 that membership was a good thing when compared with 59 percent for Slovakia and only 38 percent for Hungary. This places only Hungary below the EU average of 49 percent (Standard Eurobarometer, November 2010). All three countries continue to show more trust in the European Union than in national governments, although the differences are largest for Slovakia and Poland and least pronounced for Hungary (Standard Eurobarometer, Spring 2014). Yet, all three countries have tended to show more trust toward the European Union than does the EU average. Whereas Poland's relatively pro-European position has remained stable in recent years, Slovakia's support has eroded converging on the lower Hungarian level of trust in the EU.

Secondly, all three CEE member feature socio-cultural factors facilitating the emergence anti-cosmopolitan and nativist political orientations, although the underlying issues are quite different. Whereas the role of Catholicism is of particular importance in Poland where the EU is seen by some as too liberal and secular and thus posting a threat to the nation's fundamentally Catholic character (Wysocka 2009: 6-7), Slovakia has been struggling both with parochialism and ethnic conflict. This is because Slovak nationalism had to define itself first against the Hungarians in the days of the Habsburg monarchy and later the Czechs when the Slovaks formed the smaller of the two major population groups making up Czechoslovakia. Because Slovakia also contains a sizable Hungarian minority, its role has been an additional socio-cultural cleavage issue in national politics. Hungary is affected by yet another socio-cultural issue as its still wrestles with losing two thirds of its territory and around 3.2 million ethnic Hungarians, who were separated from their motherland after 1918. The 'trauma' of Trianon is kept alive in the Hungarian collective memory until today and is repeatedly invoked by various nationalist forces (Mayer 2010: 21-23). The country's strong agrarian traditions along with widespread resentments against its Roma population are also factors fueling a political discourse in which identity, national traditions, and self-determination are important elements. Thus, the question of sovereignty vis-à-vis Brussels and a fear of selling out national resources, notably land, to more prosperous foreigners have been potent political issues. More generally, the emerging dominant socio-cultural cleavage meant that in all three countries (and in the region at large) the question of Europe could eventually be framed by political actors as representing yet another threat to a national culture and exclusivist political arrangements.

Thirdly, the three countries diverge with respect to their domestic political trajectories. The widespread fears in Poland about the economic and socio-cultural impact of accession was exploited by a coalition of Catholic-nationalist parties and right-wing groupings supported by Radio Maryja (Szczerbiak 2006: 94-95, Riishøj 2007: 521), which opposed European integration due to the perception of the imminent "*[…] destruction of Polish conscience and culture*" (Kopecký and Mudde

2002: 312). Eventually, this situation changed with the election of a much more liberal government and its successful handling of the economy after 2008. Slovakia, initially a laggard in the accession process, moved ahead of the rest of the Višegrad by becoming the first CEE country to introduce the Euro as its own currency. To the extent voters are influence by the cues sent by major political parties (cf., Zaller 1992, Bücker & Tuuli-Marja Kleine forthcoming), the relatively pro-European stance of the Slovak major parties clearly differs from the situation in Poland, where the mainstream right has been more critical of European integration. Hungary shows yet a different pattern. Emerging from the so-called goulash communism of the Kádár regime as the relatively most open and economically most liberal country in the Soviet bloc, it was assumed to find transition to a Western market economy easier than others. Nonetheless, emerging socio-economic and especially socio-cultural cleavages made the accession process more difficult than expected and led to the rise of far-right and authoritarian tendencies. Most importantly, the developments culminated in a series of political victories for the `liberal-turned-nationalist` Prime Minister Orbàn, whose party Fidesz consistently moved to right. It is not surprising that nationalism and numerous confrontations with Europe under the Orbàn government have left their mark on how Hungarians assess their country's EU membership. The country went from being a highly pro-European to becoming one of the more EU-skeptic member states (Standard Eurobarometer 79.1).

Forth, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia differ also with respect to their economic policies. Even before accession, Slovakia had distinguished itself by launching a series of landmark economic reforms that limited the role of the government. The goal of Slovakia's 'neoliberal turn' was to create unrivaled conditions for foreign investors.[2] The Euro, introduced in 2009, appeared to provide added safety to a small exposed economy at the mercy of international market forces. Nonetheless, the Slovak economy contracted by almost 5 percent in 2009 and the country was called to task in 2011 to contribute to the EU's main bailout fund for the struggling Southern Euro zone economies, particularly Greece. Following a public uproar, Slovakia refused to expand the powers of European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), resulting in the resignation of center-right government. In the end, the EFSF was approved with the backing of the Social Democratic opposition which subsequently returned to power. As a result, public opinion on the EU has declined more steeply in Slovakia than in most other EU member states since the wake of the financial crisis (Braun and Tausendpfund 2014), potentially giving rise to Euroskeptic parties. Poland, once by being by far the least competitive of the Višegrad countries, had no other option but to engage in far-reaching economic and systemic reforms while exporting surplus labor to other EU countries. As the economic liberalization improved conditions, its success prepared the way for the return of a pro-European and more market-liberal government in 2007. Most importantly Poland's larger size and bigger domestic market have shielded the country from some of the worst effects of the economic crisis. The sense of lesser vulnerability and

[2] Most famously, the country introduced a 19 percent flat tax on corporate, personal income, and VAT in 2004.

greater confidence in the nation's own resources may have also shaped electorate's perception of Poland's relationship with the European Union. By contrast, Hungary's economic and political system had entered a crisis well before the global economic downturn. The governing party Fidesz had been moderately pro-market in 2002 but moved towards greater skepticism in 2006 (Barlei and Hartleb 2010: 97). When reelected in 2010 Prime Minister Orbàn struggled both with the massive decline in foreign investment and one of the most severe recessions in Hungarian history, resulting in a downgrading of Hungarian debt to near junk status by all major credit rating agencies. In response the Orbàn has engaged in a series of highly interventionist and unorthodox policies resulting in questions about both the independence of the Hungarian National Bank and the compatibility of several of the measures adopted with EU law (Batory 2008).[3] In short, Hungarian voter may have to decide whether to blame the country's malaise on the party in power or follow Orbàn's cues and direct their discontentment against the European Union.

Our case selection provides us with a considerable range of political conditions, a varied cleavage structure, a variety of national policy responses, and different party political choices to give us confidence that we may draw more general conclusions from our research. We also should be able to see national differences across the case selection and would hypothesize attitudes toward Europe to be most positive in Poland to be followed at some distance by Slovakia and then Hungary. However, because Poland still has a significant socio-cultural cleavage with the main right party aligned along the traditionalist and Euroskeptic side of the issue, we would still expect high levels of Euroskepticism present in large parts of the Polish population. We may thus summarize the variation of the cases selected as follows – see Table 1.

[3] This included a ban on, and retroactive annulment of foreign farmland ownership Foreign and attempts to curb the influence of foreign financial institutions. Banks were forced to allow the conversion of foreign-currency mortgages to the forint even if it meant substantial losses. The new government also nationalized $13 billion of private pension-fund assets to improve the government's debt position.

Table 1: Overview of the Variation between the Cases selected for Empirical Analysis

Case	Socio-cultural Cleavage	Economic Policy	Support for EU over time	Domestic Political trajectory	Eurozone membership
Hungary	Growing nationalism ***Core issue:*** Sovereignty/identity	From pro-market to skeptic	Sign. Decline ***Status*** Low	From liberal to more nationalist and authoritarian tendencies	no
Poland	Declining parochialism ***Core issues:*** Catholicism/culture	From skeptic to pro-market	Increase ***Status*** Strong	From traditionalist to more liberal tendencies	no
Slovakia	Growing nationalism ***Core Issues:*** Ethnicity/modernization	Continued pro-market	Some Decline ***Status*** Medium	From market liberal to more populist tendencies	yes

Analysis

Data and Variables

Between 2013 and 2014, we conducted surveys in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, which were carried out by national survey agencies. The number of interviews conducted in each country was 1000. The survey data comes with demographic weights considering region, gender, age and education.

As already mentioned, the degree of Euroskepticism is measured as the general position on European integration on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating that a person is strongly opposed and a 10 indicating that a person is strongly in favor. In addition, respondents were asked to place the major national parties on the same scale. Furthermore, they were asked which party they would vote for if national elections were held the following weekend. Thereof, the attitude towards the EU of the preferred party was calculated – on the one hand as perceived by the respondent him-/herself and on the other hand as generally perceived (taking the average over the perceptions of all respondents).

As for independent variables, we measured the position of the respondents on an economic left right scale (and thereof calculated the L-R extremism). Concerning the GAL-TAN dimension, we use two different measures. First, the position on immigration was measured by the question whether immigrants are seen as a threat to the society. Second, the position on minority rights, measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating less support for minority rights. We also include a variable on the satisfaction with the way democracy works in [country], as well as an indicator for

whether a person places higher trust in European than in national government. Furthermore, we use the fact whether a person has received higher education as a proxy for an elitist status. Finally, we employ several measures to capture protest behavior: the agreement with the statement that "Politics are controlled by groups who do not represent the people" and the agreement with the statement that "These parties are all the same" for a selection of mainstream parties (both measured on a scale from 0 to 10), and the concern about the spreading of corruption (on a scale from 0 to 4).

Correlations between Euroskepticism and Euroskeptic Voting Behavior

In the first step of the empirical analysis, we test to what extent the individual attitude towards EU integration is correlated with the position on EU integration of the preferred political party. If voting for Euroskeptic parties is indeed mainly motivated by the own Euroskepticism, we would expect high correlations between these variables.

Figures 1-3 display the mean values of Euroskepticism of the major parties in each of the three countries, as perceived by the respondents in general and as perceived by their voters. Furthermore, the figures indicate the mean values of Euroskepticism of the voters of these parties. The figures offer several insights. First, as expected, the general attitude of the voters toward Europe is most positive in Poland, while voters in Slovakia and especially Hungary are significantly more Euroskeptic. However, the level of party Euroskepticism (as generally perceived) in Poland is as high as in Hungary. Using this measure, parties in Slovakia seem to be by far the most europhile. Interestingly, most parties are perceived considerably more Euroskeptic than their voters conceive themselves. This is especially apparent for Polish parties. For example, the PiS is located at a mean value of 4.1 by the respondents, while the average voter of the PiS locates him-/herself at 7.2. The party perception of that particular party's voters is located closer to the position of the voters than the general perception. This is in line with theories on projection effects, predicting that voters will place the parties they vote for closer to their own location in the policy space (Grand and Tiemann 2013).

We also calculated the correlation coefficients between self-location and location of the parties supported along the pro/anti EU dimension. Both the correlation between the self-location and the general location of the 'party voted for as perceived by the respondents in general' as well as the correlation between the self-location and the general location of the 'party voted for as perceived specifically by the voter him-/herself' are statistically significant at the 5% level. However, the correlation coefficients are rather small (0.26 and 0.48 respectively), indicating that most of the variance is left unexplained. This suggest that voting for parties that are perceived to be Euroskeptic is to a great extent influenced by factors other than one's attitude toward the EU.

Figures 1-3: Mean Values of Euroskepticism of the Major Parties in Three CEE Countries

(Euroskepticism of voter/of party as perceived by all/of party as perceived by part's voter)







Regression analysis

Table 2 displays the results of three OLS regression models, with the same independent variables, but different dependent variables. For the sake of interpretation, the variables indicating the attitudes toward European integration were re-coded such that higher values reflect stronger Euroskepticism.

In Model 1, we use the respondents' own Euroskepticism as the dependent variable. Interestingly, neither the coefficient for economic Left-Right position nor the coefficient for Left-Right extremism proves to be significant. In line with the theory, we find that higher levels of education and satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country are negatively related to Euroskepticism, which conforms to our theoretical expectations. Not surprisingly, people who place greater trust in the EU than in the national government tend to be less Euroskeptic while those with exclusivist orientations (i.e., opposed to minority rights) are also opposed to European integration. Of the variables indicating protest behavior, the perceived 'sameness' of the main national parties is significant. Although this was expected to be more a factor in explaining voting behavior, it may be indicative of voters' alienation from the political mainstream to which both the domestic party system and by extension the European institutions may be counted.

Model 2 employs 'Euroskepticism of the party voted for as seen by that voter' as the dependent variable. Importantly, as we can see, placing greater trust in the EU than in the national government is no longer significantly when it comes to Euroskeptic voting although it was clearly significant when explaining Euroskeptic attitudes. Moreover, the model indicates that the more people agree with the statement "Politics are controlled by groups who do not represent the people", the more Euroskeptic they are. Together with the 'sameness of parties' variable, two of the three indicators for protest voting are thus significant, supporting our argument about the relationship between domestic protest and Euroskeptic voting. In short, voting for a Euroskeptic party is also connected to the domestic protest motive arguably because many protest parties pursue a variety of mobilization strategies of which Euroskepticism is all but one element.

Model 3 explains the 'Euroskepticism of the party voted for as perceived in general', finding results similar to those of Model 2. However, corruption, generally an important indicator of domestic protest voting, turns out to be significant. We take this as further evidence that protest behavior is indeed an important cause in explaining voting for Euroskeptic parties. By contrast, factors such as education and left-right economic positioning do not seem to matter in the voting decision. Nonetheless, variables like the satisfaction with democracy and the attitude towards minority rights can be taken as indicators of (extremist) national protest voting. By contrast, the only factor in the model that was solely related to perceptions of the EU— the relative trust in EU governance— does not add to explaining Euroskeptic voting behavior. When comparing Models 1 and 3, we can clearly see the difference in factors explaining the adoption of an attitudinal disposition versus the act of

voting for a party. This is evident in the fact that trust in the EU is inversely related to Euroskepticism as one would, of course, expect. Yet, this variable is insignificant when making voting decisions.

Table 2: OLS Regressions Models – Explaining Euroskepticism

	M1 DV: Own Euroscepticism			M2 DV: Euroscepticism of party voted for (as perceived by oneself)			M3 DV: Euroscepticism of party voted for (as generally perceived)		
	Coeff.	SE		Coeff.	SE		Coeff.	SE	
(Intercept)	5.629	(0.435)	***	4.806	(0.477)	***	5.123	(0.180)	***
Economic L-R (0=R, 10=L)	0.020	(0.019)		-0.003	(0.021)		0.001	(0.008)	
Economic L-R extremism	0.001	(0.006)		-0.005	(0.007)		0.003	(0.003)	
Higher Education	-0.295	(0.140)	*	-0.164	(0.154)		-0.101	(0.058)	
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.666	(0.074)	***	-0.465	(0.081)	***	-0.201	(0.031)	***
Trust in EU higher than in nat Gov.	-0.723	(0.133)	***	-0.062	(0.146)		0.024	(0.055)	
Against minority rights	0.127	(0.020)	***	0.082	(0.022)	***	0.036	(0.008)	***
Immigrants threat for security	0.044	(0.067)		0.016	(0.073)		0.029	(0.028)	
Politics run by groups who…	0.000	(0.019)		0.054	(0.021)	*	0.010	(0.008)	
Main parties are all alike	0.075	(0.018)	***	0.091	(0.020)	***	0.023	(0.007)	**
Important problem: corruption	-0.018	(0.082)		-0.027	(0.089)		0.092	(0.034)	**
as.factor(country)Poland	-1.741	(0.162)	***	-1.137	(0.178)	***	-0.555	(0.067)	***
as.factor(country)Slovakia	-0.778	(0.156)	***	-1.181	(0.171)	***	-1.804	(0.065)	***
Adj. R^2	0.278			0.132			0.402		
N	1438			1438			1438		

Note: demographic weights (considering sub-national region, sex, age and education of respondents) applied.

Conclusion

In this paper, we tried to identify the motives behind voting for Euroskeptic parties in Central and Eastern Europe by drawing on novel survey data from Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. We were also interested in the question of whether voting for parties perceived to be Euroskeptic is mainly due the voters' own Euroskeptic attitudes or rather motivated by protest against mainstream parties (when the protest party in question also happens to be – among other things – also Euroskeptic. To answer these questions, we studied whether Euroskeptic attitudes and Euroskeptic voting behavior co-vary and whether the same factors that account for Euroskeptic attitudes also account for Euroskeptic voting behavior. We found that especially the correlation between people's own attitude towards the EU and the generally perceived attitude of the party supported is rather weak. Furthermore, protest behavior has a significant influence – already on Euroskepticism per se, but even more so on Euroskeptic voting

behavior. Hence, our empirical results support the argument that electoral behavior in CEE countries is indeed significantly affected by protest voting whereas Euroskeptic attitudes play a lesser role.

Summing up, who are the Euroskeptics and who are the voters of Euroskeptical parties? These two groups are not necessarily synonymous although we could establish that Euroskeptics vote also for Euroskeptic parties, but so do many others for reasons of domestic protest. For one, the Euroceptics are less likely to be Polish or Slovak, more exclusivist (nativist) in orientation, somewhat less educated, and unhappy about the state of democracy. The voters of Euroskeptic parties share many (but not all) of these motives but are additionally motivated by their protest attitudes. As such we have tried to shed some light on the Euroskeptic voter and the parties chosen ostensibly for their Euroskepticism. At least this research suggests that caution is warranted when electoral success of Euroskeptic parties in Central and Eastern Europe is summarily interpreted as yet another indictment of the European Union and its politics.

Literature

Abts, Koen, Heerwegh, Dirk, & Swyngedouw, Marc 2009, 'Sources of Euroscepticism: Utilitarian Interest, Social Distrust, National Identity and Institutional Distrust', World Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1-26.

Albertazzi, Daniele & McDonnell, Duncan 2008, Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, Palgrave Macmillan, New York and London.

Nicola Bücker & Tuuli-Marja Kleine 2015. "Cues oder Performanz? "Zeitschrift für vergleichende Politikwissenschaft (forthcoming).

Barlei, Melani & Hartleb, Florian 2010, 'Quellen des Vertrauens in die Europäische Union'Rechtsextremismus als Posttransformationsphänomen - der Fall Ungarn', Totalitarismus und Demokratie vol. 7, no.1, pp. 83-104.

Batory, Agnes 2008a, The Politics of EU Accession: Ideology, Party Strategy and the European Question in Hungary, Manchester University Press, Machester.

Beichelt, T. 2004, Die Europäische Union nach der Osterweiterung, UTB für Wissenschaft, Stuttgart, Germany.

Betz, Hans-Georg 1994, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, MacMillan, Basingstoke.

Boomgarden, Hajo H. G., Schuck, A.R.T Andreas, Elenbaas, Matthijs & De Vreese, Claes 2011, 'Mapping EU attitudes. Conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support', European Union Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 241–266.

Braun, Daniela, and Markus Tausendpfund (2014). The Impact of the Euro Crisis on Citizens' Support for the European Union. Journal of European Integration 36 (3): 231-245.

Bücker, Nicola / Kleiner, Tuuli-Marja: Cues oder Performanz? Quellen des Vertrauens in die Europäische Union. In: Steinbrecher, Markus u.a. (Hrsg.): Europa in der Krise? Öffentliche Meinung,

politische Einstellungen und politisches Verhalten im Mehrebenensystem der EU. Sonderheft der Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, Online First.

Canovan, Margaret 1981, Populism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York and London.

Conti, Nicoló & Verzichelli, Luca 2002, 'The European Dimension of political discourse in Italy. A Longitudinal Analysis of Party Preferences (1950-2001)', CIRCA Working Paper no. 12.

De Vries, Catherine E. & Van Keersbergen, Kees, 2007, 'Interests, Identity and Political Allegiance in the European Union', ActaPolitica, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 307-328.

Decker, Frank 2000, Parteien unter Druck; Der neue Rechtspopulismus in den westlichen Demokratien, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, Germany.

Ehrlich, Sean & Maestas, Cherie D. 2010, 'Risk Orientation, Risk Exposure, and Policy Opinions. The Case of Free Trade', Political Psychology, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 657-684.

Eurobarometer 79.1: Public Opinion in the European Union -- Standard Eurobarometer 79 / Spring 2013 – TNS opinion & social Available from: https://dilemmaxdotnet.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/standard-eurobarometer-79-spring-2013.pdf

Feldman, Stanley & Stenner, Karen 1997, 'Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism', Political Psychology, vol. 18, no. 4, 741-770.

Follesdal, Andreas & Hix, Simon (2006). Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik. Journal of Common Market Studies 44(3): 533-62.

Gabel, Matthew, and Kenneth Scheve (2007). Mixed Messages: Party Dissent and Mass Opinion on European Integration. European Union Politics 8 (1): 37-59.

Gałązka, Marta & Waszak, Marcin 2013, 'From Alternative Politics to the Mainstream: The Case of the Palikot's Movement' in Alternative Politics. The rise of new political parties in Central Europe, eds Mesežnikov, Grigorij, Gyárfášková, Olga & Bútorová, Zora, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava.

Grabbe, Heather & Hughes, Kirsty 1999, 'Central and East European Views on EU enlargement: Political Debates and Public Opinion' in Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, Karen Henderson, UCL Press, London/Philadelphia.

Harmsen Robert & Spiering, Menno 2004, 'Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate' in Euroscepiticism. Party politics, national identity and European integration, eds ibid., European Studies 20, Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam/New York.

Heinisch, Reinhard 2003, 'Success in Opposition -- Failure in Government: Exploring the Performance of the Austrian Freedom Party and other European Right-wing Populist Parties in Public Office', West European Politics, vol. 269, pp. 91-130.

Heinisch, Reinhard (2015). "Returning to Europe: Between Europhilia and Euroscepticism in East European Party Politics." In, The Routledge History of East Central Europe since 1700. Arpad Stephan Klimo, Irina Livezeanu (eds.), Routledge, London (forthcoming December).

Henderson, Karen 2008, 'Exceptionalism or Convergence? Euroscepticism and Party Systems in Central and Eastern Europe', in Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, eds Szczerbiak, Aleks & Taggart, Paul, Vol. 2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford University, Oxford/New York, pp. 103-126.

Hloušek, Vit & Kopeček, Lubomír 2008, 'Cleavages in the Contemporary Czech and Slovak Politics between Persistence and Change', in: East European Politics & Societies vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 518-552.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Marks, Gary, & Wilson, Carole 2002, 'Does Left/Right structure party positions on European integration?', Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, pp. 155-175.

Hooghe, Liesbet & Marks, Gary 2008, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', in: British Journal of Political Science vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 1-23.

Hug, Simon 2002, Voices of Europe. Citizens, Referendums, and European Integration, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham.

Ignazi, Piero 1996, 'The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties', Party Politics vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 549-66.

Jost, John T., Kruglanski, Arie W., Glaser, Jack & Sulloway Frank J. 2003, 'Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, Psychological Bulletin, vol. 129, no. 3, pp. 339-375.

Jungerstam-Mulders, Susanne, (ed.) 2006, Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 147-175.

Kaufmann, Bruno & M. Dane Waters 2004, Direct democracy in Europe. A comprehensive reference guide to the initiative and referendum process in Europe, Carolina Academic Press, Durham.

Kaniok, Petr 2009, 'Party Based Euroscpeticism: Opposing the Commission or the European Integration?', Contemporary European Studies 2, pp. 25-45.

Kitschelt, Herbert 1995, The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.

Kitschelt, Herbert, Mansfeldova, Zdenka, Markowski, Radoslaw & Tóka, Gabor 1999, Post–Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Kopecký, Petr & Mudde, Cas 2002, 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions in European Integration in East Central Europe', in: European Union Politics vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 297-326.

Krouwel, André & Abts, Koen 2007, 'Varieties of Euroscepticism and Populist Mobilization: Transforming Attitudes from Mild Euroscepticism to Harsh Eurocynism', Acta Politica vol. 42, pp. 252-270.

Laclau, Ernesto 2005, On Populist Reason, Verso, London.

Leconte, Cécile 2010, Understanding Euroscepticism. Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Lubbers, Marcel & Scheepers, Peer 2010, 'Divergent trends of Euroscepticism in countries and regions of the European Union', European Journal of Political Research, vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 787–817.

Mayer, Gregor 2010. "Ungarn", in: ibd. and Bernhard Odehnal: Aufmarsch. Die rechte Gefahr aus Osteuropa, Salzburg: Residenz Verlag: 17-102.

McLaren, Lauren 2002, 'Public Support for the European Union.Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural threat?', The Journal of Politics, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 551–566.

McLaren, Lauren 2007, 'Explaining Mass Level Euroscepticism.Identity, Intersts, and Institutional Distrust', Acta Politica, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 233–251.

Mesežnikov, Grigorij, Gyárfášková, Olga & Bútorová, Zora (eds.) 2013, Alternative Politics. The rise of new political parties in Central Europe, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, pp. 195-222.

Michael Minkenberg, (ed.) 2010, Historical Legacies and the radical Right in Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe, Ibidem, Stuttgart.

Mudde, Cas 2004, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 542–563.

Mudde, Cas 1996, ‘The Paradox of the Anti-Party’, Party Politics vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 265-76.

Mudde, Cas 2007, Populist radical right Parties in Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Mudde, Cas & Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.) 2012, Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Nail, Paul R. & McGregor, Ian 2009, ‘Conservative Shift among Liberals and Conservatives Following 9/11’, Social Justice Research, vol. 22, no. 2-3, pp. 231-240.

Orbán, Victor in: Stier, Gabor 2011, Prime Minister Orbán: “We will not allow Brussels dictating us their terms”, European Dialogue, April 2011. Available from: http://eurodialogue.org/eastern-partnership/Prime-Minister-Orbàn-We-Will-Not-Allow-Brussels-Dictating-Us-Their-Terms. [1 June 2013].

Riishøj, Søren 2007, ‘Europeanization and Euroscepticism: Experiences from Poland and the Czech Republic’, in: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 503-535.

Rybář, Marek 2006, ‘Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia’ in Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems, ed Jungerstam-Mulders, Susanne, Ashgate, Aldershot,

Schoen, Harald 2007, ‘Personality Traits and Foreign Policy Attitudes in German Public Opinion’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 408-430.

Sørensen, Catharina 2008, 'Love me, love me not... 'A typology of public euroscepticism. EPERN Working Paper No 19. Available from: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-working-paper-19.pdf.

Steunenberg, Barnad & Dimitrova, Antoneta 2007, ‘Compliance in the EU enlargement process: The limits of conditionality’, in: European Integration online Papers, vol. 11, pp. 1-18.

Szczerbiak, Aleks 2006, ‘Power without Love? Patterns of Party Politics in Post-1989 Poland’ in Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems, ed Jungerstam-Mulders, Susanne, Ashgate, Aldershot.

Szczerbiak, Aleks & Taggart Paul, (eds.) 2008, ‘Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism’, Vol. 2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford University, Oxford/New York, pp.103-126.

Szczerbiak, Aleks & Taggart, Paul 2008b, ‘Theorizing Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality’ in Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, eds ibid.

Taggart, Paul 1998, ‘A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 368.

Taggart, Paul 2000, Populism, Open University Press, Buckingham, UK.

Vachudova, Milada & Hooghe, Liesbet 2009, ‘Postcommunist Politics in a Magnetic Field: How Transition and EU Accession Structure Party Competition on European Integration’, in: Comparative European Politics vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 179-212.

Wagschal, Uwe 2007, ’Direktdemokratie und europäische Integration’ in Direkte Demokratie. Bestandsaufnahmen und Wirkungen im internationalen Vergleich, eds Freitag, Markus & Wagschal, Uwe, Lit Verlag, Berlin, pp. 41-70.

Weßels, Bernhard 2009, ’Spielarten des Euroskeptizismus’ in Die Verfassung Europas. Perspektiven des Integrationsprojekts, eds Decker, Frank & Marcus Höreth, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, pp. 50-68.

Wysocka, Olga 2009, ‘Populism in Poland: In/visible Exclusion’ in Freeman, Lauren (ed.) 2009, ‘In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion’, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences, Vol. 26.

Zaller, John R 1992, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zapryanova, Galina 2010, Looks Can Be Deceiving: Explaining Euroscepticism in Central and East Europe, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh.