

### Graduates (MA Philosophy) 2021

Name /date of graduation /Supervisor	Title /abstract of thesis
<b>Nina Abesadze</b>  April 28, 2021 Brett Topey / Julien Murzi	<b>The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism and the Expected Utility Objection</b>  The main aim of this dissertation is to evaluate a novel objection against the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism – the expected utility objection, that has been first put forward by Hedden (2013) and further discussed by Wroński & Godziszewski (2017); Wroński (2018), and Pettigrew (2019). My overall conclusion is that the objection is unsuccessful, but it is unsuccessful in an illuminative way. Understanding why the objection fails gives valuable insights into the nature and scope of the Dutch Book Argument. Specifically, I argue that the Dutch Book Argument is an <i>argument by interpretation</i> (Williamson 2010): we interpret or explicate a vague, imprecise concept of rational degree of belief in terms of a formally precise concept of fair betting quotient. The betting interpretation of degree of belief, together with a formal result, the so-called Ramsey-de Finetti theorem, establish that rational degree of belief should satisfy the axioms of probability. Understanding the Dutch Book Argument as an argument by interpretation shows that expected utility theory is not in tension with the betting interpretation of degree of belief.

<b>Jonathan Parnell</b>  Juli 1, 2021 Patricia Palacios	<b>Addressing the measurement problem as a wave function realist</b>  This thesis investigates wave function realism and its compatibility with the GRW, Bohmian and Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics. A novel, technical, argument is provided against the compatibility of wave function realism and the GRW interpretation. I will argue that the GRW interpretation's claim that the wave function deviates from the Schrödinger equation blocks the wave function realists' explanation of 3D appearances. Building on the work of Brown and Wallace (2005), I further argue that the Bohmian interpretation merely adds redundancies onto the Everettian interpretation, particularly within the context of wave function realism. In turn, I conclude that the Everettian interpretation is the most well-suited interpretation to be paired with wave function realism, and further inspect such an account.
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<b>Fabian Zapf</b>  September 29, 2021 Alexander Hieke	<b>Hat der Idealismus Platz in einem wissenschaftlich geprägten Weltbild? — Ein Versuch der Modernisierung klassischer Ideen der Ontologie</b>  Idealism is not dead. It is a position that has fallen into disrepute due to many misunderstandings. It had to thrive on breeding grounds which, over large sections of the history of philosophy, were largely of a physicalistic nature. The present work clarifies common misunderstandings and defends the Panpsychistic Absolute Idealism developed by Timothy Sprigge as a
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	<p>contemporary idealistic position. My defense is based on two arguments. First, I show that only an ontological monism is defensible. That being established, two positions remain which are diametrically opposed to each other. According to physicalism, everything that exists is fundamentally physical. According to idealism, on the other hand, the basic substance of all existing things is of a spiritual and thus non-physical nature. However, physicalism cannot solve the mind-body problem and furthermore cannot grasp the essential aspect of consciousness (sc. qualia). Idealism, on the other hand, copes with the mind-body problem. In addition, consciousness is our most immediate epistemic access to the world. Idealism is therefore to be preferred as an ontological theory. Panpsychistic Absolute Idealism is superior to classical idealistic theories in that it is able to explain the extent to which physical things can exist even though they are not consciously perceived by any subject. This makes it necessary to abandon the assumption of the intrinsic duality of the perceptual process. Physical things in this sense exist as non-perceived, spiritual entities in the form of interacting streams of consciousness, which all form part of the absolute.</p>
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<p><b>Stanley Barrett Johnson</b></p> <p>September 29, 2021 Johannes Brandl</p>	<p><b>Factualism and Factual Teleologism: Novel Views in the Philosophy of Action and Cognitive Science</b></p> <p>This thesis focuses on two novel and orthodox-challenging views within fields that, while seemingly far apart in terms of methodology, terminology and subject matter, nevertheless inform each other a great deal. The first is the position of factualism within the philosophy of action, specifically located within the debate about the correct ontological categorisation of practical reasons, the practical reasons debate. This position has sparked another novel view in the Theory of Mind debate, where conceptions of agents as acting on the basis of belief-desire pairs has shaped debate and theorising since cognitive science's inception, as can be seen in the traditional theory-theory versus simulation-theory paradigm.</p> <p>How much support can a factualist practical reasons account provide for a factual teleological account in the Theory of Mind debate? This is the main question I try to answer in this thesis. Such a task, while interesting and worthwhile in its own right, can also be seen as an exercise in making explicit the oft overlooked ties which bind higher-level empirically-informed fields to their more fundamental and a priori-led philosophical bases. For while, from the heights of empirical research, the philosopher of action's a priori reasoning and Anscombian focus on the conceptual truths derivable from an examination of our natural-language use may seem strange and unreliable strategies indeed, they do, at root, provide the foundations empirical research is built upon; and, what's more, while from the armchair the occasional lack of conceptual rigor in empirical work can seem to sully the results thereby derived, the findings can still have the power to drive conceptual reformation. In short, I aim with this paper to show the mutual benefits the interplay between lower- and higher-level fields can produce, as the one refines the other and vice versa, as well as advocating certain elements of the unorthodox positions of factualism and factual teleologism.</p>
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